

# MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

June, 1948

DON A. MCKENZIE. <i>Otfridiana: Some Comments on Otfrid's "Style"</i> . . . . .	131
DETLEV W. SCHUMANN. <i>Neuorientierung im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Schluss)</i> . . . . .	135
S. D. STIRK. <i>Gerhart Hauptmann's Play 'Die Finsternisse'</i>	146
GEORGES MAY. <i>La Genèse de 'Bajazet'</i> . . . . .	152
DONALD F. BROWN. <i>The Catholic Naturalism of Manuel Gálvez</i> . . . . .	165
IRVING RIBNER. <i>Bolingbroke, a True Machiavellian</i> . . . . .	177
G. BLAKEMORE EVANS. <i>A Correction to "Some More Hobson Verses"</i> . . . . .	184
SCOTT ELLEDGE. <i>Cowley's Ode 'Of Wit' and Longinus on the Sublime: A Study of One Definition of the Word "Wit"</i> . . . . .	185
WILLIAM BLACKBURN. <i>Bishop Butler and the Design of Arnold's 'Literature and Dogma'</i> . . . . .	199
ERNEST BOLL. <i>A Rationale for the Criticism of the Realistic Novel</i> . . . . .	208
RUFUS A. COLEMAN. <i>Trowbridge and Clemens</i> . . . . .	216
JOHN J. PARRY. <i>A Bibliography of Critical Arthurian Literature for the Year 1947</i> . . . . .	224
REVIEWS . . . . .	238
BOOKS RECEIVED . . . . .	254

Volume Nine

Number Two

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS  
SEATTLE

# MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

Edited by

EDWARD GODFREY COX  
*Managing Editor*

DUDLEY D. GRIFFITH

CURTIS C. D. VAIL

GEORGE W. UMPIREY

*Direct Contributions and Business Correspondence to*  
Managing Editor, Modern Language Quarterly  
Parrington Hall  
University of Washington  
Seattle 5

Subscription price \$2.00 per year • Single copies \$0.75  
Issued in March, June, September, December

Entered as second-class matter May 6, 1940, at the post office at Seattle, Washington,  
under the Act of March 3, 1879

PRINTED IN U. S. A.







# MODERN LANGUAGE QUARTERLY

Volume Nine

June, 1948

Number Two

## ARTICLES

Don A. McKenzie. <i>Otfridiana: Some Comments on Otfrid's "Style"</i> . . . . .	131
Detlev W. Schumann. <i>Neuorientierung im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Schluß)</i> . . . . .	135
S. D. Stirk. <i>Gerhart Hauptmann's Play "Die Finsternisse"</i> . . . . .	146
Georges May. <i>La Genèse de Bajazet</i> . . . . .	152
Donald F. Brown. <i>The Catholic Naturalism of Manuel Gálvez</i> . . . . .	165
Irving Ribner. <i>Bolingbroke, a True Machiavellian</i> . . . . .	177
G. Blakemore Evans. <i>A Correction to "Some More Hobson Verses"</i> . . . . .	184
Scott Elledge. <i>Cowley's Ode "Of Wit" and Longinus on the Sublime: A Study of One Definition of the Word "Wit"</i> . . . . .	185
William Blackburn. <i>Bishop Butler and the Design of Arnold's Literature and Dogma</i> . . . . .	199
Ernest Boll. <i>A Rationale for the Criticism of the Realistic Novel</i> . . . . .	208
Rufus A. Coleman. <i>Trowbridge and Clemens</i> . . . . .	216
John J. Parry. <i>A Bibliography of Critical Arthurian Literature for the Year 1947</i> . . . . .	224

## REVIEWS

"Altdutsche Übungstexte" [ <i>Carroll E. Reed</i> ] . . . . .	238
Christian F. Melz. <i>An Evaluation of the Earliest German Translation of Don Quixote</i> [ <i>Lienhard Bergel</i> ] . . . . .	239
Trusten Wheeler Russell. <i>Voltaire, Dryden and Heroic Tragedy</i> [ <i>Baxter Hathaway</i> ] . . . . .	241
Albert Grenier. <i>Camille Jullian: Un demi-siècle de science historique et de progrès français, 1880-1930</i> [ <i>Jean David</i> ] . . . . .	242

Myles Dillon. The Cycles of the Kings [ <i>Roland M. Smith</i> ] . . .	243
Edwin Johnston Howard (editor). Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man, by Sir Thomas Elyot [ <i>John Leon Lievsey</i> ] . . . . .	245
Lawrence B. Wallis. Fletcher, Beaumont & Company [ <i>G. F. Sensabaugh</i> ] . . . . .	246
Aleyn Lyell Reade. Johnsonian Gleanings: Part X, Johnson's Early Life, The Final Narrative [ <i>Bertrand H. Bronson</i> ] . . .	247
Northrop Frye. Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake [ <i>Henry Wasser</i> ] . . . . .	248
Gordon N. Ray (editor). The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray [ <i>Sophus K. Winther</i> ] . . .	249
Babette May Levy. Preaching in the First Half of New Eng- land Church History [ <i>Helen C. White</i> ] . . . . .	250
William Peirce Randel. Edward Eggleston, Author of the Hoosier School-Master [ <i>Benjamin T. Spencer</i> ] . . . . .	251
Charles R. Anderson (general editor). Sidney Lanier: Centen- nial Edition [ <i>E. Harold Eby</i> ] . . . . .	253
Books Received . . . . .	254

OTFRIDIANA  
SOME COMMENTS ON OTFRID'S "STYLE"

By DON A. MCKENZIE

In a monograph<sup>1</sup> on the relation of Otfrid's *Evangel Harmony* to its Vulgate sources the present writer attempted to show the extent to which Otfrid was bound in his narration of the life of Christ by the necessity of elucidating the original at the same time that he was attempting to reproduce in Old High German the biblical narrative. While for Otfrid the words and incidents of the Latin story had all the self-evident reality which we attach to the sensible world about us, he still seemed to be interested in carefully interpreting the well-known words of the Vulgate source for his lay and monastic fellows who did not possess his special knowledge.<sup>2</sup> It was, we assume, this interest in interpretation that forced Otfrid to adopt the halting, repetitious, and loquacious "style" which has often been decried by literary historians seeking narrative and imaginative qualities which Otfrid could have had no intention of supplying.

Was Otfrid incapable, then, of writing in a straightforward manner? Was he as perpetually cramped and cautious as he appears to be in the "narrative" chapters of his *Evangel Harmony*? If he feels compelled to elucidate as well as to narrate the events of the Vulgate he is rendering, can we expect him to exhibit those personal qualities or that direct and compelling manner which are usually associated with "style"? May we not, rather, expect that, like any interpreter, he will waver between narration and explanation, between exposition and interpretation, dropping all pretense of style in his endeavor to fulfill the multiple function to which his training and his purpose impel him?

The impression of repetitiousness and confusion which is invariably connected with Otfrid's handling of the narrative passages, however, all but vanishes when we turn to those chapters entitled "Mystice" or "Spiritualiter." Here our author is writing, so to speak, on his own, unhampered by the need of following his source word for word or of interpreting as he narrates. Here the careful reader cannot fail to be aware of a definite lightening of the atmosphere: Otfrid apparently feels free to present his thoughts and feelings as they come, bound always, of course, by the reins of monastic discipline. The pettiness which we, perhaps wrongly, associate with the monkish Schoolman almost disappears; the constriction of involuted thought is released; we feel a certain forward drive, a resolution of developing ideas, a relatively invigorating freshness of expression alien to the narrative and interpretative passages based on the sacred Vulgate.

<sup>1</sup> Donald A. McKenzie, *Otfrid von Weissenburg: Narrator or Commentator?* (Stanford University Press, 1946).

<sup>2</sup> It must have meant much in those days to have studied with the "master," Hrabanus Maurus of Fulda!

This difference in expression may be best illustrated by a comparative analysis of the progression of thought as found in certain characteristic narrative passages and in those passages where Otfrid feels no compunction to follow a sacred source. Let us consider first, by way of example, Otfrid's Old High German expansion of Matt. 2:14:

(qui consurgens accepit puerum) et matrem ejus nocte et secessit in Aegyptum. . . .

# I, 19, 13-17:

Er fuar sar théra ferti	náhtes mit giwúrti,
thaz íz ni wurti mári	joh baz firhólan wari;
Er ouh baz ingiangi	siu wáfan ni bifiangi,
bi thiú was er so éracar	joh hártó filu wáchar.
Siu fúart er, noh ni dúalta,	in lánt, thaz ih nu zálta; . . .

At first glance these lines appear merely to offer a somewhat expanded rendition of the Latin. Closer examination reveals, however, that Otfrid (unconsciously, perhaps) is focusing his attention on the single word *nocte* of the Latin original; for him this implied an unnatural haste in flight. The half-line, 13a, serves, according to this view, merely as an apt introduction to the subjunctives of purpose which follow and which, in point of fact, constitute Otfrid's explanation of *why* Joseph fled immediately. This reason was, from the positive point of view, "that the flight might not be known" (14a), or, negatively, "that it might remain concealed" (14b). And, to proceed by a sort of "slow-footed" logic, this concealment was necessary "in order that he might escape" (15a), or, to be more specific, "that the armed men might not catch them" (15b). Then we are reminded that this was the reason that Joseph was up so early and was so very vigilant: *bi thiú was er so éracar joh hártó filu wáchar*. And as if Joseph's vigilance had not already been sufficiently emphasized, we have in 17a the final reminder: *noh ni dúalta* "nor did he tarry"! This breakdown should illustrate the manner in which Otfrid's style was conditioned and hampered by the necessity he felt to expand and interpret the actions of the biblical characters.

Otfrid's penchant for interpretation as well as his assumption, on occasion, that his readers know something about the incidents to be related seems to inject into many of his renditions a sort of vacillating loquaciousness. This may be illustrated by his rendition of John 6:1:

. . . abiit Jesus trans mare Galilaeae. 2. et sequebatur eum multitudo magna.

# III, 6, 1-10:

Tház ih hiar nu zéllu,	thaz weiz thiú wórolt ellu,
wúntar filu mároz	joh thrato séltsanaz,
Wio krist nam fínf leiba	joh zuene fiska tharazua,
fon thén gab follon múases	fínf thúsonton mánnes.

Fuar drúhtin inti sine	úbar einan lántse;
thio búah iz thar zéllent	joh Galiléa iz nennent.
Bi manegemo séltsane	joh wúntoron zi wáre
fuár imo thar ingégini	mihil wóroltmenigi.
Unfirsлагan héri in war	fúar ingegin imo thar,
worolt mihil, so gizám,	wib inti gómmán.

Here, in the lines introducing a new chapter, Otfrid, instead of launching into his subject as he does in the "Mystice" and "Spiritualiter," feels obliged to warn his reader that he is about to recount a well-known story. Apparently in his times, as in ours, the dispenser of food made good copy and was well advertised. So, like a good journalist, Otfrid gives us in his introductory lines a brief résumé of the pertinent facts; the details are to follow! Only after this résumé are we informed of Christ's actions, and even here there are suspicious indications that what we are reading is "scholarly explanation." Essentially, we are informed, not that Christ sailed over Galilee, but that Galilee was a "lake": *Fuar drúhtin inti sine úbar einan lántse*. Moreover, Otfrid stops in his narration to mention that the books (*biblia*=sacred books) name this lake "Galilee": *joh Galiléa iz nennent*. He then expands the simple Latin term, *signa*, in an explanatory fashion, and underlines the cause of the concurrence: *Bi manegemo séltsane joh wúntoron zi wáre*= "because of many strange things, and wonders, in truth." And, finally, throughout three lines of narrative he expatiates on the size of the *multitudo* (III, 6, 8-10). It is obvious that an author who feels obliged to indulge in such interpretations and/or expansions of his original can hardly be expected to exhibit those qualities normally associated with a personal style.

Let us turn now to certain passages excerpted from the "Mystice" and "Spiritualiter," where our poet was unhampered by the need to follow a sacred source. Bearing in mind always that Otfrid was no Walther, we may here still find evidence of a direct, spirited, and personal mode of expression, and this even when Otfrid may appear to be only a translator, for our first example (I, 2, 1-6) is, according to Erdmann,<sup>2</sup> based on the Psalms (and as such, it may be remarked, does not form part of the "Life of Christ"). The lines of the Psalms are eternally apt, and leave our poet free to render them without comment:

Wola drúhtin mín,	já bin ih scálc thin,
thiu arma múater mín	eigan thiu ist si thin!
Fingar thinan	dua anan münd minan,
theni ouh hánt thina	in thia zúngun mina,
Thaz ih lób thinaz	si lútentaz,
giburt súnas thines,	drúhtines mines; . . .

Here we find none of the repetitiousness encountered in the narrative sections. Otfrid acknowledges his allegiance to God: *já bin ih scálc thin*; his mother is, after all, God's own (His serf in heaven?). He prays that God may touch his mouth and move his tongue that it

<sup>2</sup> O. Erdmann, *Otfrids Evangelienbuch* (Halle-Saale, 1882), p. 343.

may be loud in His praise and in that of the birth of His son, Otfrid's Lord. And so the OHG continues, aptly and succinctly listing point after point of Otfrid's proposed subject: Christ's mission, *wio ér bigonda brédigon*; His very words, *thero sínero worto*; the miracles He worked in which we even now rejoice, *Joh zéichan, thiú er déda tho, thes wir bírun nu so fró*. . . Here, we must admit, is none of that hesitant caution which we associate with so much of Otfrid. Here he writes as he thinks and feels, guided and restrained only by the purpose of the task he has set himself.

This directness of expression may be matched in many other passages from the chapters entitled "Spiritualiter," coupled on occasion with flashes of imagination and the verity of deep religious feeling; for example, the passage inspired by the *Dies Irae* (V, 19, 1-10):

Thes habet er ubar wóroltring	giméinit einaz dágathing,
thíng filu hébigaz,	zi sorganne éigun wir bi thaz.
Thir zéllu ih híar ubarlút:	nist nihéinig siner drút,
thes álleswio biginne,	ni er quéme zi themo thinge.
Quément thara ouh thánne	thie wénegun álle,
thie híar gidatun fóllon	then iro múatwillon.
Zi zéllenne ist iz suári;	nist ther fon wibe quami
(es irquimit muat min),	nub er thár sculi sin;
Ni sie sculin hértion	thar iro dáti renton
al io giwísso umbiring;	theist filu jámarlichaz thing!

Here every addition, every variation, has its point. The *dágathing* is, in truth, a *thíng filu hébigaz*; in consequence none of God's children may avoid it; *nist nihéinig siner drút, thes álleswio biginne, ni er quéme zi themo thinge*. And those poor wretches among us who have followed their own inclinations (not the will of God) shall be present too: *Quément thara ouh thánne thie wénegun álle, thie híar gidatun fóllon then iro múatwillon*. Indeed, all men born of woman shall be present to give account: *nist ther fon wibe quami . . . nub er thár sculi sin*. How right that Otfrid should close this introduction to his description of Judgment Day with the heartfelt words: *theist filu jámarlichaz thing!* This is almost powerful writing, powerful by its subject matter and by the presentation. The logical steps are apt, the implications for man are deeply felt.

In those chapters of the *Evangel Harmony* not based directly on the New Testament sources, there are many passages where Otfrid demonstrates his ability, as above, to write straightforward and even forceful verse. It is our contention that our judgment of his capacity for expression should not be based on his limping, interpretative manner of writing as usually encountered in the strictly narrative chapters of the poem. A sympathetic reading of those sections of his work where he felt free to express the commonplaces of his time or his own ideas and feelings will inspire in us a somewhat higher estimate of Otfrid's mentality and ability than has been transmitted by our standard literary historians.

University of New Mexico

## NEUORIENTIERUNG IM ACHTZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERT

(Schluß)

VON DETLEV W. SCHUMANN

Wenn bei Schlosser die innere Zartheit tief unter der rauhen, ja starren Oberfläche verborgen ist, so liegt bei seinem und Lavaters Freund Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi die unendlich sensible Organisation klar zu Tage. In Friedrich Perthes' Lebensbeschreibung tritt er uns entgegen als Persönlichkeit, an der alles "gewählt und doch natürlich" erscheint. Christoph Heinrich Pfaff, der Kieler Naturwissenschaftler, beschreibt ihn als "Philosophen und feinen Weltmann in harmonischer Verbindung." Der dänische Diplomat Johann Georg Rist endlich nennt ihn "den Gentleman unter den Philosophen . . . edel von Gesinnung und so zart von Gefühl, so fein von Takt, daß ein leiser Grad von Verzärtelung in seiner nächsten Umgebung gehahnet werden mochte." In der Tat war Jacobi überfeinert; es fehlt in seinem Bild nicht an Hypochondrie und Selbstmitleid. Und doch hat er ein durch Veranlagung und Zeitumstände seelisch nicht leichtes Leben tapfer durchlebt; seine Tapferkeit war seine unbedingte geistige Redlichkeit.

Was wissen wir aber gewöhnlich von dem Mann, der auf seine Mitlebenden solchen persönlichen Eindruck machte, von dem Manne ferner, von dem Steffens erklärt, daß er, unbeschadet seiner Schwächen, "mächtiger als irgendein anderer seiner Zeit den Keim tiefer geistiger Selbsttätigkeit in den schlummernden Gemütern zu beleben vermochte," und von dem selbst der schroff überkritische Barthold Niebuhr bezeugt, daß "sein Umgang wie der keines andern bildend" war?

Wir erinnern uns, daß er zwei Romane geschrieben hat, den *Allwill* und den *Woldemar*, die bei den Literaturhistorikern gewöhnlich wenig Anklang gefunden haben. Und wir erinnern uns seiner problematischen Freundschaft mit Goethe, der ja auch dem Schriftsteller Jacobi im allgemeinen eher kritisch als anerkennend gegenüberstand.

Werfen wir zunächst einen Blick auf dies letztgenannte Verhältnis. Nachdem recht kühle Beziehungen vorausgegangen waren, flammte die Freundschaft im Jahre 1774 bei der ersten persönlichen Begegnung hell auf. Noch nach fast vierzig Jahren lebte in Jacobi die Erinnerung an jene Tage, als wären sie eben gewesen:

Ich hoffe, Du vergisdest . . . [im dritten Teil von *Dichtung und Wahrheit*] nicht des Jabachschen Hauses, des Schlosses zu Bensberg und der Laube, in der Du über Spinoza, mir so unvergeßlich, sprachst; des Saals in dem Gasthofe zum Geist, wo wir über das Siebengebirg den Mond heraufsteigen sahen, wo Du in der Dämmerung auf dem Tische sitzend uns die Romanze "Es war ein Buhle frech genu[n]g"—und andere hersagtest. . . . Welche Stunden! Welche Tage!—Um Mitternacht suchtest Du mich noch im Dunkeln auf—mir wurde wie eine neue Seele. Von dem Augenblick an konnte ich Dich nicht mehr lassen.



Und im berausenden Gefühl des immer siegreicher vordringenden Bundes stürmischer Jugend schrieb Goethe kurz nach der Begegnung:

Ich träume, lieber Fritz, den Augenblick, habe Deinen Brief und schwebe um Dich. Du hast gefühlt, daß es mir Wonne war, Gegenstand Deiner Liebe zu sein.—O das ist herrlich, daß jeder glaubt, mehr vom andern zu empfangen, als er gibt! . . . Glaub' mir, wir könnten von nun an stumm gegeneinander sein, uns dann nach Zeiten wieder treffen, und uns wär's, als wären wir Hand in Hand gegangen.

Aber ihre Wege sollten sich dann doch trennen. Gerade Spinoza, auf den Jacobi Goethe hingewiesen hatte, sollte zwischen sie treten. In den frühen Weimarer Jahren wandte sich Goethe mehr und mehr dem (oder jedenfalls: seinem) Spinozismus zu, Jacobi aber bewunderte Spinoza—und haßte ihn doch, denn er selbst suchte den persönlichen, den überweltlichen Gott. Darüber kam es immer wieder zu Auseinandersetzungen. Goethe, der im Beschauen von Gott-Natur Genüge fand, sah in Jacobis metaphysischem Verlangen einen Fluch, einen Pfahl im Fleisch, und noch im Jahre 1812 stellte er in seinem Gedicht über die Diana der Epheser Jacobis Schrift *Von den göttlichen Dingen* seinen eigenen Glauben entgegen. Es war eine krisenreiche Freundschaft, in der Jacobi als der Werbende, Goethe zurückhaltender erscheint. Doch auch er gesteht gerade um die Zeit jenes letzten offenen Ausbruchs der Meinungsverschiedenheit:

Die Divergenz zwischen uns beiden war schon früh genug bemerklich, und wir können uns Glück wünschen, wenn die Hoffnung, sie, selbst bei zunehmendem Auseinanderstreben, durch Neigung und Liebe immer wieder ausgeglichen zu sehen, nicht unerfüllt geblieben ist.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi wurde 1743 in Düsseldorf geboren, in jener pietistischen Atmosphäre des Niederrheins, aus der auch Tersteegen hervorgegangen war. Ein sensibles, religiös erregtes, äußerlich gehemmtes Kind, das zunächst als wenig begabt und wenig strebsam galt. Sohn eines Kaufmanns, machte er eine höchst unglückliche kaufmännische Lehrzeit durch. Drei Jahre in Genf brachten geistige Befreiung und körperliche Kräftigung. Er übernahm auf kurze Zeit die väterliche Firma, dann wurde er auf Grund volkswirtschaftlicher Schriften in die kurfürstliche Regierung in Düsseldorf berufen. Später machte die Heirat mit einer reichen Frau, die übrigens allzu früh starb, es ihm möglich, ganz für seine philosophischen und literarischen Interessen zu leben und seinen Landsitz Pempelfort zu einem geistigen Mittelpunkt für ganz Deutschland zu gestalten, zu einem Sammelplatz, wie Nadler sagt, für die erhaltenden und rettenden Gedanken der Zeit. Dort besuchten ihn Hamann und die Fürstin Gallitzin, Goethe, Herder und Friedrich Leopold Stolberg. In der Französischen Revolution floh auch er nach Holstein, zu dessen religiös-literarischen Kreisen er schon vorher enge Beziehungen hatte. Im innig geliebten Eutin fand er Ersatz für die verlorene Heimat. Im



Jahre 1804 an die Akademie der Wissenschaften in München berufen, verbrachte er dort seinen Lebensabend. Er starb 1819.

Es ist wahr, daß Jacobi zwei Romane als solche nicht durchgeformt sind. Das gilt auch für Goethes *Wanderjahre*, nur daß die zünftige Kritik Jacobi in ganz anderem Maße daraus einen Vorwurf zu machen pflegt. Jedenfalls will es mir scheinen, daß das konventionelle Urteil der Literaturhistoriker zu hart ausgefallen ist. Keineswegs mangelt es hier an Interesse, keinswegs an Stimmung. Die Behauptung, es fehle an Natursinn, stimmt nicht, und wie sollte sie auch bei einem Mann, der einmal sagt, er würde schon längst nicht mehr leben, wenn es keine Bäume und Kinder gäbe, und der in diesen "etwas Freies und Frommes und Seliges" spürt, das immer wieder zur Daseinsbejahung führe? Stilistisch scheint Jacobi in diesen Werken irgendwo zwischen dem Goethe des *Werther* und Jean Paul zu stehen, gewiß ohne den Reichtum von beiden. Auch Goethe, der den *Woldemar* zunächst erbarmungslos verhöhnte, erkannte später jedenfalls den Stil an.

Tatsächlich aber ist gerade das, was Jacobi in seinen Romanen und anderwärts über Sinn und Ziel des menschlichen Daseins zu sagen hat, wahrhaft bedeutend. Hervorragend sind seine aphoristischen Bemerkungen, die entweder in den *Fliegenden Blättern* als solche vorliegen oder aus seinen übrigen Werken und Briefen herausgelöst werden können, wie Leo Matthias es getan hat. Sie zeigen eine gepflegte Sprache, die in ihrem Rhythmus oft merkwürdig modern klingt, während die Tiefe und Schärfe des Gedankens ihnen einen würdigen Platz sichern sollten in einer Gattung, zu der Pascal und Goethe, Friedrich Schlegel und Novalis, Lichtenberg und Nietzsche beigesteuert haben.

Das moralische Problem, mit dem Jacobi vor allem ringt, ist das des individuellen, genialischen und des kollektiven, im eigentlichen Sinne "sittlichen" Guten, ein Problem, das mit dem ethischen und emotionalen Individualismus des Sturms und Drangs gegeben war und mit dem ja auch Goethe sich vom *Werther* bis zu den *Wahlverwandtschaften* und darüber hinaus immer wieder auseinandergesetzt hat.

Indem Jacobi Tertullians Wort zitiert, "das Hergebrachte" habe unsern Herrn ans Kreuz geschlagen, erklärt er, die Menschheit würde "stinkend" werden, wenn nicht immer wieder "Heldengeister aufträten, um ihr einen neuen Schwung zu geben, ihr aufzuhelfen, sie zu erfrischen . . . Menschen, die ein inneres Freiheitsgefühl göttlich über ihr Zeitalter erhebt." Aufschärfste lehnt er andererseits jene Moral ab, die durch Absinken vom Genial-Persönlichen zum Triebhaft-Subjektiven entsteht. Immer entschiedener wird diese Polemik in den aufeinanderfolgenden Umarbeitungen seiner Romane. Ethik ist Disziplin, Grenze, Form:

Eure Flitterphilosophie möchte gern alles, was Form heißt, verbannt wissen. Alles soll aus freier Hand geschehen; die menschliche Seele zu allem Guten und Schönen sich selbst—aus sich selbst bilden; und ihr bedenkt nicht, daß menschlicher Charakter einer flüssigen Materie gleicht, die nicht anders als in einem Gefäße Gestalt und Bleiben haben kann; laßt euch deswegen auch nicht einmal einfallen zu erwägen, daß eitel Wasser in einem Glase mehr taugt als Nektar in Schlamm gegossen.

Am stärksten aber wendet er sich gegen die Erweichung des Ethischen zu verpflichtungslosem ästhetischem Selbstgenuß, gegen "das müßige Sammeln von Empfindungen . . . das Bestreben, Empfindungen—zu empfinden, Gefühle—zu fühlen."

Mir fallen gleich Mauschellen ein, wenn ich Leute mit erhabenen Gesinnungen herankommen sehe, die nicht einmal nur rechtschaffene Gesinnungen beweisen. Und ich werde nicht zufriedener mit ihnen, wenn sie auch ihre schönen Gesinnungen mit sogenannten schönen Handlungen begleiten; denn jedem, der ein weiches Herz und etwas Feuer im Blute hat, wird es leichter, dergleichen zu tun als zu lassen. Aber das Böse zu meiden! das erfordert andere Kräfte; da muß der ganze Mensch sich zusammennehmen, oft bis zur Vernichtung sich anstrengen und am Ende finden, daß er zu wenig hatte an den Kräften seiner ganzen Menschheit.—Noch einmal! Es ist leicht, sehr leicht, mancherlei Gutes zu tun; und Großes zu tun, ist immer eine Lust: aber ohne Sünde bleiben, ohne Missetat—das ist—o wie schwer! Aber auch wie weit erhaben über alles! Was ist der wunderbarste Luftspringer gegen den Unerschütterlichen im Kampfe?

Gesund ist die Gesellschaft, in der kein Bruch ist zwischen dem persönlichen ethischen Bewußtsein und der kollektiven Tradition, in der "Sitte" noch das Selbstverständliche ist. "Was heißt Sittenverfall?" fragt Jacobi, und er antwortet sich:

. . . Die allgemeine Meinung über das, was wahr und gut sei, muß ein der Vernunft gleiches Ansehn haben. Sobald dieser Glaube wankt und mit ihm das Ansehn der öffentlichen Stimme, tritt der Sittenverfall ein. Eigendünkel darf nun hervortreten und sich hören lassen; Eigenwille sich in Ansehn setzen; die heilige Scham verschwindet, ihr öffentlicher Altar ist verwüstet.—Summa: der Mensch muß etwas über sich erkennen, das seine Meinung und seinen Willen regiert. Der erste Grad der Sittenverderbnis ist, die öffentliche Meinung nicht mehr zu achten; der letzte, die Abwesenheit einer öffentlichen Meinung. Jeder tut alsdann, was ihm gefällt, und seinen Lüsten nachzuhangen, dünkt jedem recht: es ist keine Sitte mehr im Lande.

Freilich, diese kollektive und traditionsgebundene Sittlichkeit muß immer wieder von "Heroen" neu belebt, ja neu geboren werden. "Selbstbestimmung, Freiheit ist die Seele der Natur und auch—die erste Quelle aller Gesetze, Einrichtungen, Sitten und Gebräuche." So schließt sich der Kreis. Mit anderen Worten: in einer gesunden Kultur stehen das individuelle und das kollektive Element in positiver, schöpferischer Wechselwirkung.

Klar aber erkennt Jacobi, daß das Ethische mehr als soziale Sanktionen, daß es metaphysische Sanktionen braucht, um wahrhaft zwingend zu sein:

Das erste notwendigste Bedürfnis, wie für den einzelnen Menschen, so für die Gesellschaft, ist ein Gott. Vollkommene Unterwerfung unter ein höheres Ansehen, strenger, heiliger Gehorsam, ist der Geist jeder Zeit gewesen, welche große Taten, große Gesinnungen, große Menschen in Menge hervorbrachte. Der heiligste Tempel der Spartaner war der Furcht geweiht. Wo der feste Glaube an ein höheres Ansehen nachließ, eigener Dünkel die Oberhand gewann, da sank jede Tugend, da brach das Laster durch, da verdarb Sinn, Einbildung und Verstand.

Und ferner, auch dies erkennt er, daß ein moralischer metaphysischer Wille Entscheidung, Bewußtsein, Persönlichkeit voraussetzt. Mit anderen Worten: entweder hat die Welt Sinn von einem persönlichen Gott her, oder sie hat keinen Sinn—Theismus oder Nihilismus.

Eine solche Wahl . . . hat der Mensch; diese einzige: das Nichts oder einen Gott. Das Nichts erwählend macht er sich zu Gott; das heißt: er macht zu Gott ein Gespenst; denn es ist unmöglich, wenn kein Gott ist, daß nicht der Mensch und alles, was ihn umgibt, bloß Gespenst sei. . . . Es gibt kein Drittes.

Gewiß ist das Wort "persönlich" letzten Endes gleichnishaft und approximativ zu verstehen, denn das Göttliche ist jenseits aller Vernunft (oder vielmehr: alles Verstandes) und aller menschlichen Kategorien:

Hat er mich mit Händen gemacht, dieser Geist und Gott? Dem Frager mit diesen Worten antwortet die Vernunft ein festes Ja! Denn hier, wo jeder, auch der entfernteste, Versuch, durch Analogien einer wirklichen Einsicht näher zu kommen, dem Irrtum entgegenschreitet, ist der hart anthropomorphisierende Ausdruck, als offenbar symbolisch, der Vernunft . . . der liebste.

Aus dieser Untrennbarkeit von ethischer Sinnhaftigkeit des Lebens und Theismus entspringt Jacobis Kampf gegen Spinoza, den er doch in seiner ganzen Bedeutung erkannt und als erster seiner Zeit nahe gebracht hat, und ebenso sein späterer Kampf gegen Fichte und Schelling. Aber freilich, er hat nicht das positive biblische Christentum seiner Freunde Hamann, Lavater, Claudius, Stolberg oder seiner Freundin, der Fürstin Gallitzin. Er kann nicht die historische Offenbarung als metaphysische Erkenntnisquelle annehmen. Auch weiß er mit Kant, daß die reine Vernunft das Dasein Gottes nicht beweisen kann. Anders aber als Kant vermag er sich nicht zu begnügen mit dem Postulat der praktischen Vernunft, mit dem Als-ob der Existenz Gottes, das allzu leicht zur pragmatischen Fiktion werden kann und später bei Vaihinger ja tatsächlich geworden ist. Ein fiktives Als-ob wird zum metaphysischen Taschenspielertrick und ist wertlos, sobald seine fiktive Natur erkannt ist.

Aber hat nicht der Mensch die Gewißheit der kosmischen Sinnhaftigkeit im Gefühl?

Ich berufe mich auf ein unabweisbares, unüberwindliches Gefühl als ersten und unmittelbaren Grund aller Philosophie und Religion; auf ein Gefühl,

welches den Menschen gewahren und innerwerden läßt: er habe einen Sinn für das Übersinnliche.

Solch erkenntnisgebendes Gefühl ist es, das den Menschen eigentlich zum Menschen macht; ja, Jacobi identifiziert es mit der Vernunft—im Gegensatz zum Verstande.

Diesen Schritt—oder vielmehr, wie er selbst sagt: diesen *salto mortale*—von der Ratio zum Gefühl, zur Intuition tut Jacobi und stellt sich damit in Gegensatz zu der Metaphysik seiner Zeit, die als Wissenschaft auftreten will. Das aber eben will seine Philosophie nicht. Ihm geht es nicht um die philosophische Systematik, es geht ihm um die Existenz, und er sucht Anhaltspunkte, Indizienbeweise dafür, daß das Leben lebbar sei für den Menschen.

Freilich, Ruhe hat Jacobi in dieser Haltung nie gefunden. Eine "peinvolle innere Unfertigkeit" sieht Hettner in ihm—aber ist das richtig? Ist es nicht vielmehr eine tiefe Tragik? Licht sei in seinem Herzen, schreibt er 1783 an Hamann, aber sowie er es "in den Verstand bringen" wolle, erlösche es. Welche von beiden Klarheiten sei nun die wahre? Die des Verstandes, die zwar feste Gestalten, aber hinter ihnen nur einen bodenlosen Abgrund zeige, oder die des Herzens, welche zwar verheißend aufwärts leuchte, aber bestimmtes Erkennen vermissen lasse? Nur durch ein Wunder scheine eine Vereinigung möglich. Und an Schlosser wiederum schreibt er 1791: eins traue er sich zu, nämlich

anzutun, daß der Mensch seinem Wesen nach ein religiöses Geschöpf ist und einen Gott vor Augen haben muß, bei Strafe der Entdeckung: die Wahrheit aller Wahrheiten sei: *es gebe keine Wahrheit*.

Aber damit sei er auch am Ende; denn sein eigener Glaube sei kein Fels.

Dieser Zwiespalt hat Jacobis ganzes Leben erfüllt, hat den feinfühligsten Mann zermürbt und ihn zu einem depressiven, hypochondrischen Menschen gemacht. Aber trotz allem hatte er die Kraft und die Redlichkeit, sich selber treu zu bleiben. Er fühlte das Präkäre seiner Stellung, aber er glaubte, seine Position zwischen den "glutlosen Lichtlingen" der Aufklärung und dem positiven Dogma halten zu können. Nun aber kam mit der Französischen Revolution die unendliche Verschärfung der geistigen Gegensätze; religiös wie politisch wurden die Menschen nach rechts und links auseinandergedrängt. Als sein alter Freund Fritz Stolberg im Jahre 1800 katholisch wurde, muß der Boden unter Jacobis Füßen gewankt haben: sollte also wirklich alles hinauslaufen auf die Wahl zwischen dem historischen Christentum (womöglich in dieser seiner historischen Form *par excellence*) und dem Rationalismus, der zum Nihilismus führt? Hinzuzufügen ist dies: als die Aufklärer gegen den Darmstädter Oberhofprediger Starck den Vorwurf des Kryptokatholizismus erhoben, hatte Jacobi im Jahre 1788 erklärt, er halte "die ganze Geschichte vom einbrechenden Katholizismus für ein Hirngespinnst," und sich weiterhin

verschworen: "Habe ich unrecht . . . so ist es mit meiner Philosophie und aller meiner aus der Geschichte und Erfahrung gezogenen Kenntnis am Ende, und ich getraue mir über nichts mehr eine Meinung zu haben." Nur so ist seine maßlose Erschütterung und Erbitterung im Jahre 1800 zu verstehen: einmal in seinem Leben wurde der "Gentleman unter den Philosophen" sich selbst schmähhlich untreu; er hat es später bereut.

Auch Jacobi erkannte und bekannte am Ende die dynamische Unzulänglichkeit individueller Religiosität. Im Greisenalter, als nach den Freiheitskriegen eine stark positiv-christliche Verfestigung eintrat—es war die Zeit, in der Klaus Harms zu wirken begann—, da schrieb er an Reinhold:

Mit mir steht es so, daß ich mit Falck und Twesten [den Kieler Professoren und Publizisten aus dem Kreise um die *Kieler Blätter*] darüber vollkommen entschieden bin, daß, wer die *Religiosität* der Väter wolle, auch die *Religion* der Väter wollen müsse; wie ich aber dazu gelangen könne, diese *historisch-gediegene*, einmütige Religion der Väter so zu wollen, daß sie mir auch wirklich und wahrhaft werde: das weiß ich nicht. . . . Du siehst, lieber Reinhold, daß ich noch immer derselbe bin; durchaus ein Heide mit dem Verstande, mit dem ganzen Gemüte ein Christ, schwimme ich zwischen zwei Wassern, die sich mir nicht vereinigen wollen so, daß sie gemeinschaftlich mich trügen; sondern wie das eine mich unaufhörlich hebt, so versenkt zugleich auch unaufhörlich mich das andere.

Und auch dies bekannte er:

Ich bin jung gewesen und alt geworden und lege das Zeugnis ab, daß ich nie in einem Menschen gründliche, durchgreifende und aushaltende Sittlichkeit gefunden habe, als bei Gottesfürchtigen, nicht nach der heutigen, sondern nach der alten kindlichen Weise; nur bei ihnen fand ich auch Freudigkeit im Leben, eine herzhaft, siegende Heiterkeit, von so ausgezeichneter Art, daß sie mit keiner andern zu vergleichen ist.

Diese enge Verbundenheit von gläubigem Verlangen und Zweifel, ja Verzweiflung, lassen Jacobi als eigentümlich modern in seiner Wesensart erscheinen; denn die Menschen des 18. Jahrhunderts waren ja meist durchaus wohlgenut in ihrem Zweifel.

Jacobi war ein feinfühlig und kluger Beobachter seiner Zeit. Wenn hinter der Klarheit des Verstandes nur "ein bodenloser Abgrund" gähnte, mußte er Gegner der ganzen Kultur der Aufklärung werden. Die Aufklärung, sagt er—und hier wird seine Nähe zu seinem temperamentlich so grundverschiedenen Freunde Hamann deutlich—die Aufklärung ist wortgläubig, sie verschmäh't beides, das Sinnliche (d.h. die Natur) und das Übersinnliche. "Alles Unausprechliche ist ihr verdächtig; über die sinnliche Erfahrung hinaus hat sie weder Vertrauen noch Glauben."

Trotzdem war er zunächst optimistischer als sein Freund Schlosser. Im Jahre 1780, also drei Jahre nachdem dieser den "allgemeinen Bankrott" vorausgesagt hatte, sprach er den Glauben aus, daß die Barbarei wohl für alle Zeiten überwunden sei. Zwei Jahre später

bricht eine pessimistische Bewertung der Zeit durch, aber sein Zorn richtet sich vor allem gegen die konservativen Elemente der Gesellschaftsordnung, gegen die unheiligen Pfaffen und den Adel, der bei jedem Verfall der verdorbenste Teil sei. Wieder ein Jahr später schreibt er an Herder, das Böse der Zeit liege wie ein Berg auf ihm und drücke ihn täglich beim Anblick seiner Kinder, daß er laut aufschreien möchte. Und 1788, am Vorabend der Revolution, heißt es:

In der Tat läßt sich bei der gegenwärtigen Verfassung von Europa kaum etwas Vernünftigeres denken als eine unaufhörliche Flucht. Die Menschheit schwebt zwischen Himmel und Erde; Wolken über sich und Wolken unter sich, und nichts als Wolken.

Und nun kommt der große Umsturz, in dem er fast von Anfang an den Nihilismus des reinen Verstandes am Werke sieht. Schon wenige Wochen nach dem Bastillesturm entzieht er den französischen Volksmännern sein Vertrauen, im Gegensatz zu fast allen Deutschen seiner Zeit. Aber auch von der reaktionären preußisch-österreichischen Intervention erwartet er, im Falle eines Sieges, nichts als Unterdrückung des Geistes und eine rein negative Sicherheit und Ruhe. Wiederholt erscheint in seinen Briefen die Bemerkung, der "Bildungstrieb" habe die europäische Gesellschaft verlassen, was übrigens wieder an Toynbeesche Begriffe erinnert. "Überhaupt sehe ich nicht, wie der Menschheit mehr zu helfen ist. . . Ich gebe also meine Stimme für den Jüngsten Tag." Der Jüngste Tag—immer wieder erscheint in seinen Briefen nun dies apokalyptische Wort. Es ist ihm, als läge die Geschichte selbst in den letzten Zügen.

Mit stärkster Zustimmung liest er Burkes *Reflections*; er möchte sie auf seinem Tisch festnageln und alle französischen Broschüren zum Fenster hinauswerfen.

Und dann wächst vor seinen Augen aus der Revolution der dämonische Diktator hervor, der jenseits von Gut und Böse steht und damit jenseits des Menschlichen: "ein Fürst der Finsternis, wie noch keiner sichtbar vor ihm auf Erden gewallet hat."

Er hat so gar keinen Glauben an etwas ober oder unter; er hat so sich nur allein; er sieht sich—wie soll ich sagen? es ist ja außer dem Kreise der Menschheit—so bestimmt als das Werkzeug des Fatums an; er *will* nicht, er *wird* *gewollt* durch sich selbst—daß das Schrecklichste noch an den Tag kommen wird, was bis jetzt nur in dunkeln Sagen herumirrt.

In Napoleons Bannkreis ist das Amoralisch-Nihilistische, das Dämonische das Idol der Zeit geworden; in seinem Staat herrscht oben das gesetzlos-dynamische Prinzip, und unten gibt es nur ein Gebot: mechanischer Gehorsam ohne Freiheit und Gewissen, ohne Ehre und Gerechtigkeit. Güte und Geist werden mißachtet; von den Wissenschaften gelten nur die wertfreien exakten, nicht die humanistischen. So sieht Jacobi den französischen Herrscher.

Und der große Dämon, Vorläufer noch schlimmerer Dämonen,



von denen selbst Jacobi nichts ahnte, wirft die Völker durcheinander, entwurzelt die Menschen, zerstört das Gefüge des Lebens.

... wer mag sagen, daß er eine bleibende Stätte hat, einen Aufenthalt nur bis zum morgenden Tage? ... Ehemals wanderten die Völker, jetzt wandert ihnen der Boden unter den Füßen weg, und sie taumeln vorwärts und rückwärts übereinander hin und her. ... Wo ist nun ein Zufluchtsort, dem man vertrauen dürfte bis zum nächsten Frühling? Ehe Du zugerüstet hast, langen die Flüchtlinge an, daher, wo Du hin wolltest.

Der das schreibt, ist nicht ein Europäer der Jahre 1939-48, es ist Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi im Jahre 1806. So erlebte er die abendländischen "Zeiten der Wirren," in denen auch wir stehen an irgendeinem erst von einer fernen Zukunft klar zu bezeichnenden Punkte.

In unseren Ausführungen haben wir versucht, den Pietismus in die gebührende historische Perspektive zu rücken, und dann drei Einzelpersönlichkeiten, die mehr oder minder durch ihn bedingt sind: Lavater in Zürich, Schlosser am Oberrhein, Jacobi am Niederrhein.

Diese Kette der drei religiös bestimmten Freunde verlängert sich von Düsseldorf nordöstlich nach Münster zum katholischen Kreis der Fürstin Gallitzin, nach Osnabrück zu Herders Freund, dem Orientalisten und vergleichenden Religionswissenschaftler Kleuker (während die Verbindung zu dem mit diesem nahe verschwägerten Justus Möser loser ist), nach Wandsbeck zu Claudius und endlich zu jenem ganzen holsteinisch-dänischen Kreis, der sich um das Schloß Emkendorf gruppiert und zu dem besonders Fritz Stolberg gehört. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen ist jede dieser Persönlichkeiten mit jeder anderen auch menschlich befreundet. So ergibt sich deutlich eine süd-nördliche Linie des westdeutschen Supranaturalismus, deren Endpunkte in Zürich und Kopenhagen liegen. Verbindungslinien gehen ferner zu Jung-Stilling im Westen, und wiederum über den ganzen deutschen Raum hinweg zu Hamann in Königsberg, der allerdings schon 1788 stirbt. Aber diese weiteren Zusammenhänge können hier nur kurz angedeutet werden.

Trotz vielfacher persönlicher Beziehungen zu Weimar ist der Gegensatz zu dem sich dort verdichtenden hellenisierenden Humanismus klar zu erfassen; erbitterter ist der Streit mit der auch von den Weimaranern verspotteten Populäraufklärung um Nicolai, Gedike und Biester in Berlin.

Schon Gervinus hat im wesentlichen die Zusammengehörigkeit unserer Gruppe gesehen und Lavater und Jacobi eingehend besprochen, beide aber durchaus ohne Sympathie, ja Lavater sogar mit einem giftigen Haß, der selbst vor positiver Verleumdung nicht zurückschrickt; Schlosser schätzt er, aber er sieht in ihm einseitig den wohlmeinenden Volksfreund aufklärerischen Gepräges und erwähnt das starke religiös-irrationale Element in ihm mit keinem Wort.

Hettner stellt Hamann, Jacobi, Lavater, Jung-Stilling, Claudius und die Fürstin Gallitzin zusammen und erkennt hier die Vorbereitung der religiösen Romantik. Sein Urteil über Lavater und Jacobi zeigt größeren Willen zur Gerechtigkeit als das von Gervinus, ist aber doch ohne richtiges Verständnis; auch er preist Schlosser, rückt ihn aber ebenfalls, indem er auf seine späteren Schriften überhaupt nicht eingeht, zu sehr an die Populäraufklärung heran. Scherer erwähnt Lavater und Jacobi mit wenigen Worten, Schlosser überhaupt nicht. Und solche Einstellung wird von nun an charakteristisch. Sie gilt auch noch für die großen neueren Darstellungen von Walzel und Eloesser. Selbst Ferdinand Joseph Schneiders Werk *Die deutsche Dichtung zwischen Barock und Klassizismus* geht bei Jacobi auf das Wesentliche nicht ein, tut Lavater mit einigen allgemeinen Bemerkungen ab und erwähnt Schlosser nur ganz nebenbei als Freund von Lenz. Bei Walzel und Schneider ist allerdings zuzugeben, daß ihre Bücher als Geschichte der *Dichtung* bezeichnet sind. Auch Tersteegen übrigens wird von keinem der drei erwähnt. Eine rühmliche Ausnahme in Bezug auf Verständnis und Schätzung bildet Nadler.

Unter solchen Umständen ist es auch mit Neudrucken schlecht bestellt. Von Lavaters Schriften ist allerdings 1943 eine sorgfältige kleine Auswahl in vier Bändchen in Zürich erschienen. Für Jacobi sind wir, abgesehen von einer kleinen Sammlung von Aphorismen und einzelnen aphorismenartigen Stellen, die Leo Matthias 1926 zusammengestellt hat, auf die *Werke* von 1812-25 angewiesen; dazu kommen einige Briefsammlungen aus dem vorigen Jahrhundert. Für Schlosser fehlt ein Neudruck überhaupt, obwohl Perthes einen solchen schon um 1820 vermißte und anregte; viele seiner Werke sind in Zeitschriften des 18. Jahrhunderts verstreut, besonders in Boies *Deutschem Museum*. Eine Auswahl bieten seine *Kleinen Schriften* in sechs Bändchen (1779-93).

In Kürschners *Deutscher National-Litteratur* ist keine einzige der hier besprochenen Persönlichkeiten vertreten, im Gegensatz zu Dichterlingen der Aufklärungszeit wie Cronegk oder Brawe. Es ist zu hoffen, daß in der Reclamschen Sammlung *Deutsche Literatur in Entwicklungsreihen*, die ja noch nicht abgeschlossen ist, diese Vernachlässigung nicht wiederholt werden möge.

Nur die Geistesgeschichte theologischer Herkunft hat mehr Verständnis für unser Problem gezeigt. Von Ernst Troeltsch war schon in der Einleitung die Rede. In einigen hingeworfenen, aber bedeutenden Bemerkungen (*Gesammelte Schriften*, IV, 558 f., 810 ff.) fordert er eine Neubewertung Lavaters, erklärt von Jacobi, daß er "die in der ganzen modernen Denkweise enthaltenen Grundgegensätze scharfsinnig erleuchtete," bedauert die Vernachlässigung Schlossers und betont die vorbereitende Bedeutung der ganzen Gruppe für die Romantik.

Wieder von einem Theologen stammt die einzige eingehende Darstellung unseres Kreises aus neuerer Zeit; und zwar handelt es sich



um Wilhelm Lütgerts Werk *Die Religion des deutschen Idealismus*, das von 1923 bis 1930 erschien. In sorgfältiger und gerechter Analyse reiht er ihn in die "Erweckungsbewegung" ein—ein Begriff, der gewöhnlich allerdings auf Erscheinungen nach den napoleonischen Kriegen und der Romantik eingeschränkt wird.

Schließen wir mit der Hoffnung, daß wirklich eine Neuorientierung in der Betrachtung der deutschen Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts erfolgen möge. Nicht um eine Umwertung aller Werte kann es sich dabei natürlich handeln, um ein Verwerfen alles Erarbeiteten, sondern um vorsichtige Korrekturen und Ergänzungen. Übrigens sollten diese sich nicht nur auf die Rolle des religiösen Irrationalismus beziehen; auch anderwärts ist manche Gestalt unverdienter Vergessenheit zu entreißen, z.B. George Forster. Möchten insbesondere Sonderuntersuchungen manches von dem eingehender behandeln, was wir hier nur in großen Zügen zu umreißen versuchen konnten. Auch hier in Amerika; heutzutage trägt ja die amerikanische Germanistik eine Verantwortung wie nie zuvor.

Jenseits alles Historischen aber möge am Schluß noch einmal dies zu betonen erlaubt sein: die Menschen, von denen wir gesprochen haben, lebten, wie wir, in einer Krisis des Abendlandes, ja vielleicht am Anfang derselben, in der wir selbst stehen. Wie sie diese Krisis erlebten, wie sie auf sie reagierten, das muß uns angehen.

*Brown University*

## GERHART HAUPTMANN'S PLAY "DIE FINSTERNISSE"

By S. D. STIRK

Gerhart Hauptmann died on June 6, 1946, at the age of eighty-three. All preparations had been made for him to leave his home at Agnetendorf, in the Giant Mountains of his beloved Silesia, and move to Berlin. On July 28 he was buried on the small island of Hiddensee, just off Rügen, in the Baltic Sea, where he had spent so many happy and productive summers.

The war and the succeeding chaos in Germany have delayed the realization and appreciation of the rich fruits of Hauptmann's last decade. The final and authorized edition of his works (*Ausgabe letzter Hand*), edited by C. F. W. Behl and F. A. Voigt, was published by the Suhrkamp Verlag, the "Aryan" successor to the famous S. Fischer publishing house in Berlin, on the occasion of Hauptmann's eightieth birthday on November 15, 1942. It runs to seventeen volumes, over 9,500 pages of text. Many works hitherto known only to a small circle of friends are included, e.g., a play *Magnus Garbe*, which deals with the Counter-Reformation in a town in western Germany. Written as early as 1915, it is certainly one of the most dramatic and moving of Hauptmann's plays. But with praiseworthy tact, he hesitated to publish it, because of the conflicts it would have caused. The Nazis would have been delighted to exploit its strong anti-Catholic tendencies. The 1942 edition also contains in Volume XV the lively comedy *Ulrich von Lichtenstein* (first published in 1939), a masterly Silesian story *Der Schuß im Park* (1939), some so-called meditations under the title "Sonnen," and, most important of all, the drama *Iphigenie in Delphi*. This last play is the third link in a remarkable trilogy, of which the first, *Iphigenie in Aulis*, was published in 1944. The two one-act plays which form the center-piece, *Agamemnons Tod* and *Elektra*, have not yet been printed. Volume XVI is devoted to the collection of lyric poetry, published in 1939 under the title *Ährenlese*, and to *Der Große Traum*, a long epic in *terza rima*, first published in 1942. From the standpoint of Hauptmann's *Weltanschauung* this is the most difficult but probably the most important of all his completed works. Hauptmann often told Frau Margarete that it was with this work that he wanted to stand the test of eternity. It was placed in his coffin, along with his New Testament, and a copy of the *Canticum of the Sun* by St. Francis of Assisi. For a variety of reasons, Hauptmann research, both in Germany and abroad, has for decades been behind the schedules one might reasonably have expected, and the small but growing number of scholars engaged in it are faced with tremendous tasks. It will indeed take many years of hard work before

it is possible to cope satisfactorily with the publications noted above, and with several others not mentioned.

This article must limit itself to a consideration of *Die Finsternisse*, a short one-act play published in the summer of 1947, and the works with which it is naturally associated.<sup>1</sup> Since the play is concerned exclusively with Max Pinkus, a personal note may be pardoned here. In the early thirties, when I was lecturer in English at the University of Breslau, I often heard, as did Professor Reichart in the United States, from the professors of German, students, and others, about the Pinkus collection of Silesian literature. In 1933 I went with my fiancée to Neisse to visit her grandparents. Her grandfather had owned for decades the best bookshop in Neisse. And it turned out that as a young man Max Pinkus had lived in the same house, and had continued to buy books from him long after he settled in the near-by town of Neustadt. I wrote a letter, asking for permission to visit his library, and sending greetings from my fiancée's grandparents. A cordial invitation came by return post. We paid a second visit early in 1934, and in June were planning to go there again when the newspapers reported that Max Pinkus was dead. On my first visit, he gave me a copy of the 1932 edition of the Hauptmann bibliography: *Gerhart Hauptmann: Werke von ihm und über ihn (1881-1931)*, by Viktor Ludwig (Neustadt, Schlesien, Privatdruck). This was the real start of my own work on Gerhart Hauptmann. In January, 1936, the Breslau University Library acquired for a ridiculously small sum the remarkable Pinkus Hauptmann collection. Till I left Breslau in December of that year, and in the long vacations of 1937, 1938, and 1939, I spent many hours there, collecting Hauptmann material. Because Hauptmann was not *persona grata* with the Nazis, the collection was not properly housed; the hundreds of books and periodicals, the thousands of newspaper cuttings, the numerous portraits and drawings, were simply dumped in a storeroom. During the siege of Breslau, from January to May, 1945, the Nazi commander set up his headquarters in the University Library—no doubt with an eye to the thick walls and bombproof cellars of this former monastery. It may have been heroic in the Nazi sense to hold out in such a fine old building, but it was likewise futile and a crime against culture to make it an inevitable target for Russian shells. According to reliable reports, the Hauptmann collection and many other priceless books and manuscripts were destroyed.

Hauptmann's close association with Max Pinkus has left its mark on the former's works. "The generous, lovable Löwel Perl," in *Die*

<sup>1</sup> Gerhart Hauptmann, *Die Finsternisse, Requiem*, with an essay by Walter A. Reichart (Aurora, New York: Hammer Press, 1947), 28 pp. Cf. pp. 20 ff. for the genesis (1937) of this play, and for Professor Reichart's personal ties to Max Pinkus and to Hauptmann. The play concerns the death in 1934 of the renowned Jewish bibliophile Max Pinkus. The Hauptmanns were the only Gentiles who had the temerity to attend the funeral.

*schwarze Maske*, as Professor Reichart calls him,<sup>2</sup> reflects the character of Max Pinkus. Like many other of Hauptmann's later works, *Die schwarze Maske* has remained almost unknown. Yet it is a technical masterpiece on a small canvas, and no reader can escape its thrilling and compelling atmosphere. The scene is a small Silesian town of 1662. The social and economic misery caused by the Thirty Years War still prevails, and the pest continues to rage. Hauptmann's original plan was to give new and German form to the Alcestis story, and the play is thus a testimony to Hauptmann's preoccupation with ancient Greek tragedy in his last decades. Löwel Perl is the merchant-friend of the Burgomaster, who constantly looks to him for advice and help. Benigna, the mayor's wife, is even more dependent on him. He knows about her past, and acts as intermediary between her and her blackmailing, Negro persecutor. He is experienced and resourceful, respected and loved by all, modest, polite, cultured, and witty. Max Pinkus possessed all these qualities, and Löwel Perl is therefore, in a limited sense, a delightful tribute.

In October, 1928, Hauptmann began to write *Vor Sonnenuntergang*. This play is also a monument to Max Pinkus, on a larger scale than *Die schwarze Maske*, but in some ways of a much less happy kind. It is in this connection that Professor Reichart utters an appropriate warning:

It must not be forgotten, however, that Hauptmann never photographed his subjects. Hence there is always as much fiction as fact in his portrayals. Individual incidents may be taken from life, but the total picture becomes an artistic interpretation that shifts the emphasis from factual reality to symbolic ideals. Nevertheless it is of value to know the actualities that lie at the source of his dramatic works.<sup>3</sup>

He might also have quoted the letter which Hauptmann wrote as early as 1890, in answer to the accusation of a certain Johannes Gutzeit that Hauptmann had caricatured him in his novelle *Der Apostel* (1890): "Ich verspüre auch nie in meinem Leben so zu sagen bloß photographische Gelüste."<sup>4</sup>

The death of his wife in 1920 was a sad blow to Max Pinkus, and in his loneliness he considered a second marriage. His family objected, and he actually attempted suicide by cutting his left wrist. This late and tragic love of his friend gave Hauptmann the idea and the basic theme for *Vor Sonnenuntergang*. The scene of the play is a fairly large German town. Matthias Clausen, "Geheimer Kommerzienrat" (like Max Pinkus), a well-groomed man of seventy, head of a large and successful publishing firm, highly respected by all his fellow-citizens, falls in love with Inken Peters, the nineteen-year-old

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 25. *Die schwarze Maske* was written in February and March, 1928, and first performed in Vienna on December 3, 1929.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Viktor Ludwig, *Gerhart Hauptmann: Werke von ihm und über ihn, 1881-1931* (Neustadt, 1932), p. 38.

nièce of his gardener. With rather too obvious an eye to the "Goethe Year" of 1932, and the forthcoming hundredth anniversary of Goethe's death, Hauptmann seizes the opportunity to reproduce under twentieth-century conditions the love of the seventy-four-year-old Goethe for the seventeen-year-old Ulrike von Levetzow, which found such moving but dignified expression in the "Marienbader Elegie" (1823). He gives Clausen's sons and daughters Goethean names (Wolfgang, Egmont, Bettina, and Ottilie); he brings in several Goethe quotations; and he even introduces a well-known Goethe scene when he has Inken discovered cutting bread amidst a happy group of children (cf. Lotte in *Werther*). As was the case with Goethe's son August and his daughter-in-law Ottilie, the Clausen family react strongly against the prospect of a second marriage, and encouraged by an unpleasant lawyer, Hanefeldt, they go so far as to start a law-suit, declaring Clausen incapable of managing his affairs. The shame and scandal are too much for the old man, who goes out of his mind and commits suicide by taking poison. The play was finished in November, 1931, and given its first performance in the "Deutsches Theater" in Berlin on February 16, 1932. Several critics expressed the view that the success it achieved was due mainly to the desire on the part of theater-goers to offer congratulations and thanks to Hauptmann on his approaching seventieth birthday, and also to the masterly production by Max Reinhardt. Both dramatist and producer seem to have been unhappy about the end. In the printed text Clausen commits suicide at the close of a long and rather drawn-out fifth act. Reinhardt left out this act, and got over the suicide quickly in Act IV. Hauptmann himself had written as many as seven different versions, so Max Reinhardt was no doubt more than justified.

*Vor Sonnenuntergang* is not to be reckoned among Hauptmann's great plays. It is one of the least genuine and most artificial; it contains too many quotations, and some limping dialogue. But it is interesting to many for personal reasons; in addition to the Pinkus motifs it introduces Professor Geiger of Cambridge, a dignified, trustworthy, and lovable character, obviously modeled after Professor Fiedler of Oxford, but of course by no means identical with him. In May, 1905, the University of Oxford had conferred on Hauptmann an honorary doctorate, and from that time on, Hauptmann and Fiedler were close friends. Professor Fiedler's death on April 10, 1945, deprived England of her greatest authority on Hauptmann.

*Vor Sonnenuntergang* is also of interest because of what the Nazis made of it in their film *Der Herrscher*, with Emil Jannings in the role of Clausen. The film had the same characters as the play, with the addition of three directors, an engineer, and a foreman of the Clausen firm, which, significantly enough, was now producing steel instead of books. Another big change was that Inken Peters became Clausen's secretary, instead of the niece of his gardener. Clausen

was not only a "ruler"; he was also "the tough fighter for great social ideas." He strove for the common good, whereas his sons and daughters were dominated by private and selfish aims. Clausen rages when they try to prevent his marriage to Inken by declaring him incapable of managing his affairs. But he does not commit suicide as in the play. Like a good, heroic Nazi, he pulls himself together, rushes through the steelworks to gain strength, and then dictates to Inken his last will and testament: after his death the Clausen works are to go to the State. Leadership principle, community of the people, service to the State: such ideas made the film a wonderful piece of Nazi propaganda. At a ceremony in the Reich Chamber of Culture on May 1, 1937, Goebbels awarded Emil Jannings the National Film Prize for 1936-37. The *Kölnische Zeitung* boasted the next day: "The Americans have their *Broadway Melody*, the English their *Henry VIII*, the French their René-Clair films. In the film roles of Emil Jannings, above all in *The Ruler*, the modern German film has reached its greatest heights."

It was a sad thought that one of the most successful films the Nazis ever made went back ultimately to Max Pinkus. It is sad, but in a different way, that Max Pinkus should give rise to Hauptmann's play *Die Finsternisse*. The play, created in the same year, is the best possible answer to the film. In the first two scenes, servants in the Joel household, while laying the table for supper, discuss the death of their master, his good deeds for Jews and Gentiles, the growing anti-Semitism, and the problematical future of the firm. A sculptor arrives to make a death-mask. In the third scene, the shades of the prophet Elijah, St. John the Divine, the Wandering Jew (Ahasverus), and finally the dead Joel himself, sit at the table and comment with bitterness and gloom on the never-ending persecution of the Jews. In the fourth scene, Herr von Herdberg, a writer and friend of the deceased—obviously Hauptmann himself—arrives with his wife. The death-mask is produced, but it is quite unlike Joel: it is the face of the wandering and persecuted Jew. The eldest son (in the play he is called Lutz, instead of Hans), reads out what his father had written on a piece of paper the night before he died: "O Lord, how long shall I cry, and thou wilt not hear! even cry out unto thee of violence, and thou wilt not save!"—from Habakkuk, Chapter I, verse 2. In a nervous, unreal, and eerie atmosphere, they talk about the dead man: his greatness of heart and mind, his love of good food and wine, his suicide attempt, and his obstinacy. Von Herdberg stresses particularly his love for Silesia, and for books.

It seems very likely that, shortly after the death of Max Pinkus, Hauptmann made the following entry in his diary, which was copied by C. F. W. Behl and published in an article in the *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung* of July 20, 1946, and reprinted by Reichart:

The death of this kingly Jew was not made public, because under present conditions the town which owes him so much would not have been able to take part in his funeral. So he is lowered into the grave in silence. Of course the town knows that he has died, from the mayor to the simple citizen. But all the people twist their necks, in order to look the other way.

So the age-long fate of the Jews seems to be eternal, and therefore immortal. But it hurls ever new waves, black, threatening, and overwhelming, against the castle walls and castles of those who are involved and fall victim to it. I feel that in its eternal presence the fate of the Jewish people is greater, more sublime, and more terrible than that of any other. And so we all stood under its naked, incontrovertible, and gloomy sanctity.<sup>5</sup>

The life of Max Pinkus had its unhappy side, but he embodied in no small degree the best qualities and traditions, the greatest achievements and services, of German Jewry. Gerhart Hauptmann's play, *Die Finsternisse*, is a valuable *Zeitdokument*, of interest and significance not only to the friends of Hauptmann and Max Pinkus. We can be grateful that it has been preserved and published.

University of Manitoba

---

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 27.



## LA GENESE DE *BAJAZET*

By GEORGES MAY

*Bajazet* est la seule tragédie de Racine qui semble au premier abord ne reposer sur aucune tradition écrite. Cependant, plus sans doute que toute autre pièce du même poète, *Bajazet* présente une généalogie complexe où les influences les plus diverses viennent se mêler et se confondre, souvenirs de littérature ancienne et moderne, d'histoire et de romans, de poésie et de conversations. Cette genèse de *Bajazet*, pour confuse et incertaine qu'elle soit, permet dans une certaine mesure de suivre l'esprit de Racine au moment de l'acte créateur et, si elle ne suffit pas à expliquer pourquoi Racine a écrit un chef-d'œuvre, elle livre cependant certains des éléments qui y ont servi de base et ont donc été l'une de ses conditions essentielles.

### I

On a fait à plusieurs reprises<sup>1</sup> le rapprochement entre l'intrigue de *Bajazet* et un épisode des aventures de Théagène et Chariclée qui se trouve aux livres VII et VIII des *Ethiopiennes* d'Héliodore. Les deux amants sont tombés au pouvoir d'Arsacé, la femme d'Oroondates, satrape de Memphis. Ce dernier est absent, faisant la guerre devant Thèbes. Arsacé, toute puissante, est violemment éprise de Théagène. Chariclée conseille à Théagène de temporiser, sans se laisser toutefois "glisser jusqu'à commettre une félonie" envers elle. Sur son refus, Théagène est mis à la torture. Le dénouement de l'épisode d'Héliodore est différent de celui de la tragédie de Racine : Arsacé se pend, Oroondates ayant été prévenu ; et les deux amants sont entraînés vers d'autres aventures. Cependant, les deux ouvrages se prêtent à de multiples rapprochements de détail, dont l'article de M. Lange expose le plus grand nombre,<sup>2</sup> et qui, ajoutés à ce qu'on sait du goût de

<sup>1</sup> Cf. surtout M. Lange, "Racine et le roman d'Héliodore," *RHLF*, XXIII (1916), 150-62. Cf. également J. Maillon, édition des *Ethiopiennes* d'Héliodore (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1935-1943), I, ci, et II, 131, n. 1. D'autre part, M. Baldensperger ("La tradition romanesque de Racine," *RLC*, XIX [1939], 650, n. 1) signale le même rapprochement dans V. Vedel, *Fransk Klassik: Racine* (København, 1932), p. 157.

<sup>2</sup> A ces rapprochements, ajoutons les deux suivants qui nous paraissent significatifs. Dans Héliodore, Oroondates averti envoie deux lettres, l'une à Arsacé, l'autre à son eunuque. Cette dernière est présentée à son destinataire avec ces mots : "Lis cette lettre, et d'abord reconnais ce sceau distinctif qui te convaincra que c'est d'Oroondates que vient l'ordre" (*Ethiopiennes*, VIII, xii, 5) ; ce qui correspond assez exactement aux mots d'Orcan que rapporte Osmin :

Adorez, a-t-il dit, l'ordre de votre maître ;  
De son auguste seing reconnaissez les traits.  
(V, xi, 1682-83)

Ailleurs (*Ethiopiennes*, VII, xx, 5) la nourrice d'Arsacé met Théagène en garde contre la violence de sa maîtresse en ces mots : "Prends garde à une fureur



Racine pour le roman d'Héliodore, ne permettent guère de douter qu'il y ait eu, sinon inspiration directe, du moins réminiscence et influence possibles. L'atmosphère du roman grec est certes plus prosaïque et plus bourgeoise que celle de la tragédie de Racine, et il ne s'y trouve guère de poésie ni de tragique proprement dit. Il ne paraît pas douteux cependant que le caractère oriental et le tempérament sensuel de la puissante Arsacé, tempérament dont Héliodore décrit avec complaisance les manifestations les plus lascives, aient contribué à la personnalité tragique de la Roxane de Racine. Quant à la jalousie meurtrière de la sultane, elle n'est sans doute pas non plus étrangère à celle de la Persane d'Héliodore.

Remontant d'une génération dans l'arbre généalogique, on devrait ajouter, comme M. Maillon le fait justement remarquer,<sup>3</sup> que le romancier grec s'inspire lui-même de la légende d'Hippolyte et plus particulièrement sans doute des deux *Hippolyte* d'Euripide. Un autre épisode du roman grec s'inspire également de ces deux tragédies et Racine ne l'avait peut-être pas oublié quand il écrivit sa *Phèdre*.<sup>4</sup> Il est donc piquant de remarquer que *Bajazet* et *Phèdre*, dont les situations sont fréquemment comparées par les critiques soucieux de montrer la maîtrise croissante de Racine, procèdent peut-être en fin de compte d'une même légende antique.

Cependant, la source immédiate couramment alléguée de *Bajazet* est la nouvelle de Segrais de 1656, *Floridon ou l'amour imprudent*.<sup>5</sup> Elle retrace à peu de chose près l'histoire exacte de *Bajazet* sous les mêmes noms. On ne peut guère douter que Racine ait bien connu cette œuvre de Segrais. Encore faudrait-il noter ici que lorsque la *Segraisiana* rapporte les réflexions bien connues de Corneille lors de la "première" de *Bajazet* selon lesquelles les personnages de Racine seraient fort peu "turcs," Segrais ne souffle mot de son propre ouvrage sur la même histoire, sans doute, comme le dit Lemaitre, parce que les personnages en étaient eux-mêmes bien faiblement "turcs."

## II

Bref, nous voici en présence de deux sources non seulement possibles, mais probables de l'intrigue de *Bajazet*. Il convient de faire

amoureuse, et protège-toi de la colère d'une femme méprisée." La phrase grecque rappelle le vers fameux de Roxane "Méfie-toi du courroux d'une amante en furie" (II, i, 541) bien plus que le vers de Virgile *Notumque furens quid femina possit* (*Enéide*, V, 6) que suggère l'édition Mesnard (II, 504, n. 2). Les mots d'Héliodore rappellent encore les conseils de prudence de Phœnix à Pyrrhus :

Gardez de négliger  
Une amante en fureur qui cherche à se venger.  
(*Andromaque*, IV, vi, 1388-89)

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, II, 131, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. notre "Contribution à l'étude des sources grecques de *Phèdre*," *MLQ*, VIII (1947), 228-34.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. par exemple F. Deltour, *Les Ennemis de Racine au XVII<sup>ème</sup> siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1869), pp. 230-33, et J. Lemaitre, *Jean Racine* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1908), pp. 202-03.

remarquer ici que Racine ne dit mot d'aucune de ces deux sources et en reconnaît une troisième.

Dans son bref avertissement en tête de l'édition de 1672, il écrit en effet que M. de Césy, ancien ambassadeur du roi de France à Constantinople,

fut instruit de toutes les particularités de la mort de Bajazet; et il y a quantité de personnes à la cour qui se souviennent de les lui avoir entendu conter, lorsqu'il fut de retour en France. Monsieur le chevalier de Nantouillet est du nombre de ces personnes. Et c'est à lui que je suis redevable de cette histoire, et même du dessein que j'ai pris d'en faire une tragédie.

Dès 1672, la véracité historique à laquelle prétendait Racine fut mise en doute par Donneau de Visé dans le premier numéro du *Mercure Galant*. Son article est daté du 9 janvier, soit immédiatement après la "première" qui semble être du 5, et avant la publication de la première édition de *Bajazet* dont l'achèvement d'imprimerie est du 20 février. Cependant, comme cet article ne fut pas imprimé avant le 25 mai, il est probable que Donneau de Visé avait pris connaissance entre temps de l'avertissement de Racine dont il parle, et qu'il avait remanié son article en conséquence.<sup>6</sup> Du reste, ces prétentions historiques de Racine, il n'y a pas jusqu'à son fils Louis qui ne s'emploie à les révoquer en doute. A cet effet, il a consulté la traduction française de Jonquières (1743) du livre anglais *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire* (1734-1735), ouvrage traduit lui-même du livre de Dumitru Cantémir *Incrementorum & decrementorum aulae authmanicae . . . libri tres*; et il écrit :

Si le prince Cantémir a été bien instruit, M. de Cezy, notre ambassadeur à Constantinople, dont l'auteur de cette tragédie cite le témoignage dans sa préface, l'étoit bien peu : ce qui ne doit pas surprendre, puisqu'il est si difficile de savoir ce qui se passe dans le sérail.<sup>7</sup>

Louis Racine a encore consulté la *Relation du Sérail* de Tavernier (1680), et il ajoute :

Il [Bajazet] n'étoit pas encore né lorsque M. de Cezy étoit à Constantinople, où il ne peut pas avoir vu se promener à la pointe du sérail (comme il est dit

<sup>6</sup> Tous les critiques, depuis les frères Parfaict (XI, 183, a), affirment que la référence de Donneau de Visé à la préface de *Bajazet* est facétieuse, l'article du *Mercure* étant daté du 9 janvier et la préface n'ayant paru que dans l'édition achevée d'imprimerie le 20 février (Mesnard, II, 453; Deltour, *op. cit.*, p. 227; H. Lyonnet, *Les "Premières" de Jean Racine* [Paris: Delagrave, 1924], p. 119; et même P. Mélése, *Donneau de Visé* [Paris: Droz, 1936], p. 98). Or M. Mélése dit bien que le privilège pour le premier volume du *Mercure* date du 27 février et il ajoute que, fin mai, Visé "publia un premier recueil de ces lettres supposées" (*op. cit.*, p. 95). Visé écrit dans sa lettre datée du 9 janvier : "Le sujet de la tragédie est turc, à ce que rapporte l'auteur dans sa préface," référence fort précise à l'avertissement de l'édition de 1672 que le journaliste a fort bien pu ajouter après coup, lorsqu'il eut pris connaissance de cette préface. Si la lettre de Visé était réellement du 9 janvier, Racine y aurait sans doute répondu dès 1672, au lieu d'attendre jusqu'à son édition de 1676.

<sup>7</sup> Louis Racine, *Remarques sur les tragédies de Jean Racine*, dans *Œuvres*, 6 vols. (Paris: Normant, 1808), V, 547.

dans la préface de cette pièce) qu'Ibrahim. . . . Cet Ibrahim peut . . . avoir donné lieu à quelques discours . . . et M. de Césy a rapporté en France ces discours, qui firent imaginer au poète le sujet de cette tragédie, dont il peut bien être nommé le créateur, et qui ne perdrait rien de son prix quand le fait qui en est le fondement seroit entièrement faux.<sup>8</sup>

Du reste, à la lumière de l'histoire telle qu'on la connaît aujourd'hui, on s'aperçoit bien que le seul point sur lequel les faits authentiques coïncident avec l'intrigue de *Bajazet* est le suivant : le sultan Mourad IV fit assassiner son frère Bayazid. Quant à la favorite de l'histoire, que son nom ait été Machkeiper ou Keussem, il importe peu ; rien n'indique qu'elle ait eu une liaison avec le frère du sultan. On ne trouve point non plus trace d'Acomat ni d'Atalide.<sup>9</sup>

Qu'il y ait eu de la part de Racine une petite supercherie historique, l'examen des divers textes de sa préface ne permet guère d'en douter. L'avertissement de 1672 qui désignait si nettement Nantouillet comme "source" essentielle est sensiblement modifié en 1676. La nouvelle préface raconte bien comment M. de Césy a été mis au courant de cette "aventure tragique" ; puis, à propos de *Bajazet*, on y lit ce qui suit :

Il [M. de Césy] a écrit depuis les circonstances de sa mort. Et il y a encore plusieurs personnes de qualité et, entre autres, M. le chevalier de Nantouillet, qui se souviennent de lui en avoir entendu faire le récit lorsqu'il fut de retour en France.

Cette fois-ci, le chevalier de Nantouillet, responsable de tout en 1672, est simplement mentionné ; il n'est plus qu'un parmi d'autres qui ont pu *entendre* M. de Césy. Par cette dénomination vague de "personnes de qualité," Racine essaye-t-il de se ménager une porte de sortie au cas où on viendrait lui objecter qu'il a tiré son histoire de Segrais ? En tout cas, l'intention générale de la préface de 1676 semble être de désigner M. de Césy, mort depuis vingt-quatre ans, comme la "source" principale de l'histoire de *Bajazet*. Racine, en effet, ne supprime pas seulement sa référence trop précise et trop explicite à Nantouillet, mais il supprime encore sa référence à "la nouvelle Relation de l'empire ottoman, que l'on a traduite de l'anglais," qu'il désignait très clairement en 1672 comme source de couleur locale. Il fait disparaître en même temps cette affirmation positive qui terminait l'avertissement de 1672 : "Surtout je dois beaucoup aux avis de Monsieur de la Haye, qui a eu la bonté de m'éclaircir sur toutes les difficultés que je lui ai proposées." M. de la Haye avait été, lui aussi, ambassadeur du roi auprès du sultan, après le retour de M. de Césy en France. La suppression de cette référence particulièrement affirmative avec son *surtout*, son *beaucoup* et son *toutes* est très caractéristique. Autant les références de 1672 étaient précises, autant celles de 1676 sont vagues :

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, V, 548.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. par exemple Clément Alzonne, "*Bajazet*, tragédie de Racine (1672), vue d'Istanbul," *Revue Bleue*, LXXV (1937), 408-10.

il ne s'agit plus que d'un écrit de M. de Césy, dont certaines personnes auraient *entendu le récit*, mais que Racine se garde bien de nous dire avoir lu lui-même. On ne sait d'ailleurs pas à quoi s'en tenir au sujet de cet écrit inconnu. Bref, Racine, en 1676, n'insiste plus que sur le témoignage de feu M. de Césy. En 1687, la préface demeure la même; puis, en 1697, le nom du chevalier de Nantouillet est supprimé, peut-être en raison de la mort de ce gentilhomme survenue en 1695.

Ces variantes et hésitations de Racine d'une édition à l'autre semblent donc révéler un subterfuge de l'auteur et justifient pleinement, pensons-nous, notre méfiance. L'ouvrage historique traduit de l'anglais, auquel Racine fait allusion en 1672, ne contient absolument aucun renseignement sur l'histoire de la mort de Bajazet, et Racine ne s'en est servi, comme il le dit lui-même, que pour "ne rien avancer qui ne fût conforme à l'histoire des Turcs."

### III

Cet ouvrage, *Histoire de l'état présent de l'empire ottoman*, était la traduction, publiée à Amsterdam en 1670 par Briot, de l'ouvrage anglais de Paul Rycaut, *The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, publié à Londres en 1669. Sauf M. J.-E. Morel, dans son édition des Classiques Larousse de *Bajazet*, les critiques ne se sont généralement pas souciés des emprunts que Racine fit à l'ouvrage de Rycaut pour donner un peu plus de couleur locale à sa tragédie turque. Plusieurs d'entre eux doivent cependant être ajoutés à ceux que signale M. Morel. Rycaut écrit par exemple :

On voit dans le Serrail une armée des plus belles filles du monde, travailler toute leur vie, pour mériter l'honneur d'être reçues dans le lit de leur Souverain Maître.

Le Lecteur sçaura, que cette assemblée de belles, car il n'y en a point d'autres dans le Serrail, est composée des prises qui se font sur la mer, & sur terre, & que ces Dames sont amenées-là d'aussi loin que s'étend la domination du Turc, ou que peuvent aller les courses vagabondes des Tartares. Qu'il y en a presque de tous les pays, & de toutes les nations du monde. (Ed. 1671, I, ix, 99.)

Racine rend cette idée dans les trois vers suivants :

Quoi ! Roxane, Seigneur, qu'Amurat a choisie  
Entre tant de beautés dont l'Europe et l'Asie  
Dépeuplent leurs Etats et emplissent sa cour ?  
(I, i, 97-99)

Plus loin (*op. cit.*, I, ix, 101-02), Rycaut, parlant de la condition des femmes dans le harem, et de celle que le sultan vient de choisir, écrit :

On la conduit à la chambre où couche le Sultan. Quand elle en est proche, un Eunuque favori, qui est à la porte, en donne aussi-tôt avis au Grand-Seigneur, & dès qu'il a la permission de la faire entrer, elle vient en courant, & se jette à ses genoux, & quelquefois selon la coutume ancienne elle se glisse

dans le lit par les pieds. Mais si le Grand-Seigneur en est bien touché, il luy accourcit le chemin & la reçoit avec tendresse entre ses bras. . .

Si elle est assez heureuse pour avoir conçu, & qu'elle accouche d'un fils, on l'appelle *Hasaki Sultana*, & elle est solennellement couronnée.

C'est bien là la substance des vers suivants que prononce Roxane sur les coutumes des sultans :

Parmi tant de beautés qui briguent leur tendresse,  
Ils daignent quelquefois choisir une maîtresse ;  
Mais, toujours inquiète avec tous ses appas,  
Esclave elle reçoit son maître dans ses bras ;  
Et sans sortir du joug où la loi la condamne,  
Il faut qu'un fils naissant la déclare sultane.

(I, iii, 293-98)

Et cette coutume qu'avaient les sultans turcs de ne pas se marier, coutume qui sert d'excuse à Bajazet et qui finira par rendre possible la jalousie de Roxane, c'est encore Rycaut qui l'expose :

Bien que le Sultan soit au-dessus de toutes les loix, il n'a pourtant pas la liberté de se marier, qu'a le moindre de ses sujets. . . Cette coutume de ne point marier le Sultan, se pratique depuis Bajazet, & est considéré par les Turcs, comme un des secrets de l'Empire : on en rapporte plusieurs raisons. Busbec dit qu'entre toutes les disgrâces qui arriverent à Bajazet, après avoir esté vaincu & défait par Tamerlan, il n'y en eut point qui luy fût si sensible que celle de voir sa femme *Despina*, qu'il aimoit tendrement, entre les mains de son ennemi, qui abusant de sa bonne fortune, la traitoit indignement en sa presence : & que depuis ce temps-là les Sultans pour ne s'exposer pas à un semblable malheur, ne prennent point de femmes. (*Op. cit.*, II, xxi, 370-71.)

Détails qui se retrouvent dans la bouche de Roxane :

Je sais que des sultans l'usage m'est contraire :  
Je sais qu'ils se sont fait une superbe loi  
De ne point à l'hymen assujettir leur foi.

(I, iii, 290-92)

Oui, je sais que depuis qu'un de vos empereurs,  
Bajazet, d'un barbare éprouvant les fureurs,  
Vit au char du vainqueur son épouse enchaînée,  
Et par toute l'Asie à sa suite trainée,  
De l'honneur ottoman ses successeurs jaloux  
Ont daigné rarement prendre le nom d'époux.

(II, i, 455-460)

A ces vers, Bajazet rétorquera en faisant allusion à un autre événement historique,

Au meurtre tout récent du malheureux Osman.  
Dans leur rebellion, les chefs des janissaires,  
Cherchant à colorer leurs desseins sanguinaires,  
Se crurent à sa perte assez autorisés  
Par le fatal hymen que vous me proposez.

(II, i, 488-92)

A la vérité, cet événement avait été le sujet de l'*Osman* de Tristan l'Hermite (1647) et même d'une autre tragédie de 1623, de même

que l'événement dont parlait Roxane avait été le sujet du *Grand Tamerlan et Bajazet* de Magnon (1647), mais, dans le même livre de Rycaut, Racine avait pu lire :

Cela fut la cause de la mort de Sultan *Osman*, dixième Empereur des Turcs ; car les gens de guerre qui le firent mourir l'accusèrent principalement d'avoir épousé une femme, & fait des alliances étrangères contre les loix fondamentales de l'Empire. (*Op. cit.*, II, xxi, 371-72.)

On pourrait multiplier les rapprochements entre le texte de *Bajazet* et les détails pittoresques que donne Rycaut. Le souci des bienséances poussa Racine à ne pas faire usage de certains de ces traits qui, même rapportés, eussent paru choquants au public de l'époque, mais que le poète ne pouvait guère manquer d'avoir remarqués, celui-ci par exemple :

Quand il prend envie au Grand-Seigneur de se divertir, & de folâtrer avec quelques-unes de ces filles dans le jardin . . . les Dames à l'envy l'une de l'autre s'efforcent en chantant, en dansant, & en faisant mille postures lascives, de donner de l'amour au Grand-Seigneur, & de se rendre maîtresses de son affection, sans avoir égard au respect qui est dû à Sa Majesté, ni à leur propre modestie. (*Op. cit.*, I, ix, 100-01.)

Racine n'oublia pas entièrement le tableau, mais combien il est édulcoré dans le vers de Roxane que nous avons déjà cité :

Parmi tant de beautés qui briguent leur tendresse. . . .<sup>10</sup>

Bref, Racine a emprunté son décor à Rycaut, et, dès lors, qu'avait-il besoin de demander d'autres détails à Nantouillet ou à M. de la Haye ? De plus, il n'a emprunté à Rycaut qu'un décor et non point un fondement historique que le livre n'offrait point. A M. de la Haye il n'emprunta sans doute pas plus, s'il lui emprunta quoi que ce soit, puisque cet ambassadeur n'était arrivé à Constantinople qu'après la mort de Bajazet. Quant aux souvenirs de M. de Césy, pour les raisons chronologiques rappelées plus haut, ils devaient avoir perdu de leur précision et de leur fraîcheur au moment où Racine aurait pu en profiter. Il n'est pas impossible, du reste, que Racine ait fait mention

<sup>10</sup> *Bajazet*, I, iii, 293. Racine n'avait probablement pas encore oublié ces lectures sur les méthodes orientales de choisir les femmes quand il écrivit la première scène d'*Esther* (vers 39-42 et 55-62) :

De l'Inde à l'Hellas pont ses esclaves courent,  
Les filles de l'Egypte à Suse comparurent.  
Celles même du Parthe et du Scythe indompté  
Y briguerent le sceptre offert à la beauté . . .

Qui pourrait cependant t'exprimer les cabales  
Que formait en ces lieux ce peuple de rivaux,  
Qui toutes disputant un si grand intérêt,  
Des yeux d'Assuérus attendaient leur arrêt ?  
Chacune avait sa brigade et de puissants suffrages :  
L'une d'un sang fameux vantait les avantages ;  
L'autre, pour se parer de superbes atours,  
Des plus adroites mains empruntait le secours.

de ces deux noms d'ambassadeurs simplement pour les avoir remarqués eux aussi dans le livre de Rycaut.<sup>11</sup>

On peut dès lors se demander pourquoi Racine, au risque de se faire prendre en flagrant délit de mensonge,<sup>12</sup> éprouve le besoin de recourir en 1672 au témoignage de ses contemporains. Ce n'est pas seulement, comme le suggérait A. Gazier,<sup>13</sup> pour ne pas avoir à reconnaître sa dette envers Segrais. Il pouvait fort bien, en effet, ne pas parler de ses sources, puisqu'aussi bien l'histoire de la mort de Bajazet était déjà connue et que des personnages turcs, même quasi contemporains, n'étaient pas faits pour surprendre un public qui avait déjà assisté aux représentations de bien des "turqueries" plus ou moins historiques, et avait lu un assez grand nombre de romans orientaux et de "reportages" sur l'empire ottoman.

#### IV

Une seule raison nous paraît capable d'expliquer cet étalage de sources diverses et douteuses, et c'est la polémique. Ici encore, l'examen des variantes de la préface de *Bajazet* est instructif. Dans son avertissement de 1672, Racine admet qu'il a été "obligé de changer certaines circonstances," mais il insiste sur ce qu'il n'a pas changé: "La principale chose à quoi je me suis attaché, ç'a été de ne rien changer ni aux mœurs, ni aux coutumes de cette nation"; après quoi il mentionne l'ouvrage de Rycaut, et M. de la Haye.

A la suite des attaques comme celle de Donneau de Visé contre le manque de fidélité historique de la pièce, Racine place au début de sa préface de 1676 un long paragraphe d'histoire ottomane destiné à intégrer ses personnages dans la vérité historique. Il a sans doute été puiser, à cet effet, dans les ouvrages historiques disponibles à l'époque dont l'édition de P. Mesnard nous donne une liste (II, 458). Car c'est bien après coup, pensons-nous, que Racine s'est soucié de paraître fidèle à l'histoire: la différence de son ton entre 1672 et 1676 en est la preuve. Au reste, la suite de la préface de 1676 est encore défensive; elle tend à justifier le fait d'avoir "osé mettre sur la scène une histoire si récente," audace toute relative dont Racine ne songeait nullement à s'excuser en 1672. Enfin, dans la dernière partie de cette préface, Racine riposte contre les attaques qui avaient été dirigées par Donneau de Visé, par Corneille, par Mme de Sévigné et même par Robinet contre le manque d'authenticité des Turcs de *Bajazet*. Dans ce passage, Racine développe et amplifie ce qu'il avait

<sup>11</sup> On y trouve en effet une allusion à M. de Cesi [sic] (I, xix, 216), et deux allusions à M. de la Haye et à son fils (I, xix, 217-18, et I, xx, 223).

<sup>12</sup> La suppression du nom de M. de la Haye et l'atténuation, puis la suppression de la référence à Nantouillet, révèlent peut-être une démarche de ces deux messieurs surpris de se voir impliqués dans un ouvrage dans lequel ils n'étaient pour rien et qui fut attaqué dès son apparition.

<sup>13</sup> Augustin Gazier, "Jean Racine et le théâtre français," *RCC*, XV<sup>2</sup> (1907), 664.



dit brièvement en 1672 de la fidélité minutieuse de ses personnages aux mœurs ottomanes.

Sur ce dernier point seul, Racine semble avoir prévu l'attaque possible et s'être efforcé d'y parer dès 1672. On s'étonnera peut-être qu'il n'ait point songé à la même date que la fragilité de la base historique de *Bajazet* serait une cible facile pour la critique. Mais Racine, en changeant "certaines circonstances," était bien dans la meilleure tradition de la tragédie française du XVII<sup>ème</sup> siècle, celle que Corneille lui-même avait contribué à forger. Les personnages principaux étaient historiques, tout au moins celui qui donnait son nom à la pièce, et peut-être aussi Roxane. Pour le reste, il avait certes changé quelques "circonstances," liberté que Corneille avait revendiquée pour le poète dans ses *Discours* et *Examens* de 1660 en même temps qu'il insistait sur la nécessité absolue du fondement historique; liberté que Corneille devait encore prendre en 1673 dans sa *Pulchérie* dont l'avis au lecteur déclare, après avoir exposé les données de l'histoire: "Je ne veux point prévenir votre jugement sur ce que j'y ai changé ou ajouté." On sait que Corneille ne se privait pas, jusque dans ses meilleurs ouvrages, de donner de sérieux coups de pinceau à l'histoire; *Polyeucte* et *Rodogune* en sont témoins.

Racine, lui, était bien placé pour savoir que *Bajazet* ne devait rien à l'histoire, sinon le prétexte à écrire une tragédie qui pourrait donner l'illusion d'être historique. Qu'on se rappelle les premiers mots de son avertissement de 1672: "Quoique le sujet de cette tragédie ne soit encore dans aucune histoire imprimée, il est pourtant très véritable." Non seulement la nouvelle de Segrais était-elle bel et bien imprimée depuis douze ans, mais encore Racine savait bien que les historiens authentiques ne raconteraient l'aventure de Bajazet telle qu'il la raconte lui-même que si l'on accorde au génie des poètes le privilège de faire l'histoire. En 1672, Racine s'amuse, conscient qu'il est d'avoir écrit un chef-d'œuvre, une sorte de prélude à *Phèdre*, qui, comme le dit Louis Racine, "ne perdrait rien de son prix quand le fait qui en est le fondement seroit faux." C'est stimulé par les attaques que suscita *Bajazet* que Racine dut prendre soin de défendre son œuvre même sur le terrain historique qui lui importait peu; et c'est alors qu'il alla consulter les historiens, avec l'espoir de trouver chez eux la corroboration des faits qu'il avait lui-même induits et recréés.

Cette attitude est bien digne du Racine qui avait inventé Junie sur quelques mots de Sénèque et de Tacite parce qu'elle était nécessaire à l'architecture de *Britannicus*, qui avait inventé Antiochus encore que les deux lignes de Suétone qui firent le fondement historique de *Bérénice* n'en parlassent point, du Racine qui allait inventer encore Eriphile et Aricie. Le cas d'Eriphile, tel qu'il l'expose lui-même dans la préface d'*Iphigénie*, est caractéristique de cette démarche coutumière à l'esprit du poète, de cette méthode qui tend à établir un compromis entre la liberté d'invention poétique propre à l'artiste,



et le respect apparent de l'histoire exigé par la tradition. Après avoir découvert son personnage dans Pausanias, il déclare : "Je puis dire donc que j'ai été très heureux de trouver dans les anciens cette autre Iphigénie, que j'ai pu représenter telle qu'il m'a plu." Roxane et Acomat, eux aussi, ont été représentés tel qu'il a plu à Racine de le faire ; et ce "bon plaisir" du poète est cela seul qui compte aujourd'hui pour nous, comme c'était déjà cela seul qui comptait pour Racine.

Les événements pseudo-historiques de *Bajazet* donnèrent à Racine un prétexte pour écrire ce qu'il voulait écrire, ce qu'il lui fallait écrire, prétexte qui avait manqué aux trois sujets auxquels il avait pensé avant *La Thébaine* et auxquels il dut donc renoncer, à savoir *Théagène* et *Chariclée*, *Amasie*, et *Les Amours d'Ovide*.

## V

"Un jeune homme à qui deux femmes parlent d'amour est un objet nouveau dans une tragédie," écrit Louis Racine à propos de *Bajazet*.<sup>14</sup> La piété filiale l'aveugle quelque peu et atténue la justesse de ses remarques. En effet, comme M. Boorsch l'a bien montré,<sup>15</sup> c'était là l'une des situations préférées de Corneille qui en usa depuis Jason, pris entre Médée et Créuse, jusqu'à Suréna, pris entre Mandane et Eurydice, pour ne pas parler de ses comédies. Il s'agit là d'une coïncidence, la même situation présentant pour Corneille et pour Racine des avantages de natures différentes, dramatiques pour le premier, tragiques pour l'autre. Et pourtant, Racine avait contracté quelques dettes envers son aîné et adversaire. Voltaire<sup>16</sup> est le premier à avoir souligné la similitude de situation entre certaines scènes de *Bajazet* et certaines scènes d'*Othon*. Peu de critiques<sup>17</sup> ont étudié ces similitudes. Et cependant, la situation de Plautine, obligée à renoncer à Othon pour que celui-ci soit libre d'épouser Camille, la nièce de l'empereur Galba, est à rapprocher évidemment de celle d'Atalide. Lorsque sa suivante Flavie lui demande : "Que souhaite votre âme ?" Plautine répond :

Moi-même, à dire vrai, je ne le sais pas bien.  
Comme des deux côtés le coup me sera rude,  
J'aimerais à jouir de cette inquiétude,  
Et tiendrais à bonheur le reste de mes jours  
De n'en sortir jamais et de douter toujours.

(II, i, 440-44)

<sup>14</sup> *Op. cit.*, V, 540.

<sup>15</sup> Jean Boorsch, "L'invention chez Corneille : Comment Corneille ajoute à ses sources," *Yale Romanic Studies*, XXII (New Haven, 1943), 120-24.

<sup>16</sup> *Remarques sur Othon*, dans *Œuvres complètes*, éd. Garnier, XXXII, 252-54.

<sup>17</sup> Emile Faguet (*En lisant Corneille* [Paris : Hachette, 1913], p. 211) et Robert Brasillach (*Pierre Corneille* [Paris : Fayard, 1938], pp. 289 et 404) se bornent à signaler un vague air de parenté.

Ce qui est une sorte d'avant-goût du distique d'Atalide :

S'il se rend, que deviens-je en ce malheur extrême?  
Et s'il ne se rend pas, que devient-il lui-même?  
(I, iv, 341-42)

Evidemment l'atmosphère d'*Othon* n'est pas la même que celle de *Bajazet*, mais il y a déjà dans *Othon* une ambiance oppressante de coupe-gorge. Du reste, que Racine ait bien connu *Othon*, on ne peut pas en douter. Sans compter les rapprochements que M. Herrmann a fait entre *Bérénice* et *Othon*,<sup>18</sup> au moins un vers de *Bajazet* vient, semble-t-il, directement de Corneille. Lorsqu'Atalide s'écrie :

Mais qu'aisément l'amour croit tout ce qu'il souhaite!  
(I, iv, 373)

elle reproduit presque mot pour mot les paroles qui, dans *Othon*, sont prononcées non pas par Plautine, mais, chose curieuse, par Camille qui, toutes proportions gardées, joue le rôle que Roxane jouera dans *Bajazet*:

Hélas! Que cet amour croit tôt ce qu'il souhaite!<sup>19</sup>

Mais, si l'on en croit les critiques, ce n'est pas seulement à *Othon* que pensa Racine en écrivant *Bajazet*, mais encore à *L'Heureux Voyage* de Rotrou (1637), mais encore au *Grand Tamerlan et Bajazet* de Magnon (1647),<sup>20</sup> et à tant d'autres!

## VI

Mais, faudrait-il s'arrêter là? Les rugissements que la jalousie arrache à Roxane, ne sont-ils pas un peu les échos de ceux de toutes les femmes blessées et trahies de l'antiquité, de toutes ces princesses abandonnées et meurtries qui pleurent en distiques dans les *Héroïdes*

<sup>18</sup> "Vers une solution du problème des deux 'Bérénices,'" *MdF*, CCIII (1928), 229-30.

<sup>19</sup> *Othon*, III, i, 829. Au reste, Axiane disait déjà à Cléofile (*Alexandre*, III, i, 651-52) :

Vous poussez un peu loin vos vœux précipités,  
Et vous croyez trop tôt ce que vous souhaitez.

Mithridate dira de même (*Mithridate*, III, iv, 1027) :

L'amour évidemment croit tout ce qui le flatte.

De même Corneille faisait dire à son Amarante (*La Suivante*, III, v, 811-12) :

Qu'aisément un esprit qui se laisse flatter  
S' imagine un honneur qu'il pense mériter;

Tandis que Théante soupirait au contraire (*ibid.*, I, ii, 106-08) :

Que l'amour aisément penche à la jalousie!  
Qu'on croit tôt ce qu'on craint en ces perplexités  
Où les moindres soupçons passent pour vérités.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ferdinando Neri, "La sorte del Rotrou," dans *Storia e poesia* (Turin: Chiantore, 1944), pp. 173-74; et Consuelo Houts, "Two Sources of Racine's *Bajazet*," dans University of Washington, *Abstract of Theses* (Seattle, 1937), pp. 291-93.

d'Ovide, de Déjanire et de Didon, de Phèdre et de Circé, et même de Bradamante? Leurs cris et leurs soupirs, immortalisés par Sophocle et Euripide, par Homère et Virgile, par Sénèque, par Ovide, par l'Arioste, n'avaient-ils pas constitué le fond sonore de l'adolescence et de la jeunesse du poète français? Derrière tels vers de Roxane, ne peut-on pas entendre sur un mode différent la Médée de Sénèque:

Si quaeris odio, misera, quem statuas modum,  
Imitare amoris;<sup>21</sup>

ou encore celle d'Ovide:

Si facere hoc aliamue potest praeponere nobis,  
Occidat ingratus.<sup>22</sup>  
Est aliqua ingrato meritum exprobare uoluptas;  
Hac fruar, haec de te gaudia sola feram;<sup>23</sup>

ou même celle de Corneille:

S'il a manqué d'amour, manque-t-il de mémoire?  
Me peut-il bien quitter après tant de bienfaits?  
M'ose-t-il bien quitter après tant de forfaits?  
Sachant ce que je suis, ayant vu ce que j'ose,  
Croit-il que m'offenser ce soit si peu de chose?<sup>24</sup>

Nous touchons ici aux limites mêmes de ce genre d'études, où tout est possible et rien n'est certain, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de Racine qui avait tout lu et relu la plume à la main et dont la mémoire, même si elle n'avait pas effectivement retenu comme le veut la tradition les dix livres d'Héliodore, n'en était pas moins exceptionnellement fidèle.<sup>25</sup> Nous touchons ici au point précis où le poète va "cristalliser" toutes ses "sources," celles que nous avons relevées et les autres, en un chef-d'œuvre final; et c'est précisément ce phénomène magique de "cristallisation" que nous sommes impuissants à montrer. C'est là le secret que Racine n'a partagé qu'avec sa Muse, et ces colloques nous sont infiniment plus hermétiques que ceux du poète avec la Duparc ou la Champmeslé.

Ce que nous pouvons dire cependant, c'est que le sujet de *Bajazet*, Racine le portait en lui depuis Port-Royal et son tête-à-tête d'adolescent avec Théagène et Chariclée. Comment décrire cette gestation de quinze années? D'Héliodore à Nantouillet, quels furent les instruments d'un hasard clairvoyant qui rappelait constamment à Racine qu'il lui faudrait un jour créer Roxane et Phèdre pour se libérer une fois pour toutes? François Mauriac écrit dans son *Journal*:

<sup>21</sup> *Médée*, 397-98.

<sup>22</sup> *Métamorphoses*, VII, 42-43.

<sup>23</sup> *Héroïdes*, XII, 21-22.

<sup>24</sup> *Médée*, I, iv, 230-34.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. les belles et fines pages d'Henri Bremond sur la mémoire de Racine dans *Racine et Valéry* (Paris: Grasset, 1930), pp. 153-59.

Il existe des hommes qui n'imaginent pas comment ils auraient pu vivre s'ils n'avaient su donner à leur tourment son expression. . . . Après *Phèdre*, Racine pouvait sans regret cesser d'écrire. Et même après *Andromaque* (et plus précisément après le cri d'Hermione: 'Je ne t'ai point aimé, cruel! Qu'ai-je donc fait?' et les vers qui suivent) il aurait pu alors consentir au repos, car tout le trouble de sa propre vie, les pleurs qu'il avait fait verser, et les larmes peut-être qu'il avait lui-même répandues, tout cela avait déjà trouvé sa justification et son accomplissement.<sup>26</sup>

C'est surtout au cri: "Ah! je l'ai trop aimé pour ne le point haïr" que nous pensons quand nous considérons Hermione et Roxane comme les deux premiers avatars de *Phèdre*, comme les deux premières ébauches magistrales de Racine pour se délivrer du fardeau qu'il portait, pour essayer de mettre en scène à jamais le beau crime passionnel, la femme qui pour toujours demeurera pour nous celle qui tue par amour et malgré elle.

Mais, en dépit de cette prétendue fatalité de l'œuvre d'art, nous pensons que, n'eût été cette histoire turque que Nantouillet lui conta en le renvoyant sans doute à Segrais,<sup>27</sup> Racine n'eût pas écrit en 1672 ce drame qu'il portait en lui, et que *Phèdre* dès lors y eût sans doute perdu en fini. Assurément les personnages d'Héliodore auraient pu se prêter au même drame, mais il leur manquait l'estampille de l'histoire ou de la légende noble. Racine, qui avait renoncé dans sa jeunesse à mettre en scène Théagène et Chariclée, ne s'y serait pas aventuré en 1672 après les cabales suscitées par *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, et *Bérénice*. Les quelques mots distraits que Nantouillet dit peut-être à Racine par un bel après-midi dans un couloir de Versailles, de ce Nantouillet qui, nous rapporte Saint-Simon, était "si goûté du monde par le sel de ses chansons et l'agrément et le naturel de son esprit," ces quelques mots ont agi à la manière d'un catalyseur. Les éléments du précipité étaient prêts depuis quinze ans; ils étaient mûrs et n'attendaient que l'occasion. Quelle ne dut pas être la stupeur du chevalier en se voyant attribuer dans la préface de *Bajazet* la paternité de l'explosion!

C'est donc pour des raisons somme toute secondaires, des raisons transitoires de goût contemporain, de tabous passagers, de mode provisoire, de polémique, qu'en 1672, l'incarnation de la meurtrière amoureuse porte un costume turc, costume dont l'authenticité douteuse devait être une cible facile pour les jaloux de l'époque. Mais ce costume, lui aussi, est secondaire et adventice. Comme le disait Giraudoux: "Dans aucune œuvre d'art les corps nus des héros n'ont été aussi distincts de leurs vêtements."<sup>28</sup>

Yale University

<sup>26</sup> François Mauriac, *Journal II* (Paris: Grasset, 1937), pp. 137-40.

<sup>27</sup> L'hypothèse selon laquelle Nantouillet aurait renvoyé Racine à Segrais est de M. Lancaster (*History of French Dramatic Literature in the Seventeenth Century*, 9 vols. [Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929-1942], IV, 78). Du reste la source commune de Segrais et de Nantouillet était en dernière analyse M. de Césy à qui Segrais fait une allusion fort claire dans sa nouvelle.

<sup>28</sup> Jean Giraudoux, "Racine," dans *Littérature* (Paris: Grasset, 1941), p. 53.

## THE CATHOLIC NATURALISM OF MANUEL GALVEZ

By DONALD F. BROWN

Except for a brief interlude in his youth, Gálvez has always been a loyal Catholic.<sup>1</sup> Throughout most of his literary career he has also shown himself to be a loyal naturalist, believing strongly in the deterministic effects of heredity and environment. The balance which he strikes between the churchly belief in free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and naturalistic determinism on the other makes an interesting subject of investigation. Gálvez thought at the publication of his fourth novel, *Tragedia de un hombre fuerte* (1922), that he had abandoned naturalism in favor of the psychological school of Paul Bourget. However, his very next novel, *Historia de arrabal* (1922), was the most naturalistic work he had yet produced. What happened thereafter was merely an amalgamation of the two influences, for really the psychological novel is but an outgrowth and refinement of its predecessor and believes no less in determinism. This development in Gálvez' work, then, does not interfere with the basic problem before us, namely, how does he reconcile determinism and free will?

But before taking up that important problem, let us consider some evidence of a more general nature to show how strong is his acceptance of the naturalistic technique and philosophy. In his essay entitled *El espíritu de la aristocracia*, which appeared in 1924, Gálvez reveals how strong is his belief in the power of heredity as a determining force:

Pero ¿qué es la aristocracia? Creo definirla con una sola palabra: distinción. Se equivocan quienes imaginan que la distinción se adquiere. Este admirable don es congénito, y no aparece, salvo excepciones, sino entre la clase aristocrática. La distinción procede de viejos hábitos de cultura, de largos años de tradición. Es obra de la herencia y del ambiente, completada en cada caso por las inclinaciones personales. A veces surge del pueblo o de la burguesía un hombre distinguido. Pero ante un ejemplo de esta índole, convendría preguntar: ¿es todo pueblo este hombre, o todo burguesía? ¿No habrá penetrado entre su ascendencia, en tiempo próximo o lejano, y mediante el amor irregular, algún poco del espíritu aristocrático?

Una aristocracia se va formando lentamente. Así como en la aptitud creadora del artista está visible el espíritu de los antepasados, así también el hombre

<sup>1</sup> Speaking of his early days as a writer, Gálvez tells us that while he did cease to be a Catholic for a few years, still "Yo no tardé en retornar a mis creencias. Hice obra católica en mis versos, publicados en 1907 y 1909, y en 1910 publiqué el primer libro católico, de carácter literario, que hubiera producido un escritor argentino de aquellas décadas: *El diario de Gabriel Quiroga*. Era católico y también algo reaccionario en política. En esto, como en otras cosas, he sido, pues, un precursor." Manuel Gálvez, *La Argentina en nuestros libros* (Santiago: Biblioteca América, 1935), p. 85.

distinguido es un producto de anteriores influencias. De este modo, una familia burguesa llega, por sucesivos mejoramientos, a producir tipos de alta distinción. Y por esto mismo, en las familias aristocráticas reaparece, de cuando en cuando, la vulgaridad del ascendiente burgués o la terquedad del abuelo hombre del pueblo. La aristocracia es una selección. Esto es verdad lo mismo entre los seres humanos que entre los caballos de carrera. Pretender destruir la aristocracia es pretender impedir el cumplimiento de una ley biológica tan indudable como lo es la herencia.<sup>2</sup>

So much for Gálvez' confession of faith in heredity. As for his belief in the determining force of environment, let us wait to consider that, novel by novel. Concerning his continued dependence on formal documentation, consider this complaint from *La Argentina en nuestros libros* (1935):

Los novelistas no tenemos facilidades para documentarnos. Un novelista casado, que quisiera frecuentar el cabaret para estudiarlo y reflejar su vida en un libro, no podría hacerlo sin desprestigiarse.<sup>3</sup>

And a further amplification of the theme from the novel *Hombres en soledad* (1938):

Claraval había más adivinado que oído. Sin contestarle, refirió algo de la lucha constante, casi heroica, de Pedro Roig contra el ambiente. Como novelista, necesitaba vivir en perpetua documentación, frecuentar toda clase de lugares, conversar con las mujeres. Pero su condición de hombre casado lo trababa en su libertad. No se atrevía a ir a un cabaret, y no para divertirse, cosa que no le interesaba, pero ni como simple observador. Su mujer recibía anónimos en los que le aseguraban haber visto a Roig con mujeres en tal o cual parte.<sup>4</sup>

Gálvez himself admits—rather cautiously—his debt to Flaubert:

La influencia francesa, en la mayor parte de los casos, es casi siempre puramente técnica. Pondré como ejemplo mi libro *La maestra normal*. . . En esa novela se ha visto, erróneamente, la influencia de Zola. No es que yo desdén al autor de *Germinal*. Al contrario, le considero como una de las cumbres de la novela universal, como un gran poeta épico que ha dado vida a una época y que ha movido las multitudes con sus pasiones, sus grandezas, sus crímenes. Pero la influencia de Zola no existe en aquel libro mío. Si a algún escritor debe algo esta novela, es a Flaubert. Pero ¿qué hay en ella de Flaubert? Nada más que estas cosas: la idea de encerrar en un volumen toda la vida de provincia; el método de composición y de narración, sobre todo la manera de sintetizar el diálogo y de mezclarlo con la descripción; probablemente algún lejano parentesco entre Emma Bovary y mi Raselda, o entre Homais y el profesor Albarenque, director de la Escuela Normal. Fuera de esto, que es bien poco, todo es netamente argentino en mi libro.<sup>5</sup>

That the influence of the naturalists goes deeper than Gálvez will here admit, is the opinion of most critics. Indeed, despite his protestations

<sup>2</sup> Manuel Gálvez, *El espíritu de la aristocracia y otros ensayos* (Buenos Aires: Agencia general de librería y publicaciones, 1924), pp. 9-10.

<sup>3</sup> P. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Manuel Gálvez, *Hombres en soledad* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Losada, 1942), p. 182.

<sup>5</sup> Gálvez, *La Argentina en nuestros libros*, pp. 60-61.

to the contrary, many compare Gálvez directly to Zola,<sup>6</sup> especially because of his obvious attempt to write a series of novels each one devoted to a distinct Argentine environment.<sup>7</sup> But whether his debt be more to Flaubert than to Zola makes little difference; the essential fact is that Gálvez did adopt French naturalism and continues to observe many of its essential tenets.

Let us turn now to the more interesting question of determinism versus free will in the novels of this Catholic naturalist, and in doing so let us consider first *La maestra normal*. One of the reasons for the continuing success of this novel is its firm basis in reality:

Son cosas vistas por mí en la Rioja o en otras provincias vecinas. El mismo profesor Albarenque ha sido tomado estrictamente de la realidad. Hasta podría decir que no he inventado nada, pues me he servido de personajes, paisajes, conflictos, caracteres, escenas y tipos secundarios que estaban al alcance de mi observación.<sup>8</sup>

In other words, Gálvez wrote the book exactly according to the Zola formula: author observes and absorbs the chosen environment until the documentation itself suggests the characters and simple plot to be portrayed in the novel. His obvious purpose was to show how the forces of the milieu brought about the downfall of the weak character Raselda. The public did not perceive this, but rather concluded that Gálvez was attacking the normal-school system by presenting this supposedly immoral girl as a typical public-school teacher. Indeed, the book got its first boost toward notoriety when Unamuno wrote an article praising it as an attack on the non-Church-connected school system. Friends of the lay school—notably Leopoldo Lugones—criticized the book violently for the same reason. But in answer to Lugones, Gálvez wrote:

Además, no se puede hablar de inmoralidad en el caso de mi protagonista. Cae engañada, piensa que su amante se casará con ella, la precipitan en su caída mil circunstancias, una sirvienta imprudente y criminal, una amiga descocada y perdida. Todo el libro no es sino una justificación de la caída de Raselda, y no es posible tratar una personaje con más afecto.<sup>9</sup>

In other words, Raselda was not immoral; she was merely up against an environment that was too strong for her, the typical naturalistic situation.

But the novel does not end according to formula. Logically Raselda should have sunk lower and lower into the dregs of *la mala vida*. But

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Olivari and Stanchini, *Manuel Gálvez, ensayo sobre su obra* (Buenos Aires: Agencia general de librería y publicaciones, 1924), pp. 23-24. The authors not only compare Gálvez to Zola, but cite the opinion of the Brazilian, Monteiro Lobato, to back them up.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *La Argentina en nuestros libros*, pp. 11-13, in which Gálvez enumerates proudly the many different Argentine milieux of which he has written.

<sup>8</sup> *La Argentina en nuestros libros*, p. 61.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted by Olivari and Stanchini in their book, *Manuel Gálvez, ensayo sobre su obra*, pp. 60-61.



no, just as the train is about to take her to Buenos Aires as the mistress of Galiani, Don Nilamón, the good Christian doctor, intervenes, snatches her off the train, gets her a job in a country school, and the last we hear of her she is finding much solace in religion. Gálvez the Catholic has superseded Gálvez the naturalist. There was one loyal Catholic in the book, and he was the only character strong enough to stand up to the forces of environment and save Raselda.

In Gálvez' third novel, *La sombra del convento* (1917), the conflict between determinism and the churchly point of view is openly joined at one point in a conversation between the unsympathetic character Ignacio—representing the bigoted views of old Córdoba—and his cousin, José Alberto Flores, who has returned to his native city full of *weltschmerz* and yearnings for the faith of his childhood:

—¡Me alegro de que te hayas desilusionado, me alegro!—exclamó Ignacio irritadamente. —Ahora aprenderás lo que vale tener un hogar y ser un buen cristiano. Me alegro!

—Yo nunca lo he dudado, Nacho. Pero hay dentro de uno algo que puede más que la propia voluntad.

—Pamplinas. No vengas aquí con ideas deterministas y materialistas porque te va a ir mal. Cada uno es el único responsable de sus malas acciones. El que obra bien es porque quiere obrar bien; porque tiene temor de Dios. El que obra mal es porque es malo y no teme a Dios ni a los castigos eternos.

José Alberto miró a su primo con inmenso asombro. Jamás, desde que dejara el colegio, había oído palabras semejantes, y ahora, al escucharlas en boca de un hombre de su tiempo y de su cultura, le causaban un extraño efecto.<sup>10</sup>

Obviously the author, who has spent thirty-eight pages explaining how environment had made José Alberto what he was, does not agree with the stiff and unyielding Christianity of Ignacio. Without being anti-clerical *La sombra del convento* succeeds in condemning intolerance and bigotry quite as effectively as *Doña Perfecta*. The difference is that Gálvez criticizes with understanding and sympathy rather than with the bitterness of a Galdós. After struggling with himself for many weeks, José Alberto finally finds a priest with the *criollo* spirit, rather than the harsh Spanish Catholicism of the other Cordovans. This Padre Rincón, who brings about José Alberto's return to the faith and who readily admits the Church's imperfections, is very likely the author's *portavoz*. One of his speeches gives a good indication of Gálvez' own religious viewpoint:

—En nuestra iglesia cabe mucho más de lo que imaginan los que no la conocen. Hay mucha libertad, pero nuestros enemigos, y aun infinidad de católicos lo ignoran. Ahí tiene usted la evolución. Nos están jorobando con esta doctrina, como si ella fuese a reventar la Iglesia. ¿Y sabe quién inventó la evolución? Pues, San Agustín, hombre, San Agustín. Y así en muchas cosas. Repito que todo cabe en nuestra Iglesia: desde el más puro espíritu franciscano hasta el catolicismo perseguidor de León Bloy, que insulta a cuanto cura Dios crió, a obispos y hasta al Papa; desde el *fideísmo* por pálpito de mi cocinera

<sup>10</sup> Manuel Gálvez, *La sombra del convento* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Tor, n.d.), p. 38.

hasta el racionalismo de los teólogos; desde la religión humana y tolerante de muchos católicos hasta la de garrotazo y tente tieso de algunos que verían con gusto la Inquisición.

—Yo encuentro—dijo Flores—que la mayoría de los católicos practicantes no son cristianos.

—¿Cómo es eso?—preguntó Rincón, sonriendo.

—El cristianismo se define pronunciando tres o cuatro palabras: fraternidad, piedad, humildad, penitencia. ¿Y qué fraternidad existe entre los católicos? Para casi todos la religión es apenas una opinión política. Un partido. Son católicos del modo que son radicales o autonomistas. Algunos creen de veras, no lo dudo. Llegan hasta ser un poco místicos. Pero no son cristianos.

Rincón pensó: 'Has hablado como un libro. Si sabré eso! Cuarenta años confesando! ¿Y quién tiene la culpa de que no haya más cristianismo? Nosotros, los curas, pues.'<sup>11</sup>

Plainly, Gálvez along with his creation, Padre Rincón, professes a liberal Catholicism which can see the flaws in the Church and yet retain a balanced Christian viewpoint and a warm sympathy for those in trouble, especially for the weak ones who find the forces of heredity and environment too strong for them.

Indeed, like most naturalists, Gálvez prefers to write of the weak and unfortunate:

La ternura del artista no puede ir sino a los fracasados y a los infelices. Ellos necesitan nuestro amor y no los triunfadores ni los dichosos. Estos se bastan a sí mismos. Y si el escritor no es un egoísta, si sabe sufrir por los que se fracasan, ¿ha de prescindir del tesoro de la compasión? ¿Ha de privarse de arrojar sobre el mundo—que tanto lo reclama—su semilla de bien y de bondad, sólo porque su simpatía hacia los débiles y los fracasados repugna a los felices y a los que ignoran la tristeza de haber perdido la voluntad y de no tener la más mínima fuerza para oponerse al Destino?<sup>12</sup>

Two things stand out in this statement of Gálvez' viewpoint as a writer: the obvious sincerity of his Christian compassion for *los fracasados*, and at the same time his admission that human souls do reach a point where there is no will power left to resist the buffetings of fate. Examples of the latter are to be found in the author's novelistic work, especially in the two novels which treat of prostitution in Buenos Aires, *Nacha Regules* (1919) and *Historia de arrabal* (1922). The interesting thing about it, however, is how long hope and the will toward self-betterment persist in the fallen women whom Gálvez describes. *Nacha Regules* is extremely well documented. It is full of case histories, any one of which might serve as a basis for a full-length naturalistic novel. In each one the girl is the victim of circumstance, although she strives against each successive degradation. Consider, for instance, Julieta's story, which is really a masterpiece of condensed convincingness:

<sup>11</sup> *Sombra del convento*, pp. 149-50.

<sup>12</sup> From Gálvez' essay, *Las almas débiles en la novela moderna*, contained in his *Espíritu de la aristocracia y otros ensayos*, pp. 131-32.

—Cuando vivíamos en Tandil éramos ricos. Mi padre tenía estancia, mis hermanos mayores se educaban en Buenos Aires. Pero un día mi padre se suicidó. Quedamos pobres. Nos vinimos a Buenos Aires. Aquí, vivíamos de una rentita que nos quedó. Mis hermanas se casaron y las dos son ricas. Yo no iba al colegio, porque tenía que trabajar en casa. Mis hermanas no ayudaban a mamá. Tuve un novio. Yo lo adoraba. Un día me llevó no sé a dónde. Yo estaba enamorada, creía que nos casaríamos, y él hizo su voluntad. Quedé pronto en una situación que era un continuo padecimiento para mí. Inventamos una visita a una amiga, y se realizó el crimen. ¡Es el dolor de mi vida! Si mi hijito viviera, nada me importaría sufrir. Volví a casa, pero mis hermanas supieron todo. Quisieron que mamá me echara. El marido de una me dijo una palabra que nunca debió decirme. Yo no era eso. Yo había caído por amor, me engañaron. ¡Qué sabía yo de la vida, ni de los hombres! Mamá intentó defenderme, pero ellas dijeron a mamá que si me defendía se quedarían sin madre. Me fui de la casa dispuesta a trabajar. Padecí hambre. Una época, dormí en un cuarto de diez pesos mensuales. Fui a una sociedad de beneficencia para pedir socorros. Dije que me moría de hambre, que tendría que perderme si no se me ayudaba. Me contestaron que una muchacha fuerte y joven debía trabajar. Que no faltaba trabajo. . . .

El llanto comenzó a borrar las palabras, a cortarlas, a mezclar las sílabas limitrofes. No importaba. Monsalvat y Nacha conocían aquella historia. Era la tierna historia de las mujeres caídas, la obra de la maldad de unos cuantos y del egoísmo y la inconsciencia de todos. Aquellas hermanas brutales no perdonaban porque la sociedad y el dinero les ordenaban no perdonar. Julieta refirió la lucha atroz por el pan. Quería ser honesta, y a cada paso la acechaba un hombre que intentaba comprarla. Si le ofrecían trabajo, los mismos labios protectores exigían su cuerpo. ¡Más bien no fuera bonita! Cayó defendiéndose, llegó a sirvienta. Ella, hija de un estanciero; ella, que tenía hermanas casadas con ricos. Limpió letrinas y comió las sobras, ella, que nació para ser una niña como las otras, una señora como sus hermanas. Por fin no pudo más y cedió. Rodó por las casas de citas, fué sencillamente una ramera. Pero aprendió a vivir y limitó su bajeza. Y entonces, dentro de su vida de prostituta, se hizo seria y ordenada. Soñó en salir de allí.

—Pero hace pocos días me pidieron el cuarto de la pensión. Debía mucho. En la casa donde ganaba la plata me iba mal. No había tenido suerte. Y esa tarde me pidieron el cuarto, salí a la calle. Nunca había hecho eso: ofrecerme al primero que pasara. Pero me echaban del cuarto. . . . No pensé lo que hacía. Fué mi desgracia terrible. Ahora, ¿qué hacer? Seguir en la vida sería un crimen. Trabajar. . . . Si no encontré trabajo antes, ¿qué sería ahora? Y, sin embargo, ahora preciso más que nunca, porque quiero curarme, porque quiero ser buena y. . . .

Un sollozo devoró la palabra que seguía. La cabeza cayó sobre el aro temblante de los brazos. Monsalvat dijo:

—Todo se ha de arreglar. . . .<sup>18</sup>

And here again, when the girl can resist no longer, the idealistic character Monsalvat—like the Catholic doctor who saved Raselda—steps in and saves Julieta. He also, after heroic struggles, saves the chief character, Nacha. The novel presents a city of the lost with one poor idealist trying to save it. As Olivari and Stanchini put it:

. . . Monsalvat; vale decir Cristo en Buenos Aires. Un nuevo Cristo triste, trágico, doloroso, infinito de piedad: ciudadano de una urbe que abre su alma

<sup>18</sup> Manuel Gálvez, *Nacha Regules* (Buenos Aires: Ed. Tor, n.d.), pp. 134-35.

a la gran injusticia social, y sólo por bondad, por bondad, lucha con el medio. . . .<sup>14</sup>

It may be asked what such an unrealistic character is doing in a naturalistic book, but the odd thing is that Monsalvat does not seem unreal at all.

Positivamente uno de los mejores aciertos de esta novela reside en la *verdad* de este personaje, porque si bien es cierto que el lector no ha conocido a ningún ser humano de las excepcionales condiciones de Monsalvat, ninguno de sus rasgos morales desdice con la naturalidad más absoluta, ni con la realidad más triste, ni con la bondad más humana. Es el hombre bueno por excelencia. El mismo hombre bueno que lleva aletargado nuestro prójimo, nuestro vecino, el primer transeunte, pero que en Monsalvat está exaltado porque la fantasía del novelista ha reformado la naturaleza humana para continuar su obra creadora. Y lo exaltado por la fantasía de los poetas—Quijote, Hamlet, Valjean—, tiene mucho más vida que lo engendrado por mujer. . . .<sup>15</sup>

Owing to the high idealism of Monsalvat and the high note of optimism with which the book ends, some critics argue that this is not naturalism at all. Certainly it is not pure and undiluted naturalism, but neither is it romanticism—it is far too real for that. To me it is merely a continuation, on an accentuated scale, of Gálvez' two loyalties, naturalism and Christianity. The lone Christian character who remained somewhat in the background in *La maestra normal* has become the central character, Monsalvat. And instead of a dreamy provincial town realistically described, we now have the great metropolis of Buenos Aires with all of its superior wickedness. Just as Zola began his Rougon—Macquart series with a portrayal of life in provincial Plassans and later reached his crescendo in *L'Assommoir*, the novel of the Paris slums, so there develops a crescendo in Gálvez' realism as he turns from La Rioja to Buenos Aires. In La Rioja the only *mala vida* to be described was that of the dirty little *ranchos* on the edge of town; in the capital there was much more scope, as Olivari and Stanchini point out:

Efectivamente, su autor revela los aspectos esenciales de la prostitución en Buenos Aires, pintando con sorprendente colorido y gran fidelidad, desde las más lujosas casas de citas hasta los más asquerosos burdeles de la Boca y Barracas, donde la alpargata, el pañuelo y el cuchillo distinguen a sus asiduos concurrentes. . . . *Nacha Regules* es, en una palabra, la novela de la mala vida en Buenos Aires.<sup>16</sup>

But these critics go on to say that despite the thoroughness of Gálvez' documentary coverage, he has exercised a certain restraint:

A pesar de que la mayoría de las descripciones de *Nacha Regules* se prestaban para pintar cuadros de baja sensualidad, lo que le hubiera conducido a un fácil triunfo. Gálvez los ha rehuido con una honestidad digna de todo elogio. . . .

<sup>14</sup> Olivari and Stanchini, *Manuel Gálvez, ensayo sobre su obra*, p. 80.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

*Nacha Regules* es un libro delicadamente limpio, que pueden leer todos los limpios de alma. . .<sup>17</sup>

Naturally the duality of viewpoint would affect Gálvez in his naturalistic frankness. The naturalists all justify their exaggerated frankness as merely an expression of their passion for truth—especially the whole truth. Nevertheless, as one reads Zola, one cannot but be aware of a certain sensual delight which permeates his frank descriptions and portrayals. Not so with Gálvez. His prostitutes do not revel in their condition as did Nana, but rather are presented as unfortunate victims who fight against each successive step downward. As we follow Monsalvat in his long fruitless searches for Nacha from one brothel to another, we share his repulsion and disgust at what he finds. The reader can readily imagine the difficulties of the author in obtaining his documentation. One senses that it was a task rather than a pleasure—a task, incidentally, which was undoubtedly much more thoroughly done than Zola's documentation for *Nana*. The latter is not nearly so convincing in its realism as is *Nacha Regules*.

Certain novels on Gálvez' list are not so interesting from the point of view of this discussion as others. I am therefore not stopping to analyze *El mal metafísico* (1916) or *Tragedia de un hombre fuerte* (1922). Neither one has much, if any, religious element, and the latter represents chiefly Gálvez' first sally into the field of the psychological novel. It is especially a study of feminine psychology, a subject in which our author became much more adept later on, notably in his *Hombres en soledad* (1938).

*Historia de arrabal* (1922) interests us because it is starkly and cruelly a naturalistic novel from beginning to end. Gálvez seems to have set himself to produce a work of fiction in which idealism should have no part whatever. It is *Nacha Regules* without Monsalvat. In his place is the sinister El Chino who has his evil way. The girl, Rosalinda, comes to be completely dominated by this criminal, and escapes only temporarily while he is serving a jail sentence. Once she did scheme to kill him, and hid some of her earnings from him in order to buy a revolver. But when she is about to pull the trigger on him in the dead of night, he awakes and reasserts his almost hypnotic dominance. While El Chino is in jail, Rosalinda has a *novio* who plans to marry her. He procrastinates, however, and El Chino being released reasserts his authority. He makes her into his "gold mine" or private prostitute, whose earnings from other men he appropriates. Through the efforts of friends she again meets her *novio*, who still loves her. They plan to set up housekeeping in another part of town and escape from El Chino. But the latter's spies have followed Rosalinda, and when the *novios* are installed, El Chino appears with his helpers. Dominating the girl once more, he gives

<sup>17</sup> Olivari and Stanchini, *Manuel Gálvez, ensayo sobre su obra*, p. 83.

her the knife, and without his uttering a word she knows what she is to do. Pretending to embrace her sweetheart, she stabs him in the heart. El Chino stands justified before his friends, who had smiled at his discomfiture over the rebellion of his "gold mine." Theirs never rebelled.

The story sounds lurid and dime-novelish, told thus briefly in résumé, but with the necessary background and details it is convincing enough. Rosalinda is a victim who, in spite of her occasional struggling, is quite incapable of overcoming the crushing forces of her environment. She is one of those who know "la tristeza de haber perdido la voluntad y de no tener la más mínima fuerza para oponerse al Destino."<sup>18</sup> Quite evidently Gálvez believes that determinism often does have its own way—when there are no good forces on hand to block it.

In *El cántico espiritual* (1923) Gálvez treats the apparently unnaturalistic theme of a platonic friendship. He accounts for it, however, in the best deterministic tradition. The man, Mauricio, is represented as a strong-willed and self-disciplined artist, very idealistic and devoted to his art. Gálvez sketches his whole background from childhood through his schooling and early manhood, showing the development of his aggressive and self-reliant character. The lady is both idealistic and afraid of the consequences of an outright adulterous situation. There is a point in the novel where the gathering forces of instinct almost have their way:

Su brazo, en la cintura de Susana, la atraía con una decisión de dueño. Hasta entonces, sus ternuras, sus caricias, tuvieron algo de flojo, y podría decirse de femenino por cuanto el sentimiento predominaba en ellas. Pero ahora, todas sus actitudes y sus gestos desbordaban de dominadora virilidad. Ya no era la caricia que busca una colaboración o una respuesta. Era la fuerte voluntad del macho, en toda su plenitud. Susana, palpitante, debía estar luchando entre ceder o apartarse. Casi no hablaban. Por fin los rostros se acercaron, atraídos mutuamente, y el beso en la boca pareció fatal.

Mauricio, de pronto, se dominó. Ocurrióle como a un pianista que estuviese ejecutando un tango sensual, y a quien alguien, instantáneamente, le cambia la música, poniéndole, en vez del tango, una sonata de Beethoven. ¿Quién cambió a Mauricio la música que ejecutaba? Así como el instinto trabaja dentro de nosotros y en un momento nos obliga a ejecutar un acto inesperado, así también las fuerzas morales salen a la superficie en ciertos instantes, sin que sepamos por qué. No es esto lo común, porque generalmente no hemos cultivado nuestras fuerzas morales. Pero los santos lo saben muy bien. La ayuda inesperada que en sus luchas contra el pecado les viene repentinamente, no es sino una consecuencia de la ejercitación de la voluntad y del pensamiento. En Mauricio el instinto era menos poderoso que las fuerzas morales. Estaba ejercitado en un sentido diferente que aquel por el cual pasaba en ese momento. Nada de extraño, pues, que el Espíritu del Bien, que no es sino la consecuencia de una serie de actos anteriores, le detuviese y le pusiera ante los ojos otra música bien distinta.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Cf. note 12.

<sup>19</sup> Manuel Gálvez, *El cántico espiritual* (Buenos Aires: Agencia general de librería y publicaciones, 1923), pp. 271-72.



Of course, the mere fact that Gálvez steps into his story to make this scientific explanation is itself a violation of the naturalistic tenet of impersonal style; nevertheless, it must have been his naturalistic conscience that impelled him to apologize for his hero's will power. His explanation, however, does sound most objective and convincing. Indeed, when he says that the Spirit of Good (with capital letters) is nothing but the consequence of one's previous acts, he sounds almost irreligious.

As the years pass, however, Gálvez becomes ever less apologetic for his religious viewpoint. In *Miércoles Santo* (1930) the difficulties of the religious life form the central theme of the novel, which recounts a day in the life of a Father Confessor. The book tells the story of Father Solanas' conflict with temptation, and dramatizes the old struggle between determinism and free will—the flesh versus the spirit. So close is the conflict that whereas in the first edition of the novel Gálvez has his protagonist lose the struggle and his own soul into the hands of Satan, in a later edition he thought it more logical and fitting for the Virgin to appear to Padre Solanas at the end and grant him pardon.<sup>20</sup> This novel but further dramatizes the duality of Gálvez' point of view—man has free will, but it is sometimes overpowered by superior forces.

The most balanced and mature novel of the contemporary scene which Gálvez has produced is undoubtedly his *Hombres en soledad* (1938). Here merge in perfect balance all the ideologies traceable in Gálvez' work. One senses that he still believes to an extent in determinism, but that he is now more inclined to take it for granted. He is still definitely Catholic in his viewpoint, too, but he realizes that the majority of the Buenos Aires intelligentsia, of whom he writes, have not had any vital experience with religion, so that aspect does not occupy the center of the stage. Gálvez' later loyalty to the psychological school comes to full fruition in this novel. Unlike the series of unreal and hard-to-remember female characters who people the pages of *Tragedia de un hombre fuerte*, *Hombres en soledad* is full of unforgettable people, both men and women. In his early novels Gálvez succeeds best when he explains his characters carefully in terms of their heredity and environment. His attempt to dispense with or overcondense this background material resulted in a series of pale characterizations in *Tragedia*. However, in *Soledad* his hand is surer. Sixteen more years of work and observation have made the difference. His work as a naturalist has served as training for the production of this sound psychological novel.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Manuel Gálvez, *Miércoles Santo* (Buenos Aires: Librería y editorial "La Facultad," J. Roldán y Cia, 1930). Cf. also the same title published in Buenos Aires by Editorial Tor in 1942. Cf. also Donald F. Brown, "Some Significant Changes in the Second Edition of Manuel Gálvez: *Miércoles Santo*," *MLN*, LXII (1947), 471-73.



Perhaps, too, his greater maturity and reputation have helped him obtain better documentation, especially as concerns his female characters. *Soledad* is one of the very few Spanish-American novels in which the women stand out as real individual characterizations—not mere types. Much light is thrown on how Gálvez may have obtained his documentation for this happy result by a statement in the book itself concerning a novelist, Pedro Roig, who is one of the chief characters:

—Vive en contacto con el público, recibe cartas confidenciales, le hacen consultas. Para algunas mujeres es un confesor, y, por quién sabe qué conformación psicológica u orden del destino, atrae los secretos ajenos. Roig, más retraído que cualquiera de nosotros, sabe más de las miserias humanas, y de las grandezas humanas, que cualquiera de nosotros. Todos los que hablan con él tienen que contarle cosas ignoradas. Y se atreve a preguntar a quien acaba de serle presentado, cosas que nosotros no preguntaríamos a nuestros amigos. En este sentido no está solo.<sup>21</sup>

There is no direct conflict in this novel between determinism and religion. However, there are incidents which reveal that Gálvez' religious viewpoint is still much the same. The law partner of the central character, Claraval, becomes converted at one point in the story. Claraval envies him the satisfaction and peace which the experience seems to have brought him. Claraval's own father is deeply religious, puritanical, and overbearing. Despite the lack of sympathy between father and son, there is one point where Claraval suddenly realizes the deep satisfaction which his father must derive from religion. But since much of the novel bears on love, divorce, and adultery, the following bit of conversation with Pedro Roig, the *raisonneur*, is revealing of Gálvez' religious yet tolerant point of view:

—No soy moralizador, pero sí moralista. Y no moralizo con premeditación sino por la fuerza de las cosas. En toda novela de la realidad humana, en donde la vida está mostrada o interpretada con sinceridad, o con humildad, mejor dicho, hay siempre una enseñanza moral, aunque el autor no se lo proponga. Y la vida no aconseja el adulterio, que, lejos de hacernos felices, nos llena de preocupaciones que complican la existencia y la amargan. . . .

—Entonces, a esas desgraciadas, ¿no les queda sino resignarse y sufrir?

—No les queda otra cosa. Pero hay también la religión y la caridad, que procuran grandes satisfacciones íntimas y hacen feliz a mucha gente.

Flavia quiso saber si él se conformaría, en el caso de ser mujer. Roig contestó que tal vez. Pero era preciso no olvidar que él hablaba como novelista.

—¡Ah! Eso quiere decir que no condenaría a esas mujeres si se rebelaran. . . .

—No las condenaría porque las comprendo.<sup>22</sup>

"I would not condemn them because I understand them" might well be quoted as an underlying motif for all of Gálvez' work. His Christian compassion for the weak serves as motivation for producing novels which will explain how they came to be the victims of those

<sup>21</sup> *Hombres en soledad*, p. 179.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.

overwhelming forces—heredity and environment. Thus, Christianity motivates his naturalism. But the same compassion which makes him prepare, as it were, a good brief in defense of his protagonists also induces him to save them from their harsh fate by the intervention of idealists such as Monsalvat and Don Nilamón. Even when no one saves the protagonist, as in the case of Rosalinda, the reader's compassion for her is but enhanced thereby. Gálvez uses naturalism as a literary technique to increase his own and his readers' knowledge of certain social milieux, so that all may pity those who fall victim to their milieu. His Catholicism is perhaps not quite orthodox when he admits that many do reach the sad state of having no will power left to combat their evil fate. Neither is his naturalism strictly orthodox, for he admits that religion and idealism do play an important part in the world. But his degrees of unorthodoxy are not strong enough on either side to prevent our classifying him as a "Catholic naturalist"—paradoxical as that combination of terms may seem.

*Johns Hopkins University*

## BOLINGBROKE, A TRUE MACHIAVELLIAN

By IRVING RIBNER

The Elizabethan manuscript translation of *The Prince*, edited by Hardin Craig,<sup>1</sup> calls attention to the need for investigation of a new aspect of the problem of the influence of Machiavelli upon the Elizabethan drama. Investigation of the problem has traditionally centered about the burlesque stage "Machiavel," whose genesis has been, with questionable accuracy, attributed to the *Contre-Machiavel* of Innocent Gentillet, written in 1576, translated into English by Simon Patericke in 1577 and printed in 1602, with its corrupted version of the Florentine's philosophy.<sup>2</sup> The wide influence of the "Machiavelli legend" in England may be seen in the traditional "Machiavels" of the Elizabethan stage—the Iagos, Aarons, Gloucesters, and Edmunds of Shakespeare's plays—whom Edward Meyer,<sup>3</sup> Mario Praz,<sup>4</sup> and others have treated. But an English translation of *The Prince*, which must have been in existence as early as 1585, though it be in manuscript form, reminds us that the text of Machiavelli's own work was known also, and that it exerted an influence independent of such corruptions as that of Gentillet.

Nor are manuscript translations the only evidence we have. Lewis Einstein many years ago argued that the political career of Thomas Cromwell was modeled closely upon the philosophy of Machiavelli.<sup>5</sup> The story of how John Wolfe, a London printer, published the original Italian of Machiavelli's works in England with false Italian title-page inscriptions, from 1584 to 1588, is well known. Italian editions of *The Prince* must also have been brought back to England by the many travelers to Italy, and a Latin translation was available by 1560.

<sup>1</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince: An Elizabethan Translation*, edited by Hardin Craig (Chapel Hill, 1944). The Furthman MS, which Dr. Craig edited, is the best of seven extant manuscripts containing three distinct translations of *The Prince*, each entirely unrelated to the 1640 translation of Edward Dacres. For a description of the remaining six manuscripts see Napoleone Orsini, *Studi sul Rinascimento in Inghilterra* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1937), pp. 1-19.

<sup>2</sup> The classic presentation of this thesis is Edward Meyer, *Machiavelli and the Elizabethan Drama* (Weimar: Emil Felber, 1897). Others include Piero Rebora, *L'Italia nel Dramma Inglese (1558-1642)* (Milan: Modernissima, 1925), pp. 165-94.

<sup>3</sup> Meyer, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Mario Praz, "Machiavelli and the Elizabethans," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XIV (1928), 49-97.

<sup>5</sup> Lewis Einstein, *The Italian Renaissance in England* (New York, 1902), p. 292. The story of Cardinal Reginald Pole's reading *The Prince* in manuscript in 1527, upon the instigation of Cromwell who had brought it with him from Italy, is an old one that has been told many times. See, for instance, Grattan Freyer, "The Reputation of Machiavelli," *Hermathema*, LVI (1940), 154.

A manifestation upon the Elizabethan stage of the actual Machiavellian philosophy in *The Prince* may perhaps be seen in Shakespeare's Bolingbroke, both in *Richard II* and in the Henry IV plays. Henry IV's political career, as Shakespeare presents it, coincides strongly with what Machiavelli saw as necessary for the new prince who would unify and strengthen Italy at a time when the Florentine republic had fallen and Medici despotism seemed inevitable.

When we think of Bolingbroke and Machiavelli, we are immediately struck by the similarity between the chaotic England of the one and the chaotic Italy of the other. Italy, writes Machiavelli, is "brought down to her present position, to be more a slave than the Hebrews, more a servant than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without government; defeated, plundered, torn asunder, overrun; subject to every sort of disaster."<sup>6</sup>

And Bolingbroke's England, in the dying words of John of Gaunt,

Is now leas'd out (I die pronouncing it)  
Like to a tenement or pelting farm.  
England, bound in with the triumphant sea,  
Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege  
Of wat'ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame,  
With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds.  
That England that was wont to conquer others  
Hath made a shameful conquest of itself.<sup>7</sup>

Machiavelli, writing *The Prince* in a time of political chaos and corruption, is calling for a governor who will lead Italy out of bondage and restore it to prosperity, and in his book, he sets down the formula by which such a leader may accomplish that end.

So Italy remains without life and awaits the man, whoever he may be, who is to heal her wounds, put an end to the plundering of Lombardy and the tribute laid on Tuscany and the kingdom of Naples, and cure her of those sores that have long been suppurating. She may be seen praying God to send some one to redeem her from these cruel and barbarous insults.<sup>8</sup>

Shakespeare's Bolingbroke appears to be just such a leader.<sup>9</sup> Coming into power at a similar moment in the history of England, his handling of that power, when it is his, follows closely the formula set down by Machiavelli.

As the curtain rises on *Richard II*, we find Bolingbroke in a typical application of that philosophy. Bolingbroke, in his accusation of Mowbray, is covertly attacking the government of Richard, of which

<sup>6</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translated and edited by Allan H. Gilbert, University Classics (Chicago, 1941), p. 177. All future references to Machiavelli in this paper will be to this edition.

<sup>7</sup> William Shakespeare, *Richard II*, II, i, 59-66. Shakespearean references are to *Complete Works of Shakespeare*, edited by George Lyman Kittredge (Boston, 1936).

<sup>8</sup> *The Prince*, p. 177.

<sup>9</sup> See discussion of his cause by the nobles in *Richard II*, II, i, 221-300.

Mowbray is a part. Bolingbroke knows that Richard is as responsible for the murder of Gloucester as is Mowbray,<sup>10</sup> and all of his passionate speeches are merely the rhetoric of a politician assuming a pose.

This deception for political purposes is completely in line with Machiavelli's words on dissimulation and the keeping of faith, contained in Chapter 18 of *The Prince*. "To those who see and hear him," he writes, "he should seem all compassion, all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion." Bolingbroke, to his hearers, seems all of that, but he need only seem, for as Machiavelli says, "It is not necessary, then, for a prince really to have all the virtues mentioned above, but it is very necessary to seem to have them." Bolingbroke is the "prudent" man who "cannot and should not observe faith when such observance is to his disadvantage."<sup>11</sup> The solemn oath he takes to Richard when he is banished, he breaks with ease. Honesty and trust mean nothing to Bolingbroke when his own advantage is involved.

In Chapter 4 of *The Prince*, Machiavelli says that in the type of principality to which England belongs, where "there are a prince and barons, and the latter hold their positions not through the grace of their lord but through the antiquity of their blood,"<sup>12</sup> a usurping prince must have a tool among the barons. "You can enter them easily, if you win to your side some baron of the kingdom, because there are always some lords who are discontented and desire revolution; these, for the reasons given, can open you the way to control of the country and make victory easy for you."<sup>13</sup> Such a tool Bolingbroke finds in Northumberland. Note his courtship of the young Percy:

I thank thee, Gentle Percy; and be sure  
I count myself in nothing else so happy  
As in a soul remembering my good friends;  
And as my fortune ripens with thy love,  
It shall be still my true love's recompense.  
My heart this covenant makes, my hand thus seals it.<sup>14</sup>

Here we have a statement of sworn friendship, but it is a lying and a deceitful statement, for, as becomes a follower of Machiavelli, a new prince must remember the Florentine's warning that one will not be "able to keep as friends those who have placed you there,

<sup>10</sup> This is made clear in Act I, Scene 2, lines 37 ff., in which John of Gaunt, speaking of Gloucester's murder, says:

God's is the quarrel; for God's substitute,  
His deputy anointed in his sight,  
Hath caus'd his death . . .

thus making Richard's guilt clear. For further evidence, see also *Richard II*, II, i, 126-32.

<sup>11</sup> *The Prince*, pp. 148-50.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>14</sup> *Richard II*, II, iii, 45-50.

because you cannot satisfy them in the manner they have been looking forward to, and you cannot use strong medicine against them because you are under obligation to them."<sup>15</sup> Bolingbroke knows that he will have to get rid of the "ladder wherewithal he mounts the throne" as soon as he is king, and this he does in *Henry IV, Part 1*. This pledge of friendship to the Percys is an excellent example of calculated Machiavellian deceit.

Bolingbroke from the very beginning enlists the good will of the common people upon his side, and here also he is following to the letter a basic precept of Machiavelli. In *The Prince*, we find:

He who becomes ruler with the aid of the great maintains himself with more difficulty than he who becomes ruler with the aid of the people, because the first is in the position of a prince with a good many subjects whom he regards as his equals, and for this reason cannot direct them as he wishes to. But he who becomes prince with popular favor stands alone, and has no subjects, or at most only a few, who are not ready to obey him. Further, one cannot satisfy the upper class with honor and without injury to others, but it is possible to satisfy the people in that way, because the purpose of the people is more just than that of the upper class, since the latter wish to oppress and the former not to be oppressed. Besides, when the people are unfriendly the prince never can make himself secure, for he has too many against him. . . .<sup>16</sup>

And further:

But a man who becomes prince in opposition to the people and with the favor of the upper classes, ought to endeavor before everything else to gain the support of the people. . . .<sup>17</sup>

And finally:

I shall conclude merely that it is necessary for a prince to have the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no resource in adversity.<sup>18</sup>

This is a strongly emphasized point in Machiavelli's philosophy, and it is strongly emphasized in Shakespeare's depiction of Bolingbroke. In the first act of *Richard II*, the king says of him:

Ourself and Bushy, Bagot here, and Green  
 Observ'd his courtship to the common people;  
 How he did seem to dive into their hearts  
 With humble and familiar courtesy;  
 What reverence he did throw away on slaves,  
 Wooing poor craftsmen with the craft of smiles  
 And patient underbearing of his fortune,  
 As 'twere to banish their affects with him.  
 Off goes his bonnet to an oyster-wench;  
 A brace of draymen bid God speed him well  
 And had the tribute of his supple knee,  
 With 'Thanks, my countrymen, my loving friends';

<sup>15</sup> *The Prince*, p. 97.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>18</sup> *Idem*.

As were our England in reversion his,  
And he our subjects' next degree in hope.<sup>19</sup>

How successful Bolingbroke's wooing of the people is, can be seen in the Duke of York's description of his triumphal march through London:

Then, as I said, the Duke, great Bolingbroke,  
Mounted upon a hot and fiery steed  
Which his aspiring rider seem'd to know,  
With slow and stately pace kept on his course,  
Whilst all tongues cried 'God save thee, Bolingbroke.'

Whilst he, from the one side to the other turning,  
Bareheaded, lower than his proud steed's neck,  
Bespake them thus, 'I thank you, countrymen.'  
And thus still doing, thus he pass'd along.<sup>20</sup>

Contrast this with the crowd's reception of Richard, whom he has supplanted. Bolingbroke, in true Machiavellian fashion, had wooed the common people and won them to his side.

In the magnificent deposition scene in *Richard II*, Henry is as Machiavellian as ever. To the crowd, he paints himself as a man of virtue, coming in submission to kingly authority, merely to plead a just cause:

Henry Bolingbroke  
On both his knees does kiss King Richard's hand  
And sends allegiance and true faith of heart  
To his most royal person; hither come  
Even at his feet to lay my arms and power. . . .<sup>21</sup>

But at the end of the scene, Richard is in Henry's power, and is conveyed to London by him, as a king only in name. Here again Bolingbroke is accomplishing his own unjust ends and, at the same time, giving his act the appearance of justice for the sake of the crowd. "He should strive in all his actions," says Machiavelli, giving his formula for the efficient ruler, "to give evident signs of greatness, spirit, gravity, and fortitude."<sup>22</sup> Bolingbroke is here giving the appearance of having those virtues which Machiavelli says he should pretend to, but need not have.

The first act which Bolingbroke performs upon coming into power is to destroy Bushy, Bagot, Green, and the Earl of Wilshire, the faithful supporters of Richard. Now, one of the most important of Machiavelli's principles, contained in Chapter 3 of *The Prince*, is that when a new prince has come into power, all those who supported the old prince must be destroyed. There is a "natural and

<sup>19</sup> *Richard II*, I, iv, 23-36.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, V, ii, 7-21.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, III, iii, 35-39.

<sup>22</sup> *The Prince*, p. 151.



normal necessity," he writes, "which makes it always necessary for a new ruler to harm those over whom he places himself," even to the extent of wiping out the race of the old prince.<sup>23</sup> Further confirmation comes from Bolingbroke's immediate arrest of the Bishop of Carlisle, although he is a member of the clergy, when he speaks against the dethronement of Richard.<sup>24</sup>

Another of the basic principles in the philosophy of Machiavelli is that of legality in the maintenance of a kingdom, and particularly of hereditary legality:

I say, then, that hereditary states, being accustomed to the family of their prince, are maintained with fewer difficulties than new ones, because it is enough for the hereditary ruler merely not to go beyond the customs of his ancestors, and otherwise to deal with accidents by moving slowly and cautiously. This is so true that if such a prince is of ordinary diligence, he will always maintain himself in his position, unless some extraordinary and excessive force deprives him of it; and even if he is deprived of it, he will get it back whenever the conqueror falls into misfortune.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout the plays, Bolingbroke is concerned with the legality of his title. He knows that he has no hereditary right to the throne, and it is to him a constant source of anxiety. In Act IV of *Richard II*, when Richard sends in word that he is ready to give up the crown, Henry says:

Fetch hither Richard, that in common view  
He may surrender. So we shall proceed  
Without suspicion.<sup>26</sup>

He wants no doubt cast upon the legality of the transaction. And in *Henry IV, Part 2*, on his deathbed, he speaks of the question with his son:

God knows, my son,  
By what bypaths and indirect crook'd ways  
I met this crown; and I myself know well  
How troublesome it sat upon my head.  
To thee it shall descend with better quiet,  
Better opinion, better confirmation;  
For all the soil of the achievement goes  
With me into the earth. . . .  
And now my death  
Changes the mood; for what in me was purchas'd,  
Falls upon thee in a more fairer sort;  
So thou the garland wear'st successively.<sup>27</sup>

Bolingbroke's dying consolation is that his son, Henry V, will wear the crown with hereditary right to bolster it, as Machiavelli said that

<sup>23</sup> *The Prince*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>24</sup> *Richard II*, IV, i, 103-06.

<sup>25</sup> *The Prince*, p. 96.

<sup>26</sup> *Richard II*, IV, i, 155-57.

<sup>27</sup> *Henry IV, Part 2*, IV, v, 184-91, 199-202.

it should be bolstered.<sup>28</sup> This preoccupation with the importance of title makes necessary the murder of Richard II. While Richard lives, Henry's title to the throne is open to question; so Richard must not live.

According to another principle of Machiavelli, the deposed ruler must always be destroyed.

But afterwards if you wish to maintain your conquest, these conditions will cause you innumerable difficulties, both with those who have aided you and with those you have overcome. Nor is it enough for you to exterminate the family of the prince, because the nobles will still be left to take the lead in new rebellions. . . .<sup>29</sup>

Bolingbroke, therefore, must destroy both Richard and Northumberland. Richard is destroyed immediately and Northumberland at the first opportunity that arises. That the murder of Richard is an act of extreme cruelty does not dismay Bolingbroke in the least. If his title is to be made secure, and the nation strengthened and united, Richard must be murdered. Machiavelli says:

Hence a prince ought not to be troubled by the stigma of cruelty, acquired in keeping his subjects united and faithful. By giving a very few examples of cruelty he can be more truly compassionate than those who through too much compassion allow disturbances to continue, from which arise murders or acts of plunder. Lawless acts are injurious to a large group, but the executions ordered by the prince injure a single person. The new prince, above all other princes, cannot possibly avoid the name of cruel, because new states are full of perils.<sup>30</sup>

As a disciple of the Machiavellian philosophy, Bolingbroke cannot do the killing himself. "Princes should have things that will bring them hatred done by their agents," says Machiavelli,<sup>31</sup> and Bolingbroke accordingly employs Pierce of Exton.

Bolingbroke's last statement in *Richard II* is one in the Machiavellian vein. "I'll make a voyage to the Holy Land," he says.<sup>32</sup> Machiavelli maintains throughout that the good ruler must appear pious in the eyes of his people.

The political activity of Bolingbroke in Shakespeare's *Richard II* closely adheres to Machiavelli's political philosophy as contained in *The Prince*. There are a few incidents where Bolingbroke does not follow Machiavelli to the letter, the most noteworthy of these being his failure to destroy Aumerle; but these incidents, in relation to the whole, are minor. In almost every important act, from his quarrel with Mowbray in the opening scene, to his projected pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the closing, the underlying philosophy of Machiavelli can be seen.

<sup>28</sup> *The Prince*, p. 96.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>32</sup> *Richard II*, V, vi, 49.

If we accept this thesis as true, many problems arise. Was this parallel accidental, or was it intentional? Had Shakespeare read *The Prince* in one of the Elizabethan manuscript translations or in the Italian, or had he perhaps studied the career of Thomas Cromwell? There is no doubt that he was familiar with the Machiavel that came to him with the heritage of the Elizabethan stage; we find it in his plays. But whether or not Shakespeare, as a student of political theory, was familiar with the actual ideas of Machiavelli is another matter, and one which presents a subject for further study.

University of North Carolina

---

#### A CORRECTION TO "SOME MORE HOBSON VERSES"

By G. BLAKEMORE EVANS

After it was too late to stop the appearance of my Hobson note in the March issue of the *Modern Language Quarterly*, I accidentally ran across the seventeenth-century source of the four Hobson verses printed by James Jones in his *Sepulchrorum Inscriptiones* (1727). All four appeared together in *Witts Recreations* (1640), Epitaphs 9, 10, 11, 12 (sig. Aa3<sup>r</sup>; in the 1650 and later editions, Epitaphs 63, 64, 65, 66 (sig. M1<sup>r</sup>). The texts, with one very minor variant (*us'd* for *used*, first epitaph, line 3), are the same as in the *Inscriptiones*, but Jones seems to have used the 1650 edition, or some later one, for his text.

The 1640 *Witts Recreations* and the later editions also contain another Hobson poem, not hitherto noticed by me, beginning: "Whom seeke ye sirs? Old Hobson? fye upon" (14 lines; Epitaph 56, sig. Bb2<sup>r</sup> [mis-signed Aa2]; 1650 and later editions, Epitaph 147, sig. [N6]<sup>r</sup> and <sup>v</sup>). The 1650 *Witts Recreations* and the later editions add two more Hobson poems to those in the 1640 text (Epitaphs 146, sig. [N6]<sup>r</sup>, and 148, sig. [N6]<sup>v</sup>, the 14-line form), numbers I and IV in my earlier collection ("Milton and the Hobson Poems," *MLQ*, IV, [September, 1943], 285, 289).

Hobson has "drawn on" far too long and is now "dead and gone" for all of me.

University of Illinois

COWLEY'S ODE "OF WIT" AND LONGINUS ON THE  
SUBLIME: A STUDY OF ONE DEFINITION  
OF THE WORD WIT

By SCOTT ELLEDGE

Inconclusive but numerous parallels between Cowley's ode "Of Wit" and Longinus'<sup>1</sup> definition and discussion of true sublimity suggest answers to four questions: Why does the ode, which because of its position among the otherwise chronologically arranged *Works* (1668) appears to have been written, as Nethercot suggests, sometime before 1642, seem so clearly to reflect Hobbesian theory that Loiseau would set its date of composition ten years later?<sup>2</sup> Is there in Cowley's critical statements no sign of a source of his "theory"? Did *Peri Hupsous* remain unread and unconsidered in England until about 1675, when Dryden read Boileau's new translation? What, finally, led Dryden to define wit simply as decorum, and Pope to "reduce it from strength of thought to happiness of language?"

Cowley's learning was so extensive that even without good proof we should be inclined to believe that he knew Longinus' work;<sup>3</sup> nor is it reasonable to suppose that he waited until the appearance of Hall's English translation (1652) to read a critic whose work had appeared with a Latin translation and critical notes in Oxford just a few years before Cowley, the young student and poet, fled from Cambridge to the refuge of loyal scholars. If, indeed, Cowley had not read the treatise in his own university, where Milton probably had first seen it, and where certainly John Rainolds long before had referred to it in a lecture on poetry,<sup>4</sup> acquaintanceship with Gerald Langbaine, who while a fellow at Queens had prepared its first English edition, might have prompted him to read it sometime during the two years Sprat says Cowley spent in Oxford. Though we may not be able to say precisely when he read the treatise, only perverseness would make us believe that he was ignorant of a book which he recommended as one of five on rhetoric to be studied in his ideal university. To be sure, Longinus is only a casual suggestion: "[Among the Greek Authors<sup>5</sup>] for the *Morals and Rhetorick Aristotle* may suffice, or *Hermogenes* and *Longinus* be added for the latter."<sup>6</sup> Although

<sup>1</sup> The authorship of *Peri Hupsous* is, of course, uncertain.

<sup>2</sup> A. H. Nethercot, *Abraham Cowley, the Muse's Hannibal* (London, 1931), p. 46, Jean Loiseau, *Abraham Cowley, sa vie, son œuvre* (Paris, 1931), p. 107.

<sup>3</sup> Cowley is not mentioned in Alfred Rosenberg's *Longinus in England* (Berlin, 1917).

<sup>4</sup> William Ringler, "An Early Reference to Longinus," in *MLN*, LIII (1938), 23-24.

<sup>5</sup> The Roman rhetoricians suggested were Cicero and Quintilian.

<sup>6</sup> *Abraham Cowley: Essays, Plays and Sundry Verses*, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 1906), p. 256.

the *Proposition for the Advancement of Experimental Philosophy*, in which this suggestion occurs, was not published till 1661, a date much too late to support our thesis and late enough to permit the suspicion that Cowley may have been here following Milton's *Of Education*, still the mention is not completely insignificant.

The chief reason, however, for believing that Cowley had paid close attention to Longinus is that in the ode "Of Wit" much of the definition of this troublesome word parallels the definition of the sublime in *Peri Hupsous*. In this poem Cowley is trying to analyze wit not as a quality of mind, but as a characteristic of expression. Those characteristics which in the seventeenth century were connoted by *wit* were not much if at all different from what the French meant by *esprit*, and were consequently hard to distinguish from the marks of *genius*; nor was Locke the first to see that these characteristics are different from those produced by judgment. When *wit* was used in the larger sense, as distinguished from the more limited sense of conceit, there was very little difference between wit and sublimity. Or if that conclusion be not granted, it must be admitted that Cowley's notion of what wit was and was not closely corresponds with Longinus' definition of the sublime.

If the ode is considered only as a discourse on good style, all the observations about excellences and faults in writing must be recognized as commonplaces whose immediate sources it is folly to seek. Aristotle, Quintilian, and the rhetoricians generally had urged propriety as the grand masterpiece to observe; and bombast and conceits had in England been ridiculed and condemned for at least a century before Cowley's ode. But the ode is not a versified treatise on rhetoric; it is an effort to define the excellence in expression which distinguishes good writing. In this respect, therefore, the ode is more like *Peri Hupsous* than any classical or renaissance treatise on rhetoric or any protest against abuses in writing. Though he aimed at telling how the sublime may be achieved, Longinus devoted most of the early part of his essay to definition by negatives, and throughout the exposition of means he inserted observations and analyses which develop the earlier effort at definition. Beyond the similarity of purpose, of course, there are no general parallels between the two. Cowley, despairing of a positive answer to his question, turned the poem into a compliment to his friend, and like Longinus' predecessor, Caecilius, was content to define by pointing to a good example. The most original suggestion of *Peri Hupsous*, that the sublime was impossible where there was no passion, that its effect was not persuasion but transport, found no place in Cowley's short definition. Still, nearly every part of that definition has its parallel in the Greek treatise, and these parallels by their completeness are persuasive.

The first stanza, which sets the question and points to the variety of form in which wit may appear, is the only one in the ode that has

no parallel in Longinus. In the second stanza and the first quatrain of the third, Cowley says that it is not easy always to tell the true from the false:

*London that vents of false Ware so much store,  
In no Ware deceives us more.  
For men led by the Colour, and the Shape,  
Like Zeuxes Birds fly to the painted Grape;  
Some things do through our Judgment pass  
As through a Multiplying Glass.  
And sometimes, if the Object be too far,  
We take a Falling Meteor for a Star.  
  
Hence 'tis a Wit that greatest word of Fame  
Grows such a common Name.  
And Wits by our Creation they become,  
Just so, as Tit'lar Bishops made at Rome.*

Longinus warns his youthful correspondent that in the beginning of their inquiry they must "consider whether some supposed examples have not simply the appearance of elevation with many idle accretions, so that when analyzed they are found to be mere vanity—objects which a nobler nature will rather despise than admire," and that the "pursuit of novelty in the expression of ideas" had become "the fashionable craze of the day."

With the second quatrain of stanza three Cowley begins his list of things that wit is not:

*'Tis not a Tale, 'tis not a Jest  
Admir'd with Laughter at a feast,  
Nor florid Talk which can that Title gain;  
The Proofs of Wit for ever must remain.*

Neither *wit* nor *sublimity* properly describes a witty saying or a flowery speech, but these negatives, referred to in stanzas six and seven, can be more conveniently noticed later. The notion that "The Proofs of Wit for ever must remain" is, however, one that Longinus had urged long before Cowley (or Dryden or Johnson, one might add).

When, therefore, a thing is heard repeatedly by a man of intelligence, who is well versed in literature, and its effect is not to dispose the soul to high thoughts, and it does not leave in the mind more food for reflection than the words seem to convey, but falls, if examined carefully through and through, into disesteem, it cannot rank as true sublimity because it does not survive a first hearing. For that is really great which bears a repeated examination, and which it is difficult or rather impossible to withstand, and the memory of which is strong and hard to efface. In general, consider these examples of sublimity to be fine and genuine which please all and always. For when men of different pursuits, lives, ambitions, ages, languages, hold identical views on one and the same subject, then that verdict which results, so to speak, from a concert of

<sup>7</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 55 and 53. The textual references will hereinafter be given in parentheses following the page references, thus: pp. 55, 53 (7.1 and 5.1).

discordant elements makes our faith in the object of admiration strong and unassailable.<sup>8</sup>

And later "the judgment of all posterity" is called "a verdict which envy itself cannot convict of perversity."<sup>9</sup>

Three notions in stanza four agree with important parts of Longinus' theory:

'Tis not to force some lifeless *Verses* meet  
With their five gowty feet.  
All ev'ry where, like *Mans*, must be the *Soul*,  
And *Reason* the *Inferior Powers* controul.  
Such were the *Numbers* which could call  
The *Stones* into the *Theban* wall.  
Such *Miracles* are ceast; and now we see  
No *Towns* or *Houses* rais'd by *Poetrie*.

If it were not for the second quatrain, we might suppose that *soul* is equated with *reason* or *judgment*, and that these lines are simply a reflection of the common Horatian warning; but the lament at the failure of current poetry to move, to perform miracles beyond the power of judgment, seems to justify the conclusion that the second couplet contains Platonic doctrine—that the soul must inform the poem and that the poet's reason must control his inspiration. Though students at Cambridge must have met these ideas several times before they read Longinus, the fact that they are part of a description of the sublime should, in this context, be noticed. In his discussion of the figure of amplification, Longinus warns that "none of these methods [of amplification] by itself, apart from sublimity, forms a complete whole, unless indeed where pity is to be excited or an opponent to be disparaged. In all other cases of amplification, if you take away the sublime, you will remove as it were the soul from the body."<sup>10</sup> And the power of poetry so informed to "call The *Stones* into the *Theban* wall," Longinus refers to when, speaking of "the choice and proper words," he says that such a choice "breathes into dead things a kind of living voice."<sup>11</sup>

The thought of stanza four cannot be called a critical theory: it is compressed, casual, undeveloped. It is, however, a clearer, more satisfactory definition than that contained in stanza eight ("In a true piece of *Wit* all things must . . . agree"), where the similes are

<sup>8</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, pp. 55-57 (7.3, 4).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 137 (36.2).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 75 (11.2). Samuel Monk, in *The Sublime: A Study of the Critical Theories in XVIII-Century England* (New York, 1935), p. 20, quotes the following passage from the dedication of Hall's translation of Longinus (1652): "And yet all this, without somewhat which I cannot express, is but the smallest part that goes to the building up of such a prodigy, there must be somewhat *Ethereal*, somewhat above man, much of a soul *separate*, that must animate all this, and breath [*sic*] into it a fire to make it both warm and shine." But since the theory was in the text, these words of Hall's do not help to date the ode.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 119 (30.1).



too metaphysical for precision, and it comes nearer than anything else in the ode to Longinus' central theory. In it Cowley says that a true piece of wit must have life, an omnipresent, life-giving soul, a power to move or transport like that possessed by the miracle-working music of Amphion. Cowley's attributing to "true wit" the power to move the passions, the chief distinction of the "sublime," is perhaps more persuasive than any of the more specific parallels.

The sublime is like a thunderbolt, a flash that, bursting forth "at the right moment scatters everything before it";<sup>12</sup> it can be found only in passages in a speech or poem, and is in this respect different from "skill in invention and due arrangement of matter," which emerge "as a result . . . of the whole texture of composition." According to Longinus there is no question of whether the sublime ought to characterize all parts of or the whole texture of a composition, for by its very nature it can be achieved only in occasional passages. In this respect what Cowley has to say about the amount and distribution of wit is somewhat different from Longinus' theory about the sublime.

Yet 'tis not to adorn, and gild each part;  
That shows more *Cost*, then *Art*.  
*Jewels at Nose and Lips* but ill appear;<sup>13</sup>  
Rather then *all things Wit*, let none be there,  
Several *Lights* will not be seen,  
If there be nothing else between.  
Men doubt, because they stand so thick i' th' skie,  
If those be *Stars* which paint the *Galaxie*.

Still, sublimity is a "certain distinction and excellence in expression," and in discussing the use of figures Longinus warns against excess. "Not more than two, or at the most three [metaphors], should be ranged together in the same passage."<sup>14</sup> And there are similar warnings about other figures,<sup>15</sup> some of which will be noticed later when we consider propriety.

In stanza six we are told that puns and clichés are not true wit, nor is indecency:

'Tis not when two like words make up one noise;  
Jests for *Dutch Men*, and *English Boys*.  
In which who finds out *Wit*, the same may see

<sup>12</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, p. 43 (1.4).

<sup>13</sup> Compare Sidney: "I could wish . . . the diligent imitators of Tully and Demosthenes . . . did not so much keep Nizolian paper-books of their figures and phrases, and by attentive translation, as it were devour them whole. . . . For now they cast sugar and spice upon every dish that is served to the table; like those Indians, not content to wear ear-rings at the fit and natural place of the ears, but they will thrust jewels through their nose and lips, because they will be sure to be fine." *The Defense of Poesy*, ed. A. S. Cook (New York, 1890), p. 53.

<sup>14</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, p. 121 (32.1).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109 (23.4).

In *An'grams* and *Acrostiques Poetrie*.

Much less can that have any place  
At which a *Virgin* hides her face,  
Such *Dross* the *Fire* must purge away; 'tis just  
The *Author* blush, there where the *Reader* must.

For examples of frigidity, "the defect which is termed puerility" and which, coming "from a pedant's thoughts," begins "in learned trifling,"<sup>16</sup> Longinus turns to Timaeus, who "through his passion for continually starting novel notions . . . often fell into the merest childishness."<sup>17</sup> One example is a pun: "Who could have done this had he not had wantons, in place of maidens, in his eyes?"<sup>18</sup> Immodesty is not among the faults listed by Longinus, but he does warn that the "truly eloquent must be free from low and ignoble thoughts. For it is not possible that men with mean and servile ideas and aims prevailing throughout their lives should produce anything that is admirable and worthy of immortality."<sup>19</sup>

Finally among the negatives, among the things that wit is not, is bombast, two common signs of which, Cowley says, are "tall" metaphors and forced and odd similes:

'Tis not such *Lines* as almost crack the *Stage*  
When *Bajazet* begins to rage.  
Nor a tall *Meta'phor* in the *Bombast* way,  
Nor the dry chips of short lung'd *Seneca*.  
Nor upon all things to obtrude,  
And force some odd *Similitude*.

Though tragedy "is in its very nature prone to bombast," Longinus does not hesitate to criticize Æschylus for lines that almost crack the stage when a character in the *Orithyia* begins to rage:

Quell they the oven's far-flung splendour-glow!  
Ha, let me but one hearth-abider mark—  
One flame-wreath torrent-like I'll whirl on high;  
I'll burn the roof, to cinders shrivel it!—  
Nay, now my chant is not of noble strain.

Such things [says Longinus] are not tragic but pseudo-tragic—"flame-wreaths," and 'belching to the sky,' and Boreas represented as a 'flute-player,' and all the rest of it. They are turbid in expression and confused in imagery rather than 'the product of intensity, and each one of them, if examined in the light of day, sinks little by little from the terrible into the contemptible.<sup>20</sup>

Nor do the forced similes of Plato, whom Longinus admits to be capable of the greatest sublimity, escape the critic's ridicule:

The use of tropes, like all other beauties of expression, is apt to lead to excess. On this score Plato himself is much criticised, since he is often carried away by a sort of frenzy of words into strong and harsh metaphors and into inflated

<sup>16</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, p. 49 (3.4).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 49 (4.1).

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 53 (4.5).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 61 (9.3).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 47 (3.1).

allegory. 'For is it not readily observed,' he says, 'that a city ought to be mixed like a bowl, in which the mad wine seethes when it has been poured in, though when chastened by another god who is sober, falling thus into noble company, it makes a good and temperate drink.' For to call water 'a sober god,' and mixing 'chastening,' is—the critics say—the language of a poet, and one who is in truth far from sober.<sup>21</sup>

There are in *Peri Hupsous* other parallels to Cowley's objection to bombast, among them a warning against "overshooting the mark" in hyperboles; "such expressions, when strained too much, lose their tension, and sometimes swing round and produce the contrary effect."<sup>22</sup>

"What is it then," Cowley asks, "which . . . we only can by *Negatives* define?" In the next to the last stanza, before he turns his effort at definition into a generous tribute to his friend, the poet seems to conclude that wit is chiefly a matter of propriety. The explanation is given in the first couplet; the rest of the stanza adds little:

In a true piece of *Wit* all things must be,  
Yet all things there agree.  
As in the *Ark*, joy'n'd without force or strife,  
All *Creatures* dwelt; all *Creatures* that had *Life*.  
Or as the *Primitive Forms* of all  
(If we compare great things with small)  
Which without *Discord* or *Confusion* lie,  
In that strange *Mirror* of the *Deitie*.

If this represents the full answer to the puzzling question which Cowley set out to answer, we must admit that his ode is more Horatian, more Neo-Classic, than Longinian. But there are two arguments against such a conclusion—or at least two important modifications to be made.

In the very beginning of his treatise Longinus answers the question whether sublimity, which is akin to genius and to inspiration, can be discussed as if it were an art—in other words, whether there is any use in trying to analyze the methods by which the quality can be achieved:

First of all, we must raise the question whether there is such a thing as an art of the sublime or lofty. Some hold that those are entirely in error who would bring such matters under the precepts of art. A lofty tone, says one, is innate, and does not come by teaching; nature is the only art that can compass it. Works of nature are, they think, made worse and altogether feebler when wizened by the rules of art. But I maintain that this will be found to be otherwise if it be observed that, while nature as a rule is free and independent in matters of passion and elevation, yet is she wont not to act at random and utterly without system. Further, nature is the original and vital underlying principle in all cases, but system can define limits and fitting seasons, and can also contribute the safest rules for use and practice. . . . It is true that it

<sup>21</sup> *Longinus on the Sublime*, pp. 125-27 (32.7).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139 (38.1).

[the expression of the sublime] often needs the spur, but it is also true that it often needs the curb.<sup>23</sup>

Insofar as it is a handbook, that is, insofar as it teaches how a writer may learn the art of the sublime, the treatise is an exposition of propriety. All defects are improprieties, are expressions which do not "agree." Allied to bombast is *paranthyrsus*, "an unseasonable and empty passion, where no passion is required."<sup>24</sup> Some of Homer's images must be taken exception to, for though they are "awe-inspiring, yet from another point of view, if they be not taken allegorically, they are altogether impious, and violate our sense of what is fitting."<sup>25</sup> But a speech of Ajax is praised because it observes dramatic decorum.<sup>26</sup> Jests are admirable only when they are "naturally suggested by the subject."<sup>27</sup> The study of a subject called a "certain distinction and excellence in expression" had to be, in fact, not only the study of what had *Life*, but also the study of the means of joining without force or strife, which is the aim of art. And Longinus' theory of the relationship between art and nature is just as near Cowley's ode as anything in the *Ars Poetica*: "Art is perfect when it seems to be nature, and nature hits the mark when she contains art hidden within her."<sup>28</sup> No single sentence, perhaps, better expresses the aesthetic which Cowley was here hinting and which Dryden (also leaning on *Peri Hupsous*) was soon to proclaim.

The other reason for reading Cowley's definition as something more than Horatian echoes is that, as we have seen, in stanza four Cowley, like Longinus, says that this excellence because of its "soul" is able to move its readers in a miraculous way. Wit is several things. Like the sublime it transports; like the sublime it is found only in flashes; yet, like the sublime, it is possible only where in propriety all things agree. Thus far, surely, we can see parallels without ourselves being guilty of "forcing."

Still, if these observations are not sufficient to persuade us that Cowley is here reflecting his knowledge of Longinus, there remain other arguments of a different sort. First, in stanza two, where he speaks of the difficulty of telling false ware from true, Cowley compares one kind of self-deception to that of a man who takes "a *Falling Meteor* for a *Star*." Now a figure like this might easily suggest itself to the metaphysical poet, as several examples in the ode show; surely Cowley needed no literary source for it. There is, however, in Longinus a passage which suggests the figure, and the parallel adds to the weight of our collection of circumstantial evidence. Early in the

<sup>23</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, pp. 43-45 (2.1, 2).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49 (3.5).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63 (9.7).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65 (9.9).

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131 (34.2).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103 (22.1).

treatise, during the discussion of bombast and tumidity, Longinus refers to faulty expressions of Callisthenes: *καὶ τινὰ τῶν καλλισθένων ὄντα οὐχ ὑψηλὰ ἀλλὰ μετέωρα*.<sup>29</sup> In Liddell and Scott this sentence is the only example given of the metaphorical use of the adjective meaning "high-flown" or "bombastic" as opposed to "truly lofty." If Cowley took his hint from Longinus, his recognition of the aptness of the metaphor was not unique, for in 1711 in a translation of a series of lectures on rhetoric by Samuel Werenfels, of Basel, there appeared a "Dissertation concerning Meteors of Stile, or False Sublimity" in which the author attributes the phrase to the passage in *Peri Hupsous*.<sup>30</sup>

Finally, in the next to the last line of the ode Cowley parenthetically equates wit with "height of *Genius*":

And if any ask me then,  
What thing right *Wit*, and height of *Genius* is,  
I'll onely shew your *Lines*, and say, 'Tis *This*.

Almost from its beginning in the language *height* was used metaphorically, and it would be wrong to suggest that its use in English criticism derived from *Peri Hupsous*. The high style is implied in Aristotle, and defined and discussed in Cicero and Quintilian, is indeed a part of the long rhetorical tradition; and high style was known to Chaucer. But *Peri Hupsous* was the only treatise on the subject of height,<sup>31</sup> and height of genius (or *esprit* or *wit*) is not in either Cowley or Longinus the same as the lofty ornate style, but rather the quality which distinguishes those expressions which can be called "right *Wit*" or the sublime.

Determining the date of composition of Cowley's ode is not one of the pressing scholarly problems of our time, nor would the foregoing demonstration be a thoroughly convincing solution. If, however, we can believe that both in method and content the ode is like Longinus' treatise, Loiseau's argument in favor of a date of *ca.* 1650 is considerably weakened. And because that argument involves a discussion of the sources of Cowley's critical theory, a reëxamination of the problem will not be impertinent. Nethercot, who says that the ode was written about 1637 or 1638, believes that to none of his friends was Cowley so likely to address the compliment as to William Hervey, his friend at Cambridge, to whose memory Cowley in 1642 wrote "On the Death of Mr. *William Hervey*." In that poem Hervey's wit is described in concepts similar to those expressed in the ode; among several passages the following stanza is most to the point:

<sup>29</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, p. 46 (3.2).

<sup>30</sup> A Discourse of Logomachys or Contraversys about Words, So common among Learned Men. To which is Added A Dissertation concerning Meteors of Stile, or False Sublimity, by Samuel Werenfelsius of Basel (London, 1711).

<sup>31</sup> The first English translator, John Hall, translated *ὑψος* to *height*.

So strong a *Wit* did *Nature* to him frame,  
 As all things but his *Judgement* overcame;  
 His *Judgement* like the heav'nly *Moon* did show,  
     Temp'ring that mighty *Sea* below,  
 Oh had he liv'd in *Learnings World*, what bound  
     Would have been able to controul  
     His over-powering *Soul*?  
 We have lost in him *Arts* that not yet are found.

In the second place, Nethercot points out, the "Miscellanies" in both the folio of 1656 and the *Works* of 1668 are arranged chronologically:

Every poem which, from internal or external evidence, can be dated exactly, falls into its proper [that is, chronological] order in the printed volumes, and if this be a fact, the conclusion is strongly presumptive that the intervening, undatable poems also occupy the places where they belong according to time of composition.<sup>32</sup>

If this argument, tenuous as it may be, seems stronger than that of Loiseau, it becomes even more convincing when we see that what the French scholar calls Hobbesian is also Longinian. The case for 1650 is briefly expressed in the following sentence: "L'ode *Of Wit* . . . écrite certainement à cette époque [i.e., Cowley's residence in France], nous frappe comme une émanation directe des conceptions de Hobbes, ou plutôt de sa méthode."<sup>33</sup> The only conceptions which suggest Hobbes and not Longinus as well are in the similes of stanza eight, but these are hardly distinctly Hobbesian. Loiseau concludes that, except for Ben Jonson, the only men whose influence can be clearly seen in Cowley's criticism are Hobbes and Davenant.<sup>34</sup> Of course, it would have been strange if these companions in exile had not been influential, and we are convinced both that the influence can be demonstrated (especially that of Hobbes in "The Muse"), and that Hobbes's method naturally appealed to Cowley. But Longinus would and did appeal to men with the same new critical bias.

Cowley's Ode is not a good definition: it is disorganized, and it does not succeed in distinguishing between several possible meanings. But two elements of the definition are interesting because during the middle and later parts of the seventeenth century they had some currency. One of these is the association of *wit* with *the sublime*; the other is the identification of *wit* with *decorum*. The first we have noticed in the following lines:

All ev'ry where, like *Mans*, must be the *Soul*. . .  
     Such were the *Numbers* which could call  
     The *Stones* into the *Theban* wall.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 48. In the edition of 1656 line three of stanza seven in the Ode "Of Wit" read "Nor a tall *Metaphor* in th' *Oxford way*" (instead of "*Bombast way*," as in all later editions); perhaps Cowley would more likely have made this jibe before he accepted the hospitality of Oxford than after.

<sup>33</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 465.

As in the *Ark*, joyn'd without force or strife,  
All *Creatures* dwelt; all *Creatures* that had *Life*.

What thing right *Wit*, and height of *Genius* is. . .

That is, wit is the life-giving force which informs all poetry capable of moving, and it is similar to "height of *Genius*." The other we said was the most positive as well as the most original element in the definition, that is, that true wit is impossible without *decorum*:

In a true piece of *Wit* all things must be,  
Yet all things there *agree*.

How these two parts of the definition appear elsewhere at about the same time constitutes the remainder of this paper.

Cowley's friend, Thomas Hobbes, had defined the word quite differently. As a quality or function of mind, he opposed fancy to judgment, and thereby established a kind of psychological dualism which long endured. Wit was the quality or power of a mind capable of both fancy and judgment.<sup>35</sup> But later he seems to have changed his mind or to have yielded to current usage and to have noticed that men give fancy "alone the name of Wit."<sup>36</sup> Since in the next sentence Hobbes said, "In Fancie consisteth the Sublimity of a Poet," and since this identification of wit and fancy, clearly illustrated in Locke's well-known distinction between wit and judgment, is implied in Cowley's Ode, our suggestion that Cowley was thinking of the *sublime* and *wit* as similar excellences in expression seems not so unlikely. When Hobbes first called wit the quality of mind embracing both fancy and judgment (and consequently the same quality of *expression*), he might very well have used Longinus' *ὑψος* or *height*. To be sure, Hobbes's definition lacked the emphasis upon the passions which the eighteenth century underlined in Longinus, but *ὑψος* really came nearer to Hobbes's meaning than did the early seventeenth-century connotation of *wit*.<sup>37</sup>

W. Lee Ustick and Hoyt H. Hudson, in an article on wit in the seventeenth century,<sup>38</sup> have quoted a definition of wit by Richard Flecknoe, published in *A Farrago of several Pieces* (1666), which could easily pass for a brief description of what Longinus had described as the sublime:

*Wit*, like *Beauty*, has somewhat in it of *Divine*. . . It is the spirit and quint-essence of speech, extracted out of the substance of things; and a spiritual fire

<sup>35</sup> *Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, in English Works*, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1840), IV, 55-56.

<sup>36</sup> "Preface to *Homer's Odyssey*," in *Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. J. E. Spingarn (Oxford, 1908), II, 70.

<sup>37</sup> One of the few interesting things known about John Hall, the first English translator of Longinus (*Longinus of the Height of Eloquence*, 1652), is that Thomas Hobbes was his friend. *DNB*.

<sup>38</sup> "Wit, 'Mixt Wit,' and the Bee in Amber," in *Huntington Library Bulletin*, VIII (October, 1935), 112, n. 1. Throughout the last section of my paper I am very much indebted to this essay for both its ideas and the material therein cited.



that rarefies and renders everything spiritual like itself; it is a soaring quality, that just as *Dedalus* wings, elevates those who have it above other men. . . . In fine, it is somewhat above expression; and easier to admire, then tell you what it is: not acquir'd by *Art* and *Study*, but by *Nature* and *Conversation*. . . . Rendering those who have it, *good* and *vertuous*, as well as *witty* men; and whosoever is otherwise, we may well conclude, wants as much of *wit*, as they do of being such.

There are six or seven clear echoes of Longinus here, but the last one ought to be especially noticed. Wit and virtue go together: good men have wit, and witty men are good. Though this is a new notion about wit, it was soon to become a commonplace about sublimity, which Longinus has said was "the echo of a great soul." Indicating the source of this excellence, he had said that "the truly eloquent must be free from low and ignoble thoughts."<sup>39</sup>

Dryden's efforts to define wit are part of a story too long to recount here; the nature of true wit was, indeed, one of the chief issues in the controversy between Shadwell and Dryden, recently reviewed by R. Jack Smith.<sup>40</sup> Still, both the notions of Cowley which we are here noticing are reflected in Dryden. The context of the following criticism suggests, I think, that, like Cowley, Dryden had early associated wit with the sublime, or rather, height:

Shakespeare . . . is yet so far from writing wit always, or expressing that wit according to the dignity of the subject, that he writes, in many places, below the duller writer of ours, or any precedent age. Never did any author precipitate himself from such height of thought to so low expressions, as he often does.<sup>41</sup>

Earlier, in the famous passage defining wit, in the "Preface to *Annus Mirabilis*," Dryden followed Davenant, the follower of Hobbes,<sup>42</sup> in identifying wit and fancy. In the "Preface to *Gondibert*" Davenant had said that the substance of the "ornaments" of his poems was wit, which he considered to be "the laborious and the lucky resultances of thought,"<sup>43</sup> a definition which echoes the "judgment and fancy" of Hobbes. Dryden, however, neglected this pair of constituents, and emphasized the "imagination." Davenant had said, "Wit is . . . also the dexterity of thought, rounding the world, like the Sun, with unimaginable motion, and bringing swiftly home to the memory universall surveys"; but Dryden introduced his altered metaphor for

<sup>39</sup> Longinus on the Sublime, p. 61 (9.2, 3).

<sup>40</sup> "Shadwell's Impact upon John Dryden," in *RES*, XX (January, 1944), 29-44.

<sup>41</sup> "Defence of the Epilogue," in *Essays of John Dryden*, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford, 1926), I, 172.

<sup>42</sup> As Ker points out in his note to the passage, I, 287.

<sup>43</sup> Spingarn, *op. cit.*, II, 20.

the same notion by saying: "*Wit writing* . . . is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer, which, like a nimble spaniel, beats over and ranges through the field of memory, till it springs the quarry."<sup>44</sup> This narrowing of the definition may not, however, be very significant, for although the emphasis upon the imagination suggests the central thesis of Longinus, in the next sentence Dryden admits both thought and imagination: "*Wit written* is that which is well defined, the happy result of thought or product of the imagination." Before he studied Longinus in Boileau's translation about 1675, Dryden, like Cowley and other early English students, must have read the treatise as a book on rhetoric, not as the work on aesthetics which it later became. Even here in this famous passage Dryden was trying to define within an old frame of reference; the use of *elocution* (*elocutio*, *style*) in the introduction to the paragraph is a dead give-away: "I must crave leave to tell you, that as I have endeavored to adorn it with noble thoughts, so much more to express those thoughts with elocution."

But finally Dryden like Cowley (indeed, as I think, with an eye on Cowley) gave up or dodged the problem of finding a satisfactory definition of wit. In stanza eight of the Ode the reader is surprised to discover suddenly that "In a true piece of *Wit* all things must be, Yet all things there *agree*"; but the surprise is not so great as that which readers have long felt at the strange identification of wit and decorum in the rather sudden conclusion to Dryden's "Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic Licence," in which with an unconvincing deduction Dryden says:

From that which has been said, it may be collected, that the definition of Wit (which has been so often attempted, and ever unsuccessfully by many poets) is only this: that it is a propriety of thoughts and words; or, in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly adapted to the subject.<sup>45</sup>

In a letter to Wycherley (December 26, 1704) Pope said, "True Wit, I believe may be defined as justness of thought, and a facility of expression," a definition which, as Ustick and Hudson pointed out, is obviously the precursor of the more famous one in *An Essay on Criticism*: "True wit is nature to advantage dressed, What oft was thought but n'er so well expressed." Dr. Johnson said that Pope "depresses [wit] below its natural dignity, and reduces it from strength of thought to happiness of language," but the truth is that the suppression or reduction had already taken place. Pope simply made succinct and

<sup>44</sup> Ker, *op. cit.*, I, 14.

<sup>45</sup> Ker, *op. cit.*, I, 190.

famous a notion only slightly altered from that stated by Cowley and repeated by Dryden.<sup>48</sup>

Confusing as it is to try to find any clear development in the meaning of the word *wit* from Elizabethan times to Pope's *Essay*, I think that we can assume, first, that it was used by Cowley and Dryden to describe what they also thought of as high or sublime in poetry, and second, that Cowley's equation of *wit* and *decorum* was through Dryden the progenitor of the eighteenth-century connotation defined in Pope's much quoted lines.

Carleton College

---

<sup>48</sup> Notice that the lines immediately preceding the couplet are a clear echo of Cowley:

The naked nature, and the living grace,  
With gold and jewels cover every part,  
And hide with ornaments their want of art.

In "Of Wit":

Yet 'tis not to adorn, and gild each part;  
That shows more *Cost*, then *Art*.  
*Jewels* at *Nose* and *Lips* but ill appear.

And Cowley's statement of "true wit is Nature," another common equation, occurs in the simile:

Or as the *Primitive Forms* of all  
(If we compare great things with small)  
Which without *Discord* or *Confusion* lie,  
In that strange *Mirror* of the *Deitie*.

## BISHOP BUTLER AND THE DESIGN OF ARNOLD'S *LITERATURE AND DOGMA*<sup>1</sup>

By WILLIAM BLACKBURN

Commentators upon *Literature and Dogma* have tended to overlook Arnold's confession of indebtedness to Bishop Butler.

From Butler [he says], and from his treatment of *nature* in connection with religion, the idea of following out that treatment frankly and fully, which is the design of *Literature and Dogma*, first, as we are proud to acknowledge, came to us; and, indeed [he adds pointedly], our obligations of all kinds to this deep and strenuous spirit are very great.<sup>2</sup>

The question suggests itself, What is nature in religion? Perhaps the readiest answer may be had if we begin, not with Butler himself, but with Aristotle as an interpreter of him, after the fashion set by Oxford dons, in Arnold's undergraduate days, of "converting Butler into Aristotle and Aristotle into Butler,"<sup>3</sup> and making them mean the same thing.

This mode of treatment is prompted by a passage from Aristotle's *Politics*, quoted in *Literature and Dogma*:

In all wholes made up of parts [says Aristotle], there is a ruler and a ruled. . . . The living being is composed of soul and body, whereof the one is ruler and the other ruled. Now what is natural we are to learn from what fulfils the law of nature most, and not from what is most depraved.<sup>4</sup>

Aristotle, as Arnold is careful to point out, then goes on to distinguish between the body, over which the soul exercises absolute sway, and the movement of thought and desire, over which reason exercises "a

<sup>1</sup> This article originally was part of a doctoral dissertation presented at Yale University, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> *God and the Bible* (1875), in *Works of Matthew Arnold in Fifteen Volumes*, ed. G. W. E. Russell (London, 1903-1904), VIII, 154. Unless otherwise specified, all other references are to this edition.

<sup>3</sup> Jowett's phrase. Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell, *Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett* (London, 1897), I, 191.

<sup>4</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 205. See *Politics*, i, 2:

ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείωνων συνίστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διηρημένων ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐννύχου τοῖς ἐμφύχοις: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τις ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνίστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄνθρωπον θεωρεῖτον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον: τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἀρχεῖν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν.

constitutional rule."<sup>5</sup> Butler shares with Aristotle (as Arnold translates him) the idea that human nature is a hierarchy of forces, a constitution. They assign the role of "constitutional ruler," however, to different faculties. In Aristotle it is reason; in Butler, conscience. Butler defines conscience as "a superior principle of reflection," which "magisterially"<sup>6</sup> presides over the inward frame of man, just as the king, according to the British constitution, enjoys sway over lords and commons.<sup>7</sup>

Butler arrives at a formal structure of human emotions and characteristics by a process of teleological reasoning. We cannot understand the constitution of man, he says, without beginning with the knowledge that his purpose is virtue.<sup>8</sup> Seeing man always in the light of this purpose, he proceeds to distinguish within him three sources of action: (1) particular passions; (2) general principles; and (3) the moral faculty of conscience.

Butler arranges these propensions in a hierarchy of three different levels.<sup>9</sup> The particular passions, each with its own object, are at the lowest level. There are three of these: appetites, such as hunger and thirst; affections and passions proper, such as anger; and desires, such as love of society, avarice, and ambition. These particular propensities activate man's life, and happiness consists in their fulfillment. At the second level of human characteristics stand three general principles: self-love, benevolence, and submission to the will of God. Their function is so to organize and systematize the particular passions that man may live in conformity with virtue. Self-love is "a rational calculating principle which leads us to check particular impulses and to coördinate them in such a way as to maximize our total happiness in the long run."<sup>10</sup> Benevolence is to society what self-love is to the individual. "It is the principle which makes us try to maximize the general happiness according to a rational scheme and without regard to persons."<sup>11</sup> The principle of submission, or the love of God, constitutes religion.<sup>12</sup> Its function, like that of self-love and

<sup>5</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 205. *Politics*, i, 2:

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὁρέξεως πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν: .

<sup>6</sup> *Sermons*, ed. W. F. Gladstone (Oxford, 1896), p. 59.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187. In this account, I am following Lewis White Beck, *Moral Judgment according to Aristotle, Kant, & Butler* (Duke University, 1935), M.A. thesis, unpublished, pp. 45-47.

<sup>10</sup> C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London and New York, 1930), p. 61.

<sup>11</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>12</sup> "Thus is human nature formed to compliance, yielding, submission of temper. We find the principles of it within us; and every one exercises it towards some objects or other" (*Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 245). Beck is the first to point out the importance of this general principle in Butler. See his *Moral Judgment according to . . . Butler*, pp. 50-52.

benevolence, is to redirect the passions. It is the highest virtue. To love God is to retire "from the world he has made, to him alone: it is to withdraw from the avocations of sense."<sup>13</sup> At the third level of man's constitution is conscience, which the Moral Governor of the world gave man as his moral governor.

Thus the moral life, according to Butler, is a life of rational self-love, of rational benevolence, and of the love of God, presided over by the magisterial faculty of conscience.

Arnold recorded very early his lack of sympathy with this formal analysis of human nature. In what was probably his own copy of the text,<sup>14</sup> he transcribed his "Written in Butler's Sermons," a sonnet first published in 1849:

Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers,  
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control—  
So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole,  
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours.  
Vain labour! Deep and broad, where none may see,  
Spring the foundations of the shadowy throne  
Where man's one Nature, queen-like, sits alone,  
Centred in majestic unity. . . .

This protest against Butler's psychological dissection is less convincing, however, than the idealization of "man's one Nature." In Butler this expression signifies man's constitution, of which conscience is only the governing part; in Arnold it means conscience.<sup>15</sup> Arnold's figure of conscience enthroned in majesty is, on the other hand, a development from Butler's own language.<sup>16</sup>

Arnold's statement regarding Butler's treatment of Nature may take on additional meaning if we consider the significance which Butler attaches to the formula *Stoicorum*, that a virtuous life is one lived according to nature. The Stoics meant by this commonplace (1) that virtue consists in a wise obedience to the laws of the universe, and (2) that it consists in an obedience to the law governing the inner frame of man.<sup>17</sup> By the law governing the inner constitution of man, they meant what Aristotle signifies when he says, "Now what is natural we are to learn from what fulfils the law of nature most, and not from what is most depraved."<sup>18</sup> This, too, is Butler's interpretation of *secundum naturam*.

<sup>13</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 247.

<sup>14</sup> C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry, *Poetry of Matthew Arnold* (New York, 1940), p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>16</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 67.

<sup>17</sup> Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (Glasgow, 1904), II, 76.

<sup>18</sup> For the question whether Butler derived his formula from Aristotle or from the Stoics, see William J. Norton, Jr., *Bishop Butler: Moralism & Divine* (New Brunswick, 1940), p. 17 note. Norton acknowledges Aristotle's influence on Butler, but attributes the larger influence to the Stoics because Butler himself mentions them as his source. For Butler's acknowledgment, see *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, pp. 10-11.

Before arriving at this interpretation, however, Butler makes a circumspect examination of the question. He states explicitly what he does not mean by following nature. It does not mean acting as we please. In this sense, "it would be ridiculous to speak of nature as any guide in morals."<sup>19</sup> Nor does nature mean, again, the expression in man of any principle, without regard either to kind or degree. Thus "the same person hath often contrary principles, which at the same time draw contrary ways," a conflict which Butler calls a "contradiction" of man's nature.<sup>20</sup> In the third place, following nature does not mean following one's strongest passions, for these passions are often bad and to follow them would be vice.<sup>21</sup> This, incidentally, is the meaning, according to Arnold, of the French slogan, *Let us return to nature*—a slogan which prompts the Arnoldian "Ah, what pitfalls are in that word *Nature!*"<sup>22</sup> Butler defines vice as an act which is "disproportionate" to man's proper nature and a violation of it. He reaches this definition not by considering the vicious act in *itself* or its *consequences*, but rather by contrasting it with the "nature of the agent."<sup>23</sup> And what is the "nature" of the agent? Man, being defined once again, "from his *make, constitution, or nature . . . is in the strictest and most proper sense a law to himself*. He hath the rule of right within: what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it."<sup>24</sup> To follow nature is, then, according to Butler, to follow conscience, and to follow conscience is virtue.

Conscience is also the sovereign of man's moral life, his "one true Nature," in *Literature and Dogma*. Arnold betrays some doubt, it is true, about the ultimate source from which conscience derives its authority,<sup>25</sup> but none about that authority itself. Conscience is supreme, and he indicates its supremacy in a variety of ways: it is the voice of God within us, a commonplace which becomes clear when we see how Arnold translates Bishop Wilson's "Look up to God" into "Consult your Conscience";<sup>26</sup> it is a "law" whose sanctions are beyond the reach of our arbitrary wish and fancy;<sup>27</sup> it is a "tendency" which, from a moral point of view, enables men "to fulfil the law of their being";<sup>28</sup> it is the "method" of Jesus, "the great unceasing

<sup>19</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 56.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>21</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>22</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 357.

<sup>23</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, pp. 60-61. Butler's italics.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69. Butler's italics.

<sup>25</sup> Conscience may be the outgrowth of man's moral evolution, but this question is of no practical importance (*Literature and Dogma*, VII, 31); it is the gift of God (*ibid.*, VII, 34). Arnold gives a "natural genesis" of conscience in *God & the Bible* (see VIII, 112 ff.); he rebukes Bishop Butler for not giving the same genesis in *Bishop Butler & the Zeitgeist* (see IX, 307).

<sup>26</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 18.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 43.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 42.



movement of attention" to conduct.<sup>29</sup> "Had it strength, as it has right," says Butler in a sentence which Arnold quotes, "had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world."<sup>30</sup>

Using his favorite doctrine concerning racial endowments, Arnold says that conscience has a history. This history is bound up with Israel, whose genius for righteousness creates for him a signal distinction in the world. His fame for conduct, for conscience, is secured "by the facts of human nature and by the unalterable constitution of things."<sup>31</sup> But Israel's conscience was not uniformly effective. The historical justification for the advent of Jesus is that he came to restore its power.<sup>32</sup>

But what of the motive for following virtue? Though Arnold tends to consider religion and morality as being one and the same, he distinguishes, one discovers on close inspection, two planes of motivation: religious and moral.<sup>33</sup> As for the moral motive, he considered Butler the mouthpiece of all humanity when he summed it up in the word *happiness*: "Virtue is demonstrably the happiness of man";<sup>34</sup> "it is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature, but happiness."<sup>35</sup> This is the eudaemonism to which Arnold commits himself in *Literature and Dogma*, the demonstration of which constitutes the very "design" of the book. There is an "intimate dependence of happiness upon conduct,"<sup>36</sup> he declares, a "natural necessary connexion" between them.<sup>37</sup> "Happiness," he declares again, "is our being's end and aim,"<sup>38</sup> and he ransacks Bishops Barrow and Wilson, Epictetus, and St. Augustine, to prove it. The

<sup>29</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 195.

<sup>30</sup> *Bishop Butler & the Zeitgeist* (1877), IX, 291.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, IX, 57.

<sup>32</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 85.

<sup>33</sup> In some contexts Arnold indicates differences between the promptings of conscience and those of the "natural law" (*Literature and Dogma*, VII, 207) of self-renouncement, *necrosis*. To die with Christ to the law of the flesh, to live with Christ to the law of the mind is a motive which rises above Butler's appeal to our enlightened self-love, above Arnold's appeal to our desire for success in conduct: "—so, in the restoration effected by Jesus, the motive which is of force is not the moral motive that inwardness, mildness, and self-renouncement make for man's happiness, but a far stronger motive, full of ardent affection and gratitude, and which, though it really has its ground and confirmation in the fact that inwardness, mildness, and self-renouncement do make for man's happiness, yet keeps no consciousness of this as its ground. For it acquired a far surer ground in personal devotion to Christ . . ." (*ibid.*, VII, 102).

Salvation, blessedness, according to Arnold, is in the impersonal life: "For to live by dying to our life in this world is to transfer the natural love of life from the personal self to the impersonal self,—the self we share with all other men; so that to die to oneself is to love the brethren" (*ibid.*, VII, 266-67).

<sup>34</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 273.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224. Quoted, *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 46.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 67.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 55.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 51.

interrelation between happiness and conduct is the key to his interpretation of the Bible: both Israel and Jesus were eudaemonists. The great achievement of Israel is that he felt more clearly than any other nation the truth that *to righteousness belongs happiness*; the great mission of Jesus was to bring in the kingdom of happiness.<sup>39</sup>

Arnold seized upon Butler's generalization about happiness as the manifest concern of man, and developed it into the central motivation of his ethics. He liked the generalization but not the context in which he found it. Butler speaks of the general desire of our own happiness, but he calls it "the cool principle of self-love."<sup>40</sup> Such identification was not in keeping with Arnold's view. Twice in *Literature and Dogma* he goes out of his way to discredit self-love as a motivation of religion. Butler never said it is: the religious principle in Butler's system is submission, or the love of God. But Arnold had no patience with system—or with "self-love." Israel, he intimates, knew better than Bishop Butler, because Israel followed righteousness out of grateful surrender to the Eternal, and not "out of self-interest and self-love."<sup>41</sup> Self-love is a paradox, he observes again, and paradoxes have no place in religion: "And the motive for doing right to a sincere soul is now no longer his own welfare, but to *please God*; and it simply bewilders his consciousness if you tell him he does right out of self-love."<sup>42</sup>

Arnold's quarrel is largely with Butler's system and with his terminology. As moralists the two are not so far apart as it at first appears. Though Butler's self-love is admittedly an interested principle, it is not to be interpreted solely as the pursuit of our temporal good—though some passages in Butler admit of this construction.<sup>43</sup> Self-love, however paradoxical it may sound, is not to be confused with selfishness.<sup>44</sup> Quite the contrary: if to follow nature is virtue, then nature must be defined, according to Butler, as a definite organization in which some principles and faculties necessarily bear authority over the passions. In some contexts Butler assigns this authority to conscience; in others, to self-love.<sup>45</sup> If we are to live according to virtue, we must master and systematize the particular passions so that an interested act is possible, an act, that is, which is aimed not

<sup>39</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 85, 98.

<sup>40</sup> *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, pp. 224-25, 188-89.

<sup>41</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 102.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 49. In *Bishop Butler & the Zeitgeist* (1877), Arnold puts the narrowest possible construction on Butler's self-love: "a cool pursuit of our private interest" (see IX, 306). In this he was following the lead of Mark Pattison's remarks on Butler's "sleek and sordid epicurism" in *Essays and Reviews*, 7th ed. (London, 1861), p. 275, a sketch which Arnold thought "admirable" (see IX, 276).

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, *Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 189.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>45</sup> Conscience, in *Sermons* I-III; self-love, in Sermon XI. The two are not incompatible: "Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way" (Sermon III, p. 76).

at the satisfaction of the moment, but at our whole total good. From this point of view men need more self-love, not less, for, if they will but truly love themselves, they will control their passions and choose lasting satisfactions instead of momentary ones.<sup>46</sup> Thus Butler's principle of self-love does not deny the promptings of what Arnold prefers to call our "permanent" or "higher" self. Both aim at the control of the passions, and, insofar as that control is successful, both yield happiness.

Happiness, as Arnold is well aware, is the word of Utilitarianism. He admits the general tendency of English moralists toward "an unworthy eudaemonism."<sup>47</sup> In the fourth edition, he fortified Butler's testimony on happiness by that of the "glorious" St. Augustine himself, lest Butler's words be considered too provincial and therefore suspect. Is Arnold himself a suspected witness? Is he too a purveyor of Benthamite Profit-and-Loss?

He was quick to deny the charge brought against *Literature and Dogma* that he had joined forces with the Utilitarians, and "made self-interest the spring of human action":

Utilitarianism [he exclaims]! Surely a pedant invented the word; and oh, what pedants have been at work employing it! But that joy and happiness are the magnets to which human life inevitably moves, let not the reader of *Literature and Dogma* for a moment confuse his mind by doubting. The real objection is to low and false views of what constitutes happiness.<sup>48</sup> *Pleasure* and *utility* are bad words to employ, because they have been so used to suggest such views. But *joy* and *happiness*, on the whole have not.<sup>49</sup>

Arnold's defense, though he protests too much, implies a difference in words and ends between him and the Utilitarians. He freely adopts their language, but directs his readers toward more spiritual and worthy objects than "mere escape from misery, getting freedom from uneasiness, pain, and sorrow, or getting mitigation of them"—to use his own description of what he considered the weakness in Butler's ethics.<sup>50</sup> His awareness of the conflict between flesh and spirit, his idealization of duty, conscience, and the moral law clearly lift his ethics above the level of Bentham's hedonism.

<sup>46</sup> "Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life" (*ibid.*, p. 75). See also Beck, *Moral Judgment according . . . to Butler*, p. 48.

<sup>47</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 46.

<sup>48</sup> Carlyle's fierce hatred of "the low and false views" of the Utilitarians is one of the obvious notes in *Sartor*. See Harrold's edition (New York, 1937), pp. 36, 117, 159, 162. Obvious also is his distrust of the romantic preoccupation with self, the pursuit of happiness, in "The Everlasting Yea." Arnold gives a curious interpretation to the book when he declares its "grand point" is summed up in Carlyle's ironic "What if thou wert born and predestined not to be happy, but to be unhappy." See *Discourses in America* (1885), IV, 378. But surely the grand point of *Sartor* is "Love not pleasure, love God" (p. 192).

<sup>49</sup> *God and the Bible* (1875), VIII, 140-41.

<sup>50</sup> *Bishop Butler & the Zeitgeist* (1877), IX, 304-05.

But Arnold does not escape Butler's appeal to our "enlightened" self-love. He is correct in saying that the latter makes "self interest the spring of human action." Nor does Arnold deny it. Butler, he says, knew well enough that the pursuit of our own interest and happiness, rightly understood, and the obedience to God's commands, "must be in every case one and the same."<sup>51</sup> This identity of happiness with living up to God's commandments is implicit in the proposition *To righteousness belongs happiness*, and to the proof from human experience which Arnold brings to bear upon it in *Literature and Dogma*.

"Beatitudo non est virtutis praeium," says Spinoza, "sed ipsa virtus."<sup>52</sup> Not so, Arnold. *Literature and Dogma* is a "practical" book: virtue is a means, rather than an end in itself. It is significant of Arnold's desire to make virtue useful that he calls conscience a "method." If men will appropriate this method, they shall be happy. This is the happiness which follows right living, proper conduct, righteousness. It is not "the peace which passeth all understanding," but something quite different and quite understandable—the happiness which comes from success:

the sense of succeeding, going right, hitting the mark, in conduct . . . give[s] satisfaction, and a very high satisfaction, just as really as the sense of doing well in his work gives pleasure to a poet or painter. . . .<sup>53</sup>

If we may describe Arnold's morality loosely as pragmatic and utilitarian, then the conclusion seems inescapable: Arnold's God is a pragmatist and a utilitarian also.

We did not make ourselves, or our nature, or *conduct* as the object of three-fourths of that nature; we did not provide that happiness should follow conduct, as it undeniably does. . . .<sup>54</sup>

In this view, he had been anticipated by Butler, who seems to have held "that God's sole ultimate motive is to maximize the total amount of happiness in the universe."<sup>55</sup>

Unlike Butler, however, Arnold seems inhibited in his account of why happiness is the reward of those who follow their true nature. He flouts Butler's "intelligent Author of nature" as too anthropomorphic,<sup>56</sup> and derides the Archbishop of York's "Eternal Cause"

<sup>51</sup> *Bishop Butler & the Zeitgeist* (1877), IX, 304-05.

<sup>52</sup> *Ethica*, V, xliii, in *Opera*, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg, n.d.), II, 307.

<sup>53</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 28.

<sup>54</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>55</sup> Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, pp. 81-82. Butler describes God's purpose as "the general happiness of all with whom he hath to do" (*Sermons*, ed. Gladstone, p. 235). Again, "The happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and Proprietor of it" (*Analogy*, ed. Gladstone, p. 410).

<sup>56</sup> Perhaps it is not too fanciful to suggest that the apotheosis of Lord Shaftesbury has its literary inspiration in Bishop Butler. By way of preparing himself for *Literature and Dogma*, Arnold has been re-reading this great apologist for orthodoxy. See his letter of November, 1871, to Cardinal Newman (*Unpub-*

as too metaphysical.<sup>57</sup> In his anxiety to discredit both theology and metaphysics, Arnold seems to have overlooked the logical necessity of providing an explanation of his own. Butler believed that it makes no sense to say that man was made for virtue, unless we assume that God so made him. But Arnold consistently refuses to make that assumption. Once, it is true, he declares that "the great work of the Eternal is the foundation of this [moral] order in man,"<sup>58</sup> but this positive assertion is hardly reassuring in the midst of Arnold's other negations. The only certainty is that man did not make the moral order: "create it he did not."<sup>59</sup> The *not ourselves* is a mere evasion: it describes our ignorance, like Herbert Spencer's Unknowable,<sup>60</sup> but attributes no creative power to the Deity. *The power not ourselves that makes for righteousness* assumes the preëxistence of the moral law, but, at the same time, evades the issue. *The stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being* turns out to be a *petitio principii*, for it merely asserts elaborately that "all things act as they act."<sup>61</sup> Though Arnold admits in one passage that naming the moral order God is simply "a matter of choice,"<sup>62</sup> he is clearly more interested in finding new names than in discussing the divine attributes—except for the vague hint of the Deity's providing "that happiness should follow conduct." Is God, then, the Happiness Principle? the Stream of Happiness by which all humanity may attain to happiness, if they follow their true nature? Shortly after the appearance of *Literature and Dogma*, the logician F. H. Bradley, arch-critic of Utilitarianism, pointed out that this is the conclusion to which Arnold's hazy theorizing had brought him.<sup>63</sup>

Duke University

lished *Letters of Matthew Arnold*, ed. Whitridge [New Haven, 1923], p. 57), whose *Sermons* (1726) he had first become acquainted with as an undergraduate at Oxford. Butler's conception of God is anthropomorphic: "the intelligent Author of Nature and Governor of the world" (*Analogy*, ed. Gladstone, p. 12). Arnold accepts this as the stock definition of an anthropomorphic Deity, heightens it for effect into "a great Personal First Cause, who thinks and loves, the moral and intelligent Governor of the universe" (*Literature and Dogma*, VII, ix, and *passim*—Arnold added "who thinks and loves," p. 124) and holds it up to ridicule throughout this book.

<sup>57</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 32.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 34.

<sup>59</sup> *God and the Bible* (1875), VIII, 67.

<sup>60</sup> See Arnold's comment, *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 59; *God and the Bible* (1875), VIII, xli.

<sup>61</sup> Lionel Trilling, *Matthew Arnold* (New York, 1939), p. 353.

<sup>62</sup> *Literature and Dogma*, VII, 43.

<sup>63</sup> See *Ethical Studies* (1876), 2nd ed. (New York, 1927), p. 284 note. Cited, T. S. Eliot, "Francis Herbert Bradley," *Essays Ancient and Modern* (London, 1936), pp. 55-56.

## A RATIONALE FOR THE CRITICISM OF THE REALISTIC NOVEL

*By* ERNEST BOLL

The purpose of the following rationale of the criticism of realistic novels is to assemble compactly the fundamental ideas of criticism that have been used as probes, to relate them, and to supplement them with whatever further ideas have been suggested by their use.<sup>1</sup> I have not analyzed any one principle to its ultimate elements, but rather have aimed to lay bare the skeletal structure that is both basic and practicable for fair-minded critical procedure.

Such a discipline seems needed, because critical practice of the present day, when faced with a discussion of the realistic novel, tends to fall into the old pattern of extravagant praise or total condemnation. Instead of accepting the author's point of view as the right of an individual, and instead of showing a willingness to admit that the author is conversant with the life he is portraying in a specific book, the critic tends to engage in a personal quarrel with a writer who presents material he does not like.

This belligerent approach to the criticism of serious fiction must arise in part from the critic's narrowly hedonistic, or palate, test for awarding approval, in part from his uncertainty in the presence of ideas relating to social conditions or psychological truths, but rudimentarily from his failing to have thought out what the novelist's purposes may be, and what his own practice should be in justice to the novelist and to the reader. The sense of fairness seems to have declined as one quite useless for survival in literary criticism as in politics.

The critic should begin by recognizing that, while the motive of the realistic novelist is to communicate his discoveries of human relations, his ultimate practical aim with respect to the general reader belonging to a society different from that portrayed in any particular novel is to give entertainment by broadening that reader's knowledge and refining that reader's sensitivity to the existence of other human beings. And the realistic novelist holds such an aim to be worth while because in general he believes that the most desirable objective in life is living life fully, with the utmost possible perception and understanding of people. With regard to those readers who belong to the society projected in the novel, the serious novelist's first purpose is to be truthful in representing their group ways and the circumstantial materials of

<sup>1</sup> My special reading has been in the fields of English fiction and of English and American criticism.

their everyday lives, for to such readers he offers the deep satisfaction of a recognition, an understanding of their own existence.

If the critic will only grant such intentions to the serious realistic novelist, he can plan his survey of a novel to ensure his missing nothing that the novelist intends him to gain, and to miss nothing that will aid his assessment of the literary art and social significance of the novel. I see five different sightings that the critic may take in his effort to arrive at a fair and comprehensive judgment.

#### I. AESTHETIC CRITICISM

(1) The degree of concreteness of the writing measures the intensity with which a novel momentarily provides an extension to the reader's experiences with life. When that concreteness suffers no great lapse, it invites the total illusion that the novel has been a continuous experience in an imagined life.

(2) The expertness of style measures the skill with which a novelist keeps his reader's attention occupied with the experiential content of the novel and protected from distraction. That skill is exercised through an adherence to correct grammar and idiom, the avoidance of awkward rhythms and contrasts of imagery, a harmony of rhythm and content, and a certain temperate freshness of phrasing that creates the blended effect of uniqueness and familiarity that is the central quality of experience at its keenest.

(3) Expertness of patterning economizes the reader's expenditure of effort to achieve both the immediate experiential pleasure of the story and the auxiliary pleasure that narrative offers through a stimulation of the imaginary sense of progressing to a goal. Expert patterning is demonstrated through clear intimation of a theme or of themes, timely preparation for emphasized actions, the marking of the total story into a distinct or subtle rhythm of separate internal stresses, the smoothness of transitions between elementary parts, the tactful provocation of curiosity, and the pointing to and arrival at a satisfying total conclusion.

There is need for a more precise code for discriminating the kinds of elemental and over-all patterns; and such a code requires an easily acceptable point of view. One point of agreement could be the author's principle of casting his novel. What was his reason for choosing his people? What factors, personal and impersonal, does he emphasize?

The biographical pattern results when a single person receives as much care and emphasis as would the subject of a biographical study. It is not the completeness of the life span covered, but the exclusive emphasis on one principal actor that marks the biographical pattern. Subordinate people are drawn upon as they are needed to explain or evoke the essential traits of the single principal. Among other patterns evolved from casting motifs are: the courtship pattern, the family story, the private social group (representing a friendship and ac-



quaintance group), the regional pattern (representing the occupations and social castes of a region), the environmental pattern (emphasizing the relationship between a setting and the people environed), the psychological pattern (analytic in its emphasis upon the elements that combine into a momentum of causation to produce and resolve a central, subjectively significant situation), and what I have named the "microcosmic" pattern, which gathers together a unified public purpose group as the basis of its cast, and usually distributes an egalitarian emphasis over its numerous principals.

The genus action-novel emphasizes the grosser entertainment of adventure instead of character revelation. Its patterns include the dossier (telling the story through linked documents or accounts and stressing the variety of viewpoints gathered round the joining theme), the picaresque, the travel, and the mystery stories. Of course, any specific novel may be designed out of any combination of elemental patterns.

(4) The emotional effect of a satisfying conclusion is a blend of the results drawn from the causative materials supplied in the novel and from the reader's own fictional intervention upon these materials. A careful critic will check his imaginative anticipations springing from private impulses to a minimum of divagations from the pathways suggested by the author, whose probability of having weighed each force involved in the momentum of causes as he saw them in a unified conception is greater than that of any critic.

(5) The stimulation of a variety of successive moods is one of the most pleasing effects of thoughtful planning. It produces not only the specific pleasure derived from orderly change, but it also conduces to a general pleasure in permitting a longer exertion of attention by preventing the temporary exhaustion of any one mood, with its consequent threat to an exhaustion of interest in the book.

(6) The economy with which narrative and expository effects are secured has an obvious aesthetic value.

(7) The stimulation of an especial mood of brief duration, that is various in its possibilities and yet so clear in its appeal that to call it simply "poetic" is ample identification, may provide many pleasurable moments in a novel. Its chief difference from the narrative mood is its still, or apparently resting, quality that allows a change from progressive movement to a permeating action. The stimulus to a poetic mood induces a halting of the narrative advance over the surface of represented life. It differs from the expository halt by inducing the reader to savor the tones and overtones of feeling that have been roused by a single chord struck on the sensibilities of his imagination.

(8) The cumulative intensity with which particular episodes of dramatic excitement, either objectively visualized or subjectively represented, absorb the reader, is a valid as well as a popular subject of criticism.

(9) The author's lucidity is an aesthetic component of his art, through its effect upon the physical process of reading that enframes the reader's imaginative attention upon the story. It is also linked with the practical phase of his art insofar as it causes the most faithful transference of the who, what, where, how, and why of the author's material to the reader.

## II. PRACTICAL, EMPIRIC, OR SOCIAL CRITICISM

The three adjectives in the section-heading are intended to be blending synonyms identifying the solid content of social experience that the author contributes to the reader's knowledge of life. This content may be examined by recourse to a number of guiding topics.

(1) The degree of humanitarianism with which the author writes about his people is an important index to his justification for writing at all about people. The most dependable authority on human beings is one who not merely knows them deeply, but who cares for all human beings equally, and presents them with tolerance, sympathy, fairness. But he is also unterrified by contemporary tabus forbidding truth-telling about the vile-tempered, the vengeful, the customarily suffered, the traditionally honored, and the sentimentally excused. The genuine humanitarian is to be distinguished from the selective humanitarian, whose benevolence is narrowly circumscribed or heavily discounted by personal or group interests. The test is easily applied by the critic who is himself a humanitarian. The requirement that the realistic novelist should prove himself to be a true humanitarian, that is, a fair, sympathetic, unspiteful, fearless depicter of human beings, is no more fantastic than the ideal of science, that the scientist be a person whose presentation of the truth is assured by a minimum of error-inducing bias. With respect to his representation of people, the novelist is a scientist in the field of human behavior. Defoe, Fielding, Dickens, Mrs. Gaskell, Thackeray, Trollope, Hardy, Meredith, Conrad, and Bennett were genuine humanitarians, and so are hundreds of contemporary novelists.

(2) The most tangible proof of the humanitarian nature of his art is the author's success in fusing his knowledge and sympathy into literary characters whose impact on informed readers varies from securing an admission of their plausibility to exciting wonder at the magic of their reality. As Arnold Bennett implied in his *The Author's Craft*, an inner sympathy with even the outwardly most reprehensible character is the secret of giving that character the conviction of reality.

(3) The content in philosophy, that is, in statements summarizing the author's experience in some field of human relationships, is an element of interest for its own sake as usable wisdom, and as a glimpse into the personality of the author, even into the motivation of his art.

(4) To his reporting of the physical world of any particular novel, that is, the social setting of the people who are given an active and a

motivated life, the serious realistic novelist brings the same care that the professional student of society brings to a factual report. The social setting is the foundation and often the chief reason for the novel. The seriousness of the novelist as a student of the people he presents can be measured in the objectively visualized novel by the exactness with which he reports the matters that are pressing to these people: their living and working conditions, their housing, wages, food, clothing, taxes; their recreations and prevailing types and themes of conversation; their opinions about their living conditions, themselves, and their governments, local and national.

(5) The accuracy of the factual materials establishing the setting can be tested either by the critic's own observation or by his recourse to reliable social documentation. In this age the critic should be willing to progress beyond the traditional appreciation of the merely aesthetic effect of verisimilitude to an appreciation of the practical, socially enlightening effect of solid truthfulness. He does not sacrifice the pleasure of the aesthetic effect; he reinforces it with the discovery of its firm foundation in the life he faces when he closes his book. He may derive from his efforts at verification one of the most satisfying of all pleasures: the discovery that his instinctive will to believe had not been duped.

(6) The social commentary of the novelist, that is, his opinions on specific topics of contemporary social interest, is worth noticing as one man's interpretation of the part of human existence that he knows.

### III. BIOGRAPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITICISM

(1) An area of critical thinking that may add to the understanding of a book regards the novel as an expression of the personality of the writer, and studies his life and frankly personal writings for any evidence in them of experiences that may have led to fictional expression as an incident, a character, a philosophical aside, a social description, or a social commentary. The tracing to their sources in actual life of materials presented as fiction satisfies again that will to believe (that is, to submit to another's persuasion) that I regard as one of the essential ingredients of the complex of impulses associated in the reading of fiction.<sup>2</sup> An examination of any successfully isolated instances of the fictional expression of intimate and momentous experiences in the author's life lays the groundwork for an understanding of his creative processes. The critic will study psychiatric texts to acquire a control of interpretative techniques, and then learn to check his impulse to apply them without hesitation.

(2) If the critic will regard the imaginative productions, taken in their chronological order of writing, as reflected portions of the continuous imaginative creativeness of their author, he will be able to

<sup>2</sup> See the author's "Charles Dickens in *Oliver Twist*," *Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. 27 (1940), pp. 133-43.

identify and follow the original appearances, repetitions, variations, and evolutions of nuclear ideas and characterizations, and he will be able to see more sharply the uniqueness, the completeness, and the growth of the author's creative life. By establishing a feeling for the organic continuity of these works of the imagination, the critic will find himself also able to sustain his sense of their living reality more easily.

#### IV. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITICISM

Every year sees more documentary materials that help the thinker about literary mysteries at the very least to reduce the obviousness of his errors in speculating on the probably existing lines of reciprocal influence between society and the novel.

What thoughts and what experiences shared by national, regional, class, and occupational groups cause what sorts of novels to be written, immediately or eventually, by their members or by observers? and cause what sorts of novels to be desired by what readers? If they do, *how* do social currents affect the style, form, theme, spirit, and content of novels written at any particular time? How do these social currents affect the tastes of readers for novels written in earlier times? What psychological and social effects do novels have upon readers? Even though he may be able to do no more than speculate, the critic ought not to disregard these questions. I think that he will find year by year more and more clues to the answers in a parallel study of social conditions on one side and publication lists and reading tastes on the other, in studies of the history of the sales of specific books, and of the time lag between social occurrence and literary representation.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See the author's "Social Causation in the English Novel of the Armistice Interval," *Psychiatry*, vol. 9 (1946), pp. 309-21. A careful parallel study of the social conditions and of hundreds of English novels written during the Armistice Interval (1918 to 1939) has led the author to conclude that the microcosmic pattern, mentioned earlier in this paper, is a distinctive reflection and product of the greatly speeded urbanizing, mechanizing, and egalitarian social currents of that period. The reader is invited to initiate himself, if he has not already done so, in socio-psychological criticism by reading about a dozen microcosmic novels and then a dozen sociological studies of the period, and listing the relationships that compel his attention.

The sociological studies recommended are these: Philip Gibbs, *Now It Can Be Told* (1920), *More That Must Be Told* (1921), *Since Then* (1930), *Ordeal in England* (1937); C. E. Montague, *Disenchantment* (1922); R. H. Gretton, *A Modern History of the English People*, vol. 3, 1910-1922 (1929); Carleton Kemp Allen, *Bureaucracy Triumphant* (1931); J. B. Priestley, *English Journey* (1934); Esme Wingfield-Stratford, *The Harvest of Victory* (1935); H. V. Morton, *Our Fellow Men* (1936); Robert Sinclair, *Metropolitan Man* (1937); James Curtis, *The Land of Liberty* (1938); George Thomas, *My Mind a Kingdom* (1938); Walter Greenwood, *How the Other Man Lives* (1939); Thomas Burke, *Living in Bloomsbury* (1939); Malcolm Muggeridge, *The Sun Never Sets* (1940); Robert Graves and Alan Hodges, *The Long Week End: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918-1939* (1941).

The microcosmic novels could be chosen from these titles: Adelaide Eden Phillpotts, *Lodgers in London* (1926); Denis Mackail, *The Flower Show* (1927); E. F. Benson, *Paying Guests* (1929); J. B. Priestley, *The Good Com-*

## V. HISTORICAL CRITICISM

Historical criticism places a book, or a part of it, in relationship to works of other authors of the same time or of other times.

(1) A novelist deserves mention for any pioneering he has done in materials or in methods; for the first or a prior representation of a setting, of a social group, a kind of character, a situation, a theme, or of a structural, expository, or stylistic device.

(2) The stimulus that some literary work effected in an author and that led him to a creative expression that might otherwise never have taken body has value in explaining that expression and also the author's creative sensibilities. The argument for the causative relationship between the literary source and the author ought, of course, to satisfy demands for proof of direct association; of psychological preparations or adumbrations predicting the likelihood of an author's being influenced by a certain theme, method, or spirit; of the existence of tangible and hardly disputable borrowings; and on to inference of high to fair probability of an assimilation of specific ideas, social points of view, narrative themes, characters and groupings of characters, stylistic devices, and structural designs.

(3) The influence may also take the form of a taste created among readers and publishers by the work of earlier authors, and catered to by the prospective author. The general adherence of an author to a tradition that is associated with an earlier author justifies his being classified in that tradition, even when there is no external evidence at hand of direct absorption.

As he reflects once more upon the almost uniform display of arbitrary and emotional criticism which the socially responsible novelist endures from the critics, the formulator of this discipline marvels at the courage of the novelists—or is it contempt?—in the face of the criticism that greets them. The best of the offending critics of our day have an answer to explain their attitude: they are artists responsible only to themselves.

It is true that criticism ought to be an art, that is, the expression by a sensitive and imaginative personality of an original experience, which, in literary criticism, is an experience in reading. But, to repeat faintly what a thousand philosophers in criticism have already tried to make obvious, in the hope that a new generation of critics may hear it again, the foundation of an art is its science, its practical, general, simple procedures for the attainment by the individual of particular goals. A science of criticism that does not oblige a critic to subordinate

*panions* (1929), *Angel Pavement* (1930); Arnold Bennett, *Imperial Palace* (1930); Eliot Crawshaw-Williams, *Night in the Hotel* (1931); Norah Hoult, *Apartments to Let* (1931); Lady Eleanor Smith, *Christmas Tree* (1933); Hugh Preston, *Head Office* (1936); Diana Darling, *Committee* (1936); Stacey W. Hyde, *Each Had His Day* (1938); James Curtis, *What Immortal Hand* (1939); John Hampson, *Care of the Grand* (1939); Walter Allen, *Living Space* (1940).

his ego while he interprets a realistic novel is not a science at all, and its practitioner cannot hope to qualify as an artist, no matter how vehement, expansive, and confident his ego, or how grand his reputation. Only by submitting his ego to the task of exploring and transmitting does the critic begin to perform the honest service that novelists and readers hope to obtain from him, and that comprises the real substance of his art.

*University of Pennsylvania*

## TROWBRIDGE AND CLEMENS

By RUFUS A. COLEMAN

Even among those reading widely in American literature, John Townsend Trowbridge today is little more than a name to be remembered chiefly for some verses about a boy named Darius, who, with his home-made contraption buckled to his back, made an early attempt to fly by jumping from a barn loft.<sup>1</sup> And yet in the seventies and eighties, Trowbridge was almost as popular a poet as Longfellow (he was a favorite with the elocutionists), and was, in addition, as editor of *Our Young Folks* and a leading contributor to the *Youth's Companion* and *St. Nicholas*, exceedingly popular with the younger generation. One critic went so far as to write that with Trowbridge a new era in juvenile literature began in America.<sup>2</sup> In his *Autobiography*, Theodore Roosevelt bore witness to his own allegiance, in these words:

As a small boy I had *Our Young Folks*, which I then firmly believed to be the very best magazine in the world—a belief, I may add, which I have kept to this day unchanged, for I seriously doubt if any magazine for old or young has ever surpassed it. Both my wife and I have bound volumes of *Our Young Folks* which we preserved from our youth. I have tried to read again the Mayne Reid books which I so dearly loved as a boy, only to find, alas! that it was impossible. But I really believe I enjoy going over *Our Young Folks* now nearly as much as ever.<sup>3</sup>

Trowbridge (1827-1916) lived through nearly all of the nineteenth century as well as the first years of the twentieth, a large share of this time being spent at his Arlington home, a few miles, by trolley, from Cambridge and Boston. A man of many contacts, he met writers as widely dispersed chronologically as Mordecai Noah and Booth Tarkington. He knew many of the New England group intimately, for years being a member of the Boston Authors Club. He was a lifelong friend of Walt Whitman, a "judicious" friend, however, not an out-and-out disciple of the Bucke, Traubel, and Harned variety.

In view of such rich associations, it may seem surprising that Trowbridge did not number Samuel L. Clemens<sup>4</sup> among his intimates, especially since Clemens was a close friend of W. D. Howells who, for a few years, also lived at Arlington not far distant from Trowbridge. But despite common literary interests, the two met infrequently and then chiefly on public or semipublic occasions. Then, too, Trowbridge

<sup>1</sup> "Darius Green and His Flying Machine" first appeared in *Our Young Folks*, March, 1867.

<sup>2</sup> *Cambridge History of American Literature*, II, 402.

<sup>3</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography* (New York, 1920), pp. 15-16.

<sup>4</sup> There is no mention of Clemens in Trowbridge's autobiography, *My Own Story* (Boston, 1903).



was critical of Clemens both as a speaker and as a writer, considering him diverting but prolix, episodic, and at times tiresome. Trowbridge was a stickler for form, and it was the lack of this quality and the presence of repetitiousness that prompted his critical disapproval of Whitman. Whitman's ideas on oratory especially disturbed him, as they had likewise done his friend Lewis B. Monroe,<sup>5</sup> for many years dean of the School of Oratory of Boston University, and editor of a series of popular school readers. An enthusiastic disciple of Delsarte, Monroe had even given Trowbridge an occasional lesson in public speaking, which accounts for the latter's frequent comments upon the poor stage presence of such men as Hale or Higginson, whose voices trailed off to a whisper so that only those in the front rows could hear them.

Trowbridge's relationship to Clemens, then, though friendly, was casual, similar in nature to his acquaintanceship with Howells, except, of course, that with the latter there was in addition a business association through the medium of the *Atlantic Monthly*.<sup>6</sup> Yet if the conjectures of scholars are correct, Clemens in his teens wrote his first sketch for Shillaber's *Carpet-Bag*<sup>7</sup> at the same time that Trowbridge, masquerading as "Paul Creyton," was one of its leading contributors.<sup>8</sup>

Both, however, were present at the famous Whittier dinner of 1877. Indeed, Clemens was very much in evidence. Initiated by H. O. Houghton, the enterprising publisher, this dinner was intended not only to honor the poet, but also to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the *Atlantic Monthly*. The *Boston Daily Advertiser*<sup>9</sup> declared that Houghton and Company had "invited the contributors of the magazine both present and past, to meet in a never before attempted meeting," and that "the company was without doubt the most notable that has ever been seen in this country within four walls." When one casts his eye over the elaborate seating chart handed to each of the guests, one is inclined to agree with this assertion.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> 1825-1879.

<sup>6</sup> William Dean Howells (1837-1920) was editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, 1872-1881. Trowbridge's story, "Pendlam," appeared in the first issue of the *Atlantic*. (See I, 70-85, November, 1857.) In all, sixty-nine of Trowbridge's stories, poems, or articles were published in this magazine, seventeen of them during the period in which Howells was editor. Trowbridge's last *Atlantic* contribution, "An Early Contributor's Recollections," appeared in the issue for November, 1903.

<sup>7</sup> For discussion of "The Dandy Frightening the Squatter" see F. J. Meine, *Tall Tales of the Southwest* (New York, 1930); Walter Blair, *Native American Humor* (New York, 1937); *American Literature* (November, 1931); Bernard DeVoto, *Mark Twain's America*, IV (Boston, 1932); and F. L. Pattee, *Mark Twain* (New York, 1933), introduction, p. xix.

<sup>8</sup> During the two-year period of this magazine's existence (March 29, 1851-March 23, 1852), Trowbridge, under the name of "Paul Creyton," contributed eleven sketches.

<sup>9</sup> December 18, 1887.

<sup>10</sup> Each guest was provided with an elaborate seating chart. For a copy of the one given Clemens see A. B. Paine, *Mark Twain* (New York and London, 1912), III, opposite p. 1646. In the Trowbridge collection is an identical chart,

Since Whittier disliked any kind of public display, it was considered a great piece of luck when the publishers were able to announce that the guest of honor would be there in person. After the dinner at 10:15 P. M., Whittier's brief and hesitant remarks were supplemented with the reading of some of his verses by Longfellow.<sup>11</sup>

The most striking episode in the whole occasion, however, was "that hideous mistake of poor Clemens,"<sup>12</sup> a phrase coined by Howells who, as toastmaster, was really put on the spot. To understand the extent of the offense, one should keep in mind the extreme veneration with which Holmes, Whittier, Longfellow, and Emerson were looked upon sixty or more years ago, an attitude somewhat like the Englishman's regard for his king. In this instance, however, the respect was intensified threefold. The newspaper reporter (one from the *Daily Advertiser*) reflected but the common esteem<sup>13</sup> when he wrote, "The three, Whittier, Emerson, and Longfellow gave a reverend, almost holy, air to the place, and their gray hairs and expressive faces, formed a beautiful group." Then what did the irrepressible Clemens do but spin a yarn about three disreputable miners masquerading as three of these mighty four, a choice part of which ran as follows:

Mr. Emerson was a seedy little bit of a chap, red-headed. Mr. Holmes was as fat as a balloon, he weighed as much as three hundred, and had double chins all the way down to his stomach. Mr. Longfellow was built like a prize fighter. His head was cropped and bristly, like as if he had a wig made of hair brushes. His nose lay straight down his face, like a finger with the end-joint tilted up. They had been drinking—I could see that.

To make matters worse, the jokester did not reveal until the very close of his speech that these reprehensibles were imposters. Carefully planned and executed as it was, his hoax failed utterly to go over. There followed a dead silence which poor Howells had to bridge over as best he could. Neither he nor Clemens got over their chagrin for months.<sup>14</sup> In a letter to Norton written only two days later Howells

according to which 58 people were provided for. Clemens' version of the incident, as well as a reprint of the speech itself, appears in *Mark Twain's Speeches* (New York and London, 1910), pp. 1-16. For other detailed accounts see Paine, *op. cit.*, II, 603-10, and for the speech itself, III, 1643, Appendix O; W. D. Howells, *My Mark Twain* (New York, 1910), pp. 58 ff.; and DeVoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 196 ff.

<sup>11</sup> See *My Own Story*, pp. 425 ff.; also Samuel T. Pickard, *Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier* (Boston and New York, 1899), II, 635-36.

<sup>12</sup> Howells' comment in a letter to Charles Eliot Norton. See Mildred Howells, ed., *Life in Letters of William Dean Howells* (Garden City, New York, 1928), I, 243.

<sup>13</sup> For the village-mindedness exemplified in this whole episode see DeVoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 220 ff.

<sup>14</sup> A few thought the speech excellent, one of these being Professor Child of Harvard, who read an account of the dinner in the next morning's paper. In later years Clemens himself came to look upon this as one of his best speeches. (See *Mark Twain's Speeches*, pp. 15-16.) The accounts of what followed after Clemens sat down are confused. Clemens, whose memory was notoriously faulty,

likened his friend's conduct to "demoniacal possession." Clemens spent much of the next few days writing apologetic letters. The whole affair seemed to have affected the principals more devastatingly than it did the other guests, for Trowbridge, who sat across the table from Clemens, made no reference to the incident either in notebook, letter, or autobiography. But the diplomacy of the press seldom appeared to better advantage. The reader of next morning's paper, on coming across this choice piece of mendacity, could never have guessed what had happened: "The humorist of the evening was next introduced and the amusement was intense, while the subjects of his wit, Longfellow, Emerson, and Holmes enjoyed it as much as any."

When the speaking was about half over, Whittier unobtrusively slipped away, and shortly after Trowbridge also left, despite the fact that he was on the program. His contribution, a poem entitled "The Story of a Barefoot Boy," published in the *Youth's Companion*,<sup>18</sup> described an episode in Whittier's life, the details of which had been furnished by Matthew Franklin Whittier, the poet's younger brother.<sup>19</sup> Having found that they could lift each other, the two youngsters evolved the bright idea that perhaps they might raise themselves to the ceiling, and, if they went outdoors, perhaps even higher. To be safe, however, they experimented first in their bedroom, standing on their bed. Trowbridge added his own philosophy in the following stanza:

'Twas a shrewd notion, none the less  
And still, in spite of ill success,  
It somehow has succeeded.  
Kind nature smiled on that wise child,  
Nor could her love deny him  
The large fulfillment of his plan,  
Since he who lifts his fellow man  
In turn is lifted by him.

That Whittier appreciated the poem is shown by the following hitherto unpublished letter:<sup>17</sup>

differed in two of his versions. In one he wrote: "The programme for the occasion was probably not more than one-third finished, but it ended there. Nobody arose. The next man hadn't strength enough to get up." (*Mark Twain's Speeches*, p. 24.) On the other hand, Paine's biography (II, 605) reported him as saying that "Bishop, the novelist, did get up and began his speech but didn't get very far with it." Paine likewise reported Howells (II, 695) to the same effect. The *Boston Daily Advertiser* reported the dinner as if it had been a great success.

<sup>18</sup> January 10, 1876.

<sup>19</sup> Matthew Franklin Whittier (1812-1883) was the only brother of John Greenleaf, and five years his junior.

<sup>17</sup> In the Trowbridge collection, at present in the possession of Mrs. Albert P. Madeira, granddaughter of Trowbridge.

Oak Knoll  
 Danvers  
 1 Mo. 6, 1878

Dear Friend Trowbridge:

Thanks for thy letter, & paper; and the bright & pleasant account of F's and my experiments in levitation. I wish it had been read at the dinner, it was just suited for such an occasion.

Cordially thy friend,  
 John G. Whittier

Remember me to Mrs. N.<sup>18</sup> and thy wife.

The two celebrities met again many years later at a session of the Boston Authors Club,<sup>19</sup> where Clemens was the principal attraction. At the turn of the century his fame was at its peak, and in consequence a large crowd filled the three rooms open for visitors. Mrs. Julia Ward Howe read an introductory poem in his honor "by the light of a candle on a table by a wall, near a doorway, where Mark was seated"—lines which ran:

Mark Twain, welcome guest,  
 Master of heroic jest;  
 He who cheers man's dull abodes  
 With the laughter of the gods;  
 To the joyless ones of earth  
 Sounds the reveille of mirth.  
 Well we meet, to part with pain,  
 But ne'er he and we be Twain.<sup>20</sup>

Clemens was placed in a central position so that his voice could reach the adjoining rooms. When Mrs. Howe had finished, he mounted a chair. Trowbridge's notebook impressions read:

The talk was about his two-weeks experience in Mo., the point of which was that Grant, then a Col., was personally afraid of the still more frightened squad of 23 men of whom Twain was one; then various things, chiefly his undertaking to teach the art of off-hand speaking in one lesson, his example, on the chance chose subject of portrait painting, being enlivened by ludicrously irrelevant anecdotes—"sarsaparilla," & "more chalk" stories and others. He must have rambled on nearly an hour being diffuse and almost wearisome at times, getting in good things occasionally with a drollery that convulsed his audience. He told a good story of the 'moral' effect of stealing a green watermelon in his boyhood, & to my surprise retold the anecdote of the whistling cure for stammering which Raymond as Col. Sellers, told on the stage much better, years ago. . . .<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Mrs. Alonzo Newton, the mother of Trowbridge's second wife.

<sup>19</sup> Trowbridge's notebooks are full of references to this organization, of which he was a charter member. At the death of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, he was made honorary vice-president.

<sup>20</sup> Mrs. Julia Ward Howe (1819-1910) has this to say of the occasion: "... I had worked hard all morning, but had managed to put together a scrap of rhyme in welcome of Mark Twain. A candle was lit for me to read by and afterwards M. T. jumped upon a chair and made fun, some good, some middling, for some three quarters of an hour. The effect of my one candle lighting up his curly hair was good and my rhyme was well received." (Laura E. Richards and Maud Howe Elliott, *Julia Ward Howe* [Boston and New York, 1916], II, 341.)

<sup>21</sup> Item in Trowbridge notebook, dated October 25, 1905.

Trowbridge was a perspiring spectator at the Aldrich Memorial Services (June 30, 1908) at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on one of the hottest days of an unusually hot month. Mrs. Aldrich had arranged for two special cars to take her guests from Boston to Portsmouth. Many, who naturally thought their tickets had been paid for, were sharply disillusioned when the conductor came around to collect fares. Despite heat, cinders, and other inconveniences, Trowbridge was not too cast down to make a pun. To a group on the train discussing the question as to whether or not Clemens' popularity was holding its own, he replied that he personally hadn't noticed any "Mark (T)wain in book sales."<sup>22</sup>

An excellent contemporary newspaper account of the proceeding was written for the *Boston Globe*<sup>23</sup> by Caroline Ticknor, who, first comparing these services with the similar memorial to Longfellow in the Old Boston Museum in 1867, went on to inform her readers that:

At the celebration today, however, were literary people—famous—some of them scarcely heard of 21 years ago, and many of whom have won their Laurels within a decade. All the so-called 'schools' of American literature were represented. There was Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 85 years old, of that school which has become classic in America—the school of Emerson, Whittier, Bryant, and Lowell. There was John Townsend Trowbridge, 81 years, and there was Mark Twain, William Dean Howells, and Richard Watson Gilder who may be said to typify the second era; then came Hamilton Wright Mabie, Thomas Nelson Page, Prof. Barrett Wendell, Prof. Arlo Bates, Miss Sarah O. Jewett, Frank Dempster Sherman, John Kendrick Bangs, Mrs. Deland, Nathan Haskell Dole, Prof. Edward S. Morse, Peter Finley Dunne, T. Russell Sullivan, Robert Bridges, Nixon Waterman, Charles Warren, Edward W. Bok, Charles Gibson, and several hundred other men and women writers, and altogether about 1000 admirers, who traveled from far and near to pay their tribute of respect to the memory of one of the most genial characters in American literature—Thomas Bailey Aldrich.

Here briefly was the order of the speakers. The first literary man was Mabie, who discussed Aldrich's place in literature. Higginson came next with remarks concerning Aldrich's relation to the older school of writers. Gilder related Aldrich to the younger school, ending with his poem, "The Singing River,"<sup>24</sup> written especially for the occasion. Page represented the Southern group. Howells spoke of personal relations with Aldrich on the *Atlantic Monthly* staff. Then followed Clemens, who saw that to offset this monotonous and deadly eulogy

<sup>22</sup> This anecdote was told to the writer by Nixon Waterman (1936), who was one of the group.

<sup>23</sup> July 1, 1908.

<sup>24</sup> Gilder had this to say: "Tuesday, the 20th, at Portsmouth I read the little poem on The Singing River and another to Aldrich written long ago and not published. The night before, Mrs. Aldrich had quite a large dinner party at the hotel and in the midst of it I asked her quietly if I could offer a 'silent toast.' She said, 'I wish you would,' knowing well what it would be—so we drank in silence to 'A bright and beautiful memory.'" (Rosamond Gilder, ed., *Letters of Richard Watson Gilder* [Boston and New York, 1916], p. 463.)

something radical must be done. So lugubrious was the flow that three days later he had not recovered, writing in his notebook an excoriating account of the whole ceremonial, which, deleted from his *Autobiography*, did not appear until 1940 under the careful editorship of Bernard DeVoto.<sup>25</sup> Always a hater of pretension, Clemens was capable of writing of his hostess: "A strange and vanity-devoured, detestable woman! I do not believe I could ever learn to like her except on a raft at sea with no other provisions in sight."

Miss Ticknor's less jaundiced report is worth extended quoting:

Mayor Hackett in introducing Mark Twain told of the man who took an hour to introduce Mark at one time and this left Mark only half an hour to tell all he knew. This gave Mark a cue to say a few words about long introductions, which embarrass the person who is being introduced and make the audience feel uncomfortable.

He said one of the briefest introductions he ever had was out west in the mining country one time at a place called Red Dog. He had been announced to lecture and the little hall was filled with rough miners, but there was nobody to introduce him. One of the miners, appreciating the situation, stepped on the platform and said, 'I don't know what to say about this fellow. I only know two things about him; one is that he has never been in jail; and the other is that I don't know why.'

Mr. Clemens then said that his folks had warned him in the morning to be dignified and serious, 'and they insisted that I must wear black clothes. So here I am in these dark clothes all day. They seemed to think this was a funeral I was coming to, when, in point of fact, it is a resurrection and an occasion of joy. I have come here dressed in black, which I hate, and it is hot here; but while I have been sitting here I have made 150 speeches waiting for the riff raff to get through.

'Aldrich's life was cheerful and happy. I knew him 40 years. He was one of the brightest men it has been my fortune to meet. Some 29 years ago I met him one day at a certain place in a hotel and he looked pained; looked as if somebody had died and it wasn't the right person. I asked him why he looked so troubled, and he said, "It is all on your account! You used to be the most popular author in this country, but that popularity has all gone." "How do you know?" I said. "Come with me." He took me around the corner to a book store, and he stepped up to the man in the place and said, "Have you any of T. B. Aldrich's works?" and the man said "No!" Then he said: "Have you any of Mark Twain's works?" "Yes," said the man, "I've got a whole shelf full of them there." "Got any more than that?" asked Aldrich. "Yes, the cellar's full of them," was the reply. Then Aldrich took me out and said, "You see your popularity has all gone. I'm popular now. He's sold out all my books."'<sup>26</sup>

Outside, when the speeches were over, Trowbridge greeted Clemens with outstretched hands and mutual jokes. Clemens began it with, "Trowbridge, are you still alive? You must be a thousand years old. Why I listened to your stories while I was rocked in the cradle." Not to be outdone, Trowbridge flashed back, "Mark, there's some mistake. My earliest infant smile was awakened with one of your jokes." Albert Bigelow Paine from whom I take the above anecdote went on to say that the two were photographed in the blazing sun, their backs to a

<sup>25</sup> *Mark Twain in Eruption* (New York and London, 1940), pp. 295-99.

<sup>26</sup> For a more concise account, see Paine, *op. cit.*, III, 1456.

fence.<sup>27</sup> In one of his notebook entries Trowbridge presented more confidential impressions, referring to being photographed with Clemens and ending his notation rather caustically:

Services in the Music Hall (which was crowded) were altogether & most excessively eulogistic, and so monotonous & tiresome (11-1) enlivened by Twain's rambling drolleries & stories (the best of them about Aldrich taking him into a bookstore). Howells undertook to speak some memorized remarks, broke down, then started to read again, got mixed up & broke down again, but finally got through. . . . The lunch was served to them who had 'breakfast tickets'—standing—and not well dispensed. Fortunately three or four young men and women volunteered to help me and I got a poor and tasteless sandwich, a spoonfull of salad (not bad), a glass of tepid 'Iced tea,' and best of all, ice cream. I was thirsty.<sup>28</sup>

In all likelihood this was the last time Clemens and Trowbridge saw each other, as Clemens died two years later. At any rate, Trowbridge's notebooks and several hundred of his letters make no reference to a later meeting.

*Montana State University, Missoula*

---

<sup>27</sup> Paine, *op. cit.*, III, 1456.

<sup>28</sup> Item in Trowbridge's notebook, dated July 3, 1908.



# A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CRITICAL ARTHURIAN LITERATURE FOR THE YEAR 1947

Prepared by

JOHN J. PARRY

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AHR</i>	American Historical Review
<i>Archiv</i>	Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen
<i>BBCS</i>	Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies
<i>EHR</i>	English Historical Review
<i>ELH</i>	English Literary History
<i>Fr. St.</i>	French Studies
<i>GSLI</i>	Giornale storico della letteratura italiana
<i>JEGP</i>	Journal of English and Germanic Philology
<i>Let. Rom.</i>	Les Lettres Romanes
<i>LTLS</i>	London Times Literary Supplement
<i>Med. Æv.</i>	Medium Ævum
<i>Med. St.</i>	Mediaeval Studies
<i>MLN</i>	Modern Language Notes
<i>MLQ</i>	Modern Language Quarterly
<i>MLR</i>	Modern Language Review
<i>MP</i>	Modern Philology
<i>N&amp;Q</i>	Notes and Queries
<i>Neophil.</i>	Neophilologus
<i>Neuphil. Mit.</i>	Neuphilologische Mitteilungen
<i>PMLA</i>	Publications of the Modern Language Association of America
<i>PQ</i>	Philological Quarterly
<i>RES</i>	Review of English Studies
<i>Rev. belge</i>	Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire
<i>Rev. Lit. Comp.</i>	Revue de littérature comparée
<i>RHE</i>	Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique
<i>RLM</i>	Revista di letteratura moderna
<i>RLR</i>	Revue des langues romanes
<i>RMAL</i>	Revue du moyen âge latin
<i>RR</i>	Romanic Review
<i>SP</i>	Studies in Philology
<i>TNTL</i>	Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsche Taal- en Letterkunde
<i>YWES</i>	The Year's Work in English Studies

2829. Ackerman, Robert W. "*Syre Gawene and the Carle of Carellyle*": *An Edition*. (University of Michigan Contributions in Modern Philology, Number 8.) [Ann Arbor]: University of Michigan Press, 1947.

1778. Adams, Robert Dana Walden. *A Tristan Bibliography*. (University of Southern California Language and Literature Series Number 4.) Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1943.

2830. Adler, Alfred. "The Themes of 'The Handsome Coward' and of 'The Handsome Unknown' in *Meraugis de Portlesgues*." *MP*, XLIV (1947), 218-224.

2831. ———. "Sovereignty in Chrétien's *Yvain*." *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 281-305.

2832. Adolf, Helen. "Studies in Chrétien's 'Conte del Graal.'" *MLQ*, VIII (1947), 3-19.

2833. ———. "Robert de Boron's *Joseph* and the *Privilegium Fori*." *PQ*, xxvi (1947), 259-267.

2834. ———. "Oriental Sources for Grail Romances." [*Parsival, Joseph, Estoire*.] *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 306-323.

2835. Anonymous. "The Morte Darthur." (Leading article on Vinaver's edition of the Winchester manuscript.) *LTLS*, June 7, 1947, 273-274.

2836. ———. "Roman Britain in 1945." (Account of excavations.) *Journal of Roman Studies*, xxxvi (1946), 133-148.

2752. Anselmi, Folco. *La Morte di Tristano e Isotta*. [Selections, text, and translation from Thomas.] Firenze: Fussi, 1946.

Brief rev. by R. M. R[uggieri] in *Cultura Neolatina*, vi-vii (1946-47), 224.

2837. Auenhammer, R. *Die höfische Gesellschaft bei Herbort von Fritzlar*. (Erlangen diss.) Erlangen: Krahel, 1939.

2754. Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis*. 1946.

Rev. by F. Baldensperger in *Rev. Lit. Comp.*, xxi (1947), 619-621; by A. R. Nykl in *Speculum*, xxii (1947), 461.

2837a. Battaglia, A. (editor). *Andreae Capellani Regii Francorum "De Amore" libri tres. Testo latino del sec. XII con due traduz. toscane inedite del sec. XIV*. Roma: Perella, 1947.

See *L'Italia che scrive*, February, 1948, p. 40.

Becker, G. See P.S.S. Castex.

2837b. Beguin, Albert. *La Quête du Graal mise en langage moderne*. (With introduction.) Paris: Egloff, 1945.

Rev. by O. J[odogne] in *Let. Rom.*, II (1948), 72.

2590a. Behre, Fr. *Thomas Castelford's Chronicle*. 1940.

Additional reviews by H. Marcus in *Archiv*, CLXXIX (1941), 54, and S. B. Liljegen in *Studia Neophil.*, xv (1942-43), 372-374.

2758. Bezzola, Reto R. *Les Origines et la formation de la littérature courtoise en occident, 500-1200*. Vol. I. 1944.

Rev. by Wolfram von den Steinen in *Erasmus*, I (1947), 853-856; by M. L. W. Laistner in *EHR*, LXII (1947), 536-537; by A. M[onteverdi] in *Cultura Neolatina*, vi-vii (1946-47), 219.

2838. ———. *Le Sens de l'aventure et de l'amour*. [Includes Chrétien de Troyes.] Paris: La Jeune Parque [1947].

2839. Billanovich, Giuseppe. "Dall 'Commedia' e dall' 'Amorosa Visione' ai 'Trionfi'." *GSLI*, cxxiii (1945-46), 1-52.

2839a. Binni, Walter. "Metodo e poesia nell' Orlando Furioso." *Letteratura*, ix (1947), 3-19.

2839b. Blanck, Anton. *La Suède et la littérature française*. Translated by Lucien Maury. (*Eufemiavisor and Erikskrönika*.) Paris: Delamain et Boutelleau, 1947.

Rev. by V. S[antoli] in *RLM*, II (1947), 327-328.

2545. Bøgholm, N. *The Layamon Texts*. 1943.

Rev. by A. A. Prins in *Museum*, LII (1947), 258-260.

2840. Boesch, B. *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte in Grundzügen*. Bern: Francke, 1946.

Rev. by J. Taelis in *Erasmus*, I (1947), 796-798.

2840a. Bossuat, Robert. "Un Debat d'amour dans le roman de *Cassiodorus*." Pp. 63-75 in *Etudes romanes dédiées à Mario Roques*. Paris: Droz, 1946.

Summary by Mario Roques in *Romania*, LXIX (1946-47), 412.

2840b. Bostock, J. Knight. "Wolfram von Eschenbach, *Parsival* 241." (And Hartmann's *Iwein*.) *Med. Æv.*, xvi (1947), 21-23.

2841. Bottacchiari, Rodolfo. "L'epopea cavalleresca: Hartmann von Aue—Wolfram von Eschenbach—Gottfried von Strassburg." Pp. 47-57 in *Storia della letteratura tedesca*. Seconda edizione riveduta e ampliata. Roma: Perella, 1942.

2760. Boulenger, Jacques. *Les Romans de la Table Ronde*. (An abbreviated reprint from *Merlin, Lancelot, Saint Graal, and La Morte Arthur*, 1922-23.) 1945.

Rev. by G. H. in *Fr. St.*, I (1947), 285.

2841a. Branca, V. (editor). *G. Boccaccio, Le Rime, L'Amorosa Visione, La Caccia di Diana*. Bari: Laterza, 1939.

Rev. by Giuseppe Billanovich in *GSLI*, cxvi (1940), 134-155.

2842. ——— (editor). Giovanni Boccaccio, *Amorosa Visione*. Edizione critica per cura di Vittore Branca. [Andreas Capellanus, etc.] Autori Classici e Documenti di Lingua Pubblicati dall'Accademia della Crusca. Firenze: Sansoni [1944].

Rev. by Gianfranco Contini in *GSLI*, cxxiii (1946), 69-99.

2762. Briffault, Robert. *Les Troubadours et le sentiment roman-esque*. Paris: Editions du Chêne, 1945.

Rev. in *RMAL*, II (1946), 95. See also H. Marrou and O. Jodogne.

2843. Bromwich, Rachel. "Historical Triads: with Special Reference to Peniarth MS. 16." [Including "The emergence of Arthur."] *BBCS*, XII (1946), 1-15.

2492. Brown, A. C. L. *The Origin of the Grail Legend*. 1943.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxiv, 1943 (1945), 54.

2844. ———. "Irish Fabulous History and Chrétien's 'Perceval.'" *MLQ*, VIII (1947), 419-425.

2844a. v. Brück, M. "Parzival und seine Folgen." *Die Gegenwart*, I, 16-17 (1946?), 43 f.

2845. Calcaterra, C. "La prima ispirazione dei Trionfi del Petrarca." *GSLI*, cxvii (1941), 1-23.

2846. Castex, P. P. Surer et G. Becker. *Manuel des études littéraires françaises*. I. Moyen Age. Paris: Hachette, 1946.

2600. Chambers, E. K. *English Literature at the Close of the Middle Ages*. 1945 (1946).

Rev. by J. A. W. Bennett in *RES*, xxiii (1947), 271-273; by J. R. Hulbert in *MP*, xlv (1947), 195-196; by Laura Hibbard Loomis in *MLQ*, viii (1947), 496-498; by Hermann Peschmann in *English*, vi (1946), 87-88; by A. C. Baugh in *JEGP*, xlv (1947), 304-307; by G. L. Brook in *Med. Æv.*, xvi (1947), 43-45.

2847. Chrestien de Troyes. *Le Chevalier au Lion, précédé de Erec et Enide*. Paris: Gallimard, 1944.

2547. Closs, August. *Tristan und Isolt. A Poem. By Gottfried von Strassburg*. 1944. Second, revised edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1947.

2848. Closs, Hannah. "Jean Cocteau's 'Tristan.'" *Adelphi*, xxiii (1947), 79-81.

2848a. Cocteau, Jean. *L'Eternel Retour*. [Tristan and Iseult . . . with illustrations from the film.] Paris: Nouvelles éditions françaises.

2848b. Cohen, Adolf Emile. *De Visie op Troje van de Westerse Middeleeuwse Geschiedschrijvers tot 1160*. [Includes Trojan origin of Britons.] Assen: Van Gurcum, 1941.

Rev. by J. J. Niermeyer in *Museum*, lxxx (1948), 14-15.

2771. Cohen, Gustave. *La Grande Clarté du Moyen-Age*. Fourth edition, Paris: Gallimard [1945]. A revised and corrected edition was published New York: Maison Française d'Édition, 1943.

Rev. by B. Wolegde in *Fr. St.*, i (1947), 261; by Alexandre Micha in *RMAL*, i (1945), 335-336.

2848c. ———. *Anthologie de la littérature française du moyen-âge*. Paris: Delagrave, 1946.

Rev. by O. Jodogne in *Let. Rom.*, i (1947), 339-340; by C. P[ellegrini] in *RLM*, ii (1947), 328; by P. J. in *RLR* [LXIX] (1947), 322.

860. ———. *Chrétien de Troyes et son œuvre*. 1931. New edition, Paris: Rodstein [1947?].

2848d. Cooke, Brian Kennedy. *Arthur King of Britain*. [An abridged version by Malory.] Leicester, England: Edmund Ward, 1946.

2549. Coomaraswami, Ananda K. "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight." 1944.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxv, 1944 (1946), 59-60.

2849. Crocetti, Camillo Guerrieri. *Le Roman de Tristan di Bérroul*. Genova: Romano Editrice, 1947.

Note by P. R[aimondi] in *RLM*, ii (1947), 173.

2850. Crosland, Jessie. "Ovid's Contribution to the Conception of Love Known as 'L'Amour Courtois.'" *MLR*, xlii (1947), 199-206.

2851. Crowder, Richard. "E. A. Robinson's Camelot." [Criticism of the Arthurian poems.] *College English*, ix (1947), 72-79.

2852. Dehoucke, F. (editor). *Chansons d'Ami. Traduits du Portugais. (XII<sup>e</sup> et XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles.)* Brussels, 1945.

2853. Denomy, Alexander J. "Andreas Capellanus: Discovered or Re-discovered?" *Med. St.*, viii (1946), 300-301.

2854. ————. "The *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277." *Med. St.*, viii (1946), 107-149.

2855. ————. *The Heresy of Courtly Love*. (Boston College Candlemas Lectures on Christian Literature.) New York: Declan X. McMullen Company [1947].

2856. Desonay, F. "Où en est le problème des origines de la lyrique provençale?" in *Dépaysements*. Liège: Soledì, 1945.

2775. Edelman, Nathan. *Attitudes of Seventeenth Century France toward the Middle Ages*. 1946.

Rev. by Henri Peyre in *RR*, xxxviii (1947), 71-75; by Dorothy Mackay Quynn in *AHR*, lxi (1947), 774; by Clotilde Wilson in *MLQ*, viii (1947), 260-261.

2857. Ellis, Frances M. "The Meisterlied of the Magic Drinking Horn in Berlin 414." *PQ*, xxvi (1947), 248-258.

2551. Errante, Guido. *Lirica romanza del primo secolo. Un saggio d'interpretazione*. (Columbia diss.) New York: (S. F. Vanni), 1943. The same work as *Sulla lirica romanza delle origini*, but with a different title page.

2858. Evans, R. Wallis. "Pum Breuddwyd Gwenddydd." [Gwenddydd's dreams with Merlin's explanations.] *BBCS*, xii (1946), 19-22.

2859. Fechter, P. *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Berlin: Knaur, 1941.

2859a. Ferrero, Giuseppe Guido. *Orlando Furioso*, commentato da Giuseppe Guido Ferrero. (Scrittori italiani.) Bologna: L. Capelli, 1942.

Rev. by G. de B. in *GSLI*, cxxii (1944), 95-96.

1895. Fourquet, J. *Wolfram d'Eschenbach et le Conte del Graal*. 1938.

Rev. by M. O'C. Walshe in *Erasmus*, i (1947), 472-476.

Friedmann, Henrietta. See Jacob Hammer.

2860. Frye, Northrop. *Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake*. (Many Arthurian references; see index.) Princeton: University Press, 1947.

2861. Gilson, E. "L'Art d'identifier les auteurs. A propos d'André le Chapelain." *Rev. du Moyen Age*, January, 1947.

2862. Gist, Margaret Adlum. *Love and War in the Middle English Romances*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947.

2863. Griffiths, J. Gwyn. "In Search of the Isles of the Blest." [Avallon not included.] *Greece & Rome*, xvi (1947), 122-126.

2864. Gruffydd, W. J. "The Arthurian Legend and the Mabino-gion." *Welsh Rev.*, vi (1947), 244-248; with notes by T. J. Morgan, *ibid.*, 262-265.

2864a. Haight, Gordon S. "Tennyson's Merlin." *SP*, XLIV (1947), 549-566.

2865. Hammer, Jacob. "Note sur Geoffrey de Monmouth *Historia Regum Britanniae*, I, 11." *Latomus*, vi (1947), 127-132.

2866. ———. "Geoffrey of Monmouth's Use of the Bible in the *Historia Regum Britanniae*." *Bull. John Rylands Lib.*, xxx (1946-47), 293-311.

2867. ——— and Henrietta Friedmann. "Status Imperii Iudaici." [References to manuscripts of Geoffrey's *Historia*.] *Scriptorium*, i (1946-47), 50-65.

2868. Harris, Julian. "Contes and Lais." Pp. 94-100 of Volume I of *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*. Syracuse: University Press, 1947.

2869. Hatto, A. T. "Two Notes on Chrétien and Wolfram." *MLR*, XLII (1947), 243-246.

2870. Hogg, A. H. A. "Llwyfenydd." [Urien Rheged, Taliesin.] *Antiquity*, 80 (1946), 210-211.

2871. Hollaender, Albert. "The Pictorial Work in the 'Flores Historiarum' of the So-Called Matthew of Westminster MS. Chetham 6712." [Includes reproduction of "De Coronatione Arthuri" and relation to Chertsey tiles.] *Bull. John Rylands Lib.*, xxviii (1944-45), 361-381.

2872. Holmes, Urban T., Jr. "A New Interpretation of Chrétien's *Conte del Graal*." *SP*, XLIV (1947), 453-476.

2873. Horrent, J. "La Composition de la Folie Tristan de Berne [FB]." *Rev. belge*, xxv (1946-47), 21-38.

2874. ———. "A propos de Galerous: A. Localisation de la 'Folie Tristan de Berne'; B. Galerous et Rohal." *Moyen Age*, XLII (1946), 43-72.

2875. Housman, John E. "Higden, Trevisa, Caxton, and the Beginnings of Arthurian Criticism." *RES*, xxiii (1947), 209-217.

2876. Jackson, Kenneth. "On the Name 'Leeds.'" *Antiquity*, 80 (1946), 209-210. See correction, *ibid.*, 81 (1947), 9.

2877. Jasinski, René. *Histoire de la littérature française*. Tome I. Paris: Boivin, 1947.

Rev. by J. Bourciez in *RLR* [LXIX] (1947), 389-390.

2877a. Jeanroy, Alfred. *Histoire sommaire de la poésie occitane des origines à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*. Paris: Didier, 1947.

2878. Jodogne, O. "Sur les Origines de la lyrique provençale." (Briffault, 2672.) *Let. Rom.*, I (1947), 79-85.

2879. ———. "Les deux versions de la *Folie Tristan*." *Let. Rom.*, I (1947), 255.

2880. Johnstone, P. K. "Dual Personality of St. Gildas." *Antiquity*, 80 (1946), 211-213.

2639. Jolivet, Alfred and Fernand Mossé. *Manuel de l'allemand du moyen âge des origines au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*. Grammaire. Textes. Glossaire. (Bibliothèque de Philologie Germanique, I.) Nouvelle édition, revue et corrigée. Paris: Aubier (Editions Montaigne), 1947.

2880a. Jones, Eirwen. *Folk Tales of Wales*. (Contains Owen's Stone, Mule's Ears, Merlin, Arthur Becomes King.) London: Thomas Nelson & Sons [1947].

2881. Jones, Gwyn. "Mabinogi and Edda." *Saga Book, Viking Soc. for Northern Research*, XIII, 1 (1946), 23-47.

2882. Jones, Thomas. "'Chronica de Wallia' and other Documents from Exeter Cathedral Library MS 3514." [Manuscript includes text of Geoffrey of Monmouth.] *BBCS*, XII (1946), 27-44.

2790. Keeler, Laura. *Geoffrey of Monmouth and the Late Latin Chroniclers*. 1946.

Rev. by Grover Cronin, Jr. in *Traditio*, IV (1946), 455-457; by Jacob Hammer in *Thought*, XXII (1947), 151-155, and in *Latomus*, VI (1947), 387-389; by Faith Thompson in *AHR*, LII (1947), 771-772.

2883. Kenyon, F. G. "Morte Darthur." (Letter to editor.) *LTLS*, June 7, 1947, p. 281.

2884. Knuttel, J. A. N. "Een Motief uit *Ferguut* bij Heinrik van Aken." *TNTL*, LXIII (1944), 61-62.

2884a. Kochs, Theodor (editor). *Tristan und Isolde* (Auszug). In Auswahl hrsg. von Theodor Kochs. (Göttinger Lesebogen, Reihe I, H. 3.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1946.

2885. Kosch, Wilhelm. *Deutsches Literatur-Lexikon. Biographisches und bibliographisches Handbuch*. Zweite, vollständig neu bearbeitete und stark erweiterte Auflage. (Brief Arthurian references.) I. Lieferung, A-Bagdad; II. Lieferung, Bagge-Bleibtreu. Bern: Francke, 1947.

2513. Krappe, Alexander H. "Avallón." 1943.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, XXIV, 1943 (1945), 55.



2560. ———. "The Fisher King." 1944.  
Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxv, 1944 (1946), 58-59.
- 2885a. ———. "The Grail Messenger." *PQ*, xxvi (1947), 352-357.
2003. Lapa, Rodriguez. *Amadis de Gaula*. Seleccção, tradução, argumento e prefácio. 1937. Second edition, Lisboa, 1941.  
Brief note by J. B[ourciez] in *RLR* [LXIX] (1947), 388.
- 2885b. Legge, M. Dominica. "The *Brut Abridged*, a Query." *Med. Æv.*, xvi (1947), 32-33.
2886. Letellier, Pierre. "Tristan et Iseut ou du narcissisme des amants immortels." [Film of Jean Cocteau.] *Studia Neophil.*, xviii (1945-46), 269-275.
2887. Lewis, Timothy. *Pregethwyr Cyntaf Cymru*. [Includes ancestry of Gwenhwyfar.] Privately printed (from *Y Tyst?*), 1947.
2888. London, H. Stanford. "Sir Morolt of Ireland, Knight of the Round Table," and "Cross Engrailed and Cross Clechy," which refers to Morolt and cites Heralds College MS E 11 of "Knights of the Round Table." *N&Q* cxcii (February 15, 1947), 83, 85-86.
2889. Loomis, Roger Sherman. "From Segontium to Sinadon—the Legends of a *Cité Gaste*." *Speculum*, xxii (1947), 520-533.
2890. McHugh, Sheila Joyce. "*Sir Percyvelle*": *Its Irish Connections*. Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1946.
2891. McKisack, May. "Samuel Daniel as Historian." [Includes Arthur.] *RES*, xxiii (1947), 226-243.
2655. Magné, Augusto. *A Demanda do Santo Graal*. 1944.  
Rev. by William A. Nitze in *MP*, xlv (1947), 194-195.
2892. Magoun, Francis P. "Brutus and English Politics." *ELH*, xiv (1947), 178-180.
2893. Maranini, L. "Educazione dell' uomo e amore materno nel 'Conte del Graal.'" *Humanitas*, i (1946?), 1164-1176, 1274-1292.
2894. Marrou, H. I. "Histoires d'Amour." (A review of Briffault, Traub, etc.) *Esprit*, December, 1945, pp. 901-902.
2895. Mason, Ellsworth G. "Troilus II, 1298." [Reference to Andreas Capellanus.] *MLR*, xlii (1947), 358-359.
- Maurly, Lucien. See Anton Blanck.
2896. Maxwell, J. C. "Lucan's first Translator." [Thomas Hughes; *Misfortunes of Arthur*.] *N&Q*, cxcii (November 29, 1947), 521-522.
2897. Meyer, H., Jr. "Zum Religionsgespräch im neunten Buch des Parzival (Mit einem Exkurs über die Bernwardstüren des Hildesheimer Domes)." *Neophil.*, xxxi (1947), 18-27.

2898. Michel, P. *Les grands écrivains français par la dissertation. Moyen Age et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.* Paris: Foucher, 1946.

2899. Minis, C. "De ἀπὸ κοινοῦ constructie, vooral in den Fergut." *TNTL*, LXII (1943), 161-184, 270-289.

2899a. Moret, A. "Les Origines du Minnesang." *Etudes Germaniques*, No. 5, 1947.

Morgan, T. J. See W. J. Gruffydd and Ifor Williams.

2899b. Neri, Ferdinando. *Maria di Francia. I Lai.* Traduzione di Ferdinando Neri. Torino: Chiantore, 1946.

Rev. by Georgio de Blasi in *RLM*, II (1947), 311-314.

2899c. Neumann, Hans (editor). *Hartmann von Aue. Erec* (Auszug) und *Iwein* (Auszug). In Auswahl hrsg. von Hans Neumann. (Göttinger Lesebogen, Reihe I, H. 2.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1946.

2900. Newstead, Helaine. "The Grail Legend and Celtic Tradition." *Mag. of the American Soc. of the French Legion of Honor*, XVI (1945), 219-234. Reprinted in *Franco-American Pamphlets*, 3rd ser., No. 5.

2901. ———. "Tristan." Pp. 123-130 of Volume I of *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*. Syracuse: University Press, 1947.

2902. Nitze, William A. "Some Remarks on the Grail-Lancelot Cycle." *Romance Philology*, I (1947), 137-141.

2806. Nykl, A. R. *Hispano-Arabic Poetry*. 1946.

Rev. by Aubrey F. G. Bell in *MLN*, LXII (1947), 421-423.

2904. Parry, John J. "A Bibliography of Critical Arthurian Literature for the Year 1946." *MLQ*, VIII (1947), 243-252.

2905. ———. "Arthurian Romance." Pp. 101-123 of Volume I of *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*. Syracuse: University Press, 1947.

2906. Patchell, Mary Frances. *The Palmerin Romances in Elizabethan Fiction.* (Columbia University Studies in English and Comparative Literature, 166.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1947.

Rev. by Waldo F. McNeir in *PQ*, xxvi (1947), 377-379.

2677. Pauphilet, A. "Au Sujet du Graal." *Romania*, LXVI (1940), 289-321, 481-504.

Summarized in *Bull. de l'Ass. Guillaume Bude*, 4 (December, 1947), 96-97.

2908. Pernoud, Régine. *La Poésie médiévale française; textes choisis et présentes.* Paris: Editions du Chêne, 1947.

2909. Pompeati, A. *Storia della letteratura italiana.* Vol. I, Il medio evo; Vol. II, Dall'umanesimo al Tasso. Torino: Utet, 1946.

2910. Pons, E. *Sire Gauvain et le Chevalier Vert*. (Bibl. de Phil. Germanique, IX.) (Text and translation.) Paris: Aubier, 1946.

Rev. by H. M. Smyser in *Speculum*, xxii (1947), 92-95; by A. A. Prins in *Eng. Studies*, xxviii (February, 1947), 19-20.

2911. Purves, John. "The *Abbregeement of Roland Furious*, by John Stewart of Baldynneis, and the Early Knowledge of Ariosto in England." *Italian St.*, iii (1946), 65-82.

2811b. Ranke, Friedrich (editor). *Gottfried von Strassburg, Tristan und Isold*. In *Auswahl herausgegeben*. Bern: Francke, 1946.

Rev. by R.-M. S. Heffner in *Monatshefte*, xxxix (1947), 541-542.

2912. ————. "Die höfisch-ritterliche Dichtung (1160 bis 1250)." Pp. 36-69 in *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte in Grundzügen: Die Epochen deutscher Dichtung*, edited by B. Boesch. Bern: Francke, 1946.

2812. Remy, Paul. *La Littérature provençale au moyen âge*. 1944. Rev. by H. J. Chaytor in *Fr. St.*, i (1947), 262-263.

2913. ————. "La lèpre, thème littéraire au moyen âge. Commentaire d'un passage du roman provençal de Jaufré." [Thomas, Béroul, *Queste*.] *Moyen Age*, xlii (1946), 195-242.

2570. Ridley, M. R. *The Story of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*. 1944.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxv, 1944 (1946), 62.

2419. Roach, William. *The Didot "Perceval"*. 1941.

Additional reviews by P. Groult in *Let. Rom.*, i (1947), 340-343, and in *RHE*, xlii (1947), 467-469; by K. S. d. V[ogel] in *Neophil.*, xxxi (1947), 216-217; by Arthur Långfors in *Neuphil. Mit.*, xlviii (1947), 171-175.

2914. ————. "Grail Theme in General." Pp. 130-136 of Volume I of *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*. Syracuse: University Press, 1947.

2915. Rossi, G. C. "L'Orlando Furioso in Portogallo." *Cultura Neolatina*, iv-v (1944-45), 132-156.

2144. de Rougemont, Denis. *L'Amour et l'Occident*. 1939. Reprinted in Paris, 1947.

2685. Scherer, Margaret R. *About the Round Table*. 1945.

Rev. by Thos. A. Kirby in *MLN*, lxii (1947), 216.

2916. Schirokauer, Arno. "Tristan 11699." *Ger. Rev.*, xxii (1947), 90-91.

2917. Schwietering, J. *Die deutsche Dichtung des Mittelalters*. (Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft.) Potsdam: Athenaion, 1941.

2917a. ————. *Parzivals Schuld. Zur Religiosität Wolframs in ihrer Beziehung zur Mystik*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1946.

Rev. by Helena M. Gamer in *German Books*, i (1948), 114-116.

2918. S[imone], F. "Ancora sui versi 51-78 del *Lai du Chevrefoil* de Maria di Francia." *RLM*, II (1947), 172-173.

2919. Singer, S. "Thomas von Britannien und Gottfried von Strassburg." *Tieche Festschrift*. Bern, 1947.

2920. ———. "Dogma und Dichtung des Mittelalters." [Includes Grail.] *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 861-872.

2921. Soprano, E. *Il romanzo di Tristano e Isotta. Secondo il testo di Bedier. Poema in terza rima*. Roma: De Carlo, 1940.

2922. Southward, Elaine C. "The Knight Yder and the *Beowulf* Legend in Arthurian Romance." *Med. Æv.*, xv (1946), 1-47.

2537. Tatlock, J. S. P. "Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Vita Merlini*." 1943.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxiv, 1943 (1945), 56-57.

2923. Thurnher, Eugen. *Wort und Wesen in Südtirol. Die deutsche Dichtung Südtirols im Mittelalter*. [Frescoes at Burg Runkelstein.] Innsbruck: Österreichische Verlagsanstalt, 1947.

2924. Tonnard, Fernand. *Le roman féérique de Huon de Bordeaux*. Paris: Lithiellieux, 1946.

2823a. Valeri, Diego. *Romanzi e racconti d'amore del medio evo francese*. Milano: Garzanti, 1944.

Brief note by A. M. in *Cultura Neolatina*, vi-vii (1946-47), 220.

2925. Vinaver, Eugene. *The Works of Sir Thomas Malory*. [From Winchester MS.] 3 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1947.

Rev. by John E. Housman in *Erasmus*, I (1947), 921-925.

2925a. Viscardi, A. *Letteratura franco-italiana*. [Includes Enanchet.]

See *Romania*, LXIX (194-), 425.

2926. Wehrli, Max. "Die Tristan Gottfrieds von Strassburg." *Trivium*, iv (1946), 81-117.

2927. Wettstein, Jacques. *Mezura, l'idéal des troubadours, son essentiel et ses aspects*. Zurich, 1945.

Rev. by W. Ruegg as "Troubadours und Frauendienst" in *Sonntagsblatt der Basler Nachrichten*, March 2, 1947.

2928. Whiting, B. J. "Gawain: His Reputation, His Courtesy, and His Appearance in Chaucer's *Squire's Tale*." *Med. St.*, ix (1947), 189-234.

2928a. ———. "'By my Fader Soule.' (CT, II (B), 1178.)" [*Lestoire de Merlin*.] *JEGP*, XLVI (1947), 297.

2929. Williams, Harry F. (editor). *Floriant et Florete*. (University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, XXIII.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1947.

Rev. by Arhur Långfors in *Neuphil. Mit.*, XLVIII (1947), 175-181.

2930. Williams, Ifor. "The Welsh Literary Tradition. II: The Earliest Poetry." *Welsh Rev.*, vi (1947), 238-243; with notes by T. J. Morgan, *ibid.*, 260-262.

2748. Wilmotte, Maurice. *Origines du roman en France*. 1942.

Rev. by Alexandre Micha in *RMAL*, i (1945), 84-88.

2930a. Wissmann, E. "Wolframs Parzival, 'evangelisch' gesehen." *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Ausgabe 1946, 95-102.

2582. Zumthor, Paul. *Merlin le Prophète*. 1943.

Rev. by Gladys D. Willcock in *YWES*, xxv, 1944 (1946), 60-61.

## INDEX

- Amadis de Gaula*, 2003.  
*Amorosa Visione*, 2839, 2841a, 2842.  
 Andreas Capellanus, 2837a, 2842, 2853, 2854, 2855, 1861, 1895.  
 Anthology, 2848c, 2908.  
 Arabic poetry, 2806.  
 Ariosto, 2839a, 2859a, 2911, 2915.  
 Arthur, King, 2871, 2891.  
 Arthurian criticism, 2875.  
 Arthurian legend, 2864.  
 Arthurian romance, 2905.  
 Avallon, 2513.  
 Averroism, 2854.  
 Bédier, Joseph, 2921.  
 Bek, Thomas (of Castelford), 2590a.  
 Beowulf, 2922.  
 Berlin MS. 414, 2857.  
 Bern *Folie Tristan*, 2873, 2874, 2879.  
 Bernward, St., 2897.  
 Bérout, 2849, 2913, 2823a.  
 Bible, 2866.  
 Bibliography, 1778, 2868, 2885, 2901, 2904, 2905, 2914.  
 Blake, William, 2860.  
 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 2839, 2841a, 2842.  
 Bran, 2887.  
 Britons, Trojan origin of, 2848a.  
*Brut* of Layamon, 2545; *Brut Abridged*, 2885a.  
 Brutus, 2892.  
 Camelot, 2851.  
*Carle of Carelyle*, 2829.  
*Cassiodorus*, 2840a.  
 Castelford, Thomas, 2590a.  
 Caxton, William, 2875.  
 Celtic tradition, 2900.  
 Chaucer, Geoffrey, 2895, 2928.  
 Chertsey tiles, 2871.  
 Chetham MS. 6712, 2871.  
*Chevrefoil*, 2918.  
 Chrétien de Troyes, 2838, 860, 2869; *Erec et Enide*, 2847; *Yvain*, 2831, 2847, 2823a; *Conte del Graal (Perceval)*, 2832, 2834, 2844, 1895, 2872, 2893.  
 Christianity in Early Britain, 2887.  
*Chronica de Wallia*, 2882.  
 Chroniclers, English, 2875.  
 Chronicles, Latin, 2790.  
*Cité Gaste*, 2889.  
 Clarity of the Middle Ages, 2271.  
 Cocteau, Jean, 2848, 2848a, 2886.  
*Comedy* of Dante, 2839.  
*Conte del Graal*, see Chrétien de Troyes.  
 Coronation of Arthur, 2871.  
 Courtly literature, 2758.  
 Courtly love, 2850, 2854, 2855, 2144.  
 Coward, Handsome, 2830.  
 Criticism, Arthurian, 2875.  
 Daniel, Samuel, 2891.  
 Dante, 2839.  
*Demanda do Santo Graal*, 2655.  
*Didot "Perceval"*, 2419.  
 Dogma, 2920.  
 Dreams of Gwenddydd, 2858.  
 Dutch literature, see *Ferguut*.  
*Edda*, 2881.  
 Elizabethan fiction, 2906.  
 Enanchet, 2925a.  
 English chroniclers, 2875; literature, 2600, 2862; politics, 2892; romances, 2862; see also individual authors and works.  
*Erec et Enide*, see Chrétien de Troyes.  
*Erikskrönika*, 2839b.  
*Estoire*, 2834.  
 Eufemia ballads, 2839b.  
 Exeter MS. 3514, 2882.  
*Ferguut*, 2884, 2899.  
 Fisher King, 2560.  
 Fitz-Osborn, William, 2887.  
*Flores Historiarum*, 2871.  
*Florian et Florete*, 2929.  
*Folie Tristan*, 2873, 2874, 2879, 2823a.  
 Folk tales, 2880a.  
 French literature, 2846, 2848a, 2775, 2868, 2877, 2899, 2908, 2748; see also individual authors and works.

- Galerous, 2874.  
 Gawain, 2928; *Gawain and the Green Knight*, 2549, 2910, 2570.  
*Gawene and the Carle of Carelyle*, Syre, 2829.  
 Geoffrey of Monmouth, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2882, 2790, 2887, 2537, 2912.  
 German literature, 2840, 2841, 2859, 2639, 2885, 2912, 2917; see also individual authors and works.  
 Gildas, St., 2880.  
 Gottfried von Strassburg, 2841, 2547, 2811b, 2639, 2884a, 2916, 2919, 2926.  
 Grail legend, 2900, 2677, 2920; messenger, 2885a; romances, 2834, 2655, 2902; theme, 2914.  
 Green Knight, see *Gawain and the Green Knight*.  
 Guinevere, Gwennyfar, 2887.  
 Gwenddydd, 2858.  
 Handsome Coward, Handsome Unknown, 2830.  
 Hartmann von Aue, 2840b, 2841, 2639, 2899c.  
 Heinrich van Aken, 2884.  
 Heralds College MS. E 11, 2888.  
 Herbort von Fritzlar, 2837.  
 Heresy, 2855.  
 Higden, Ranulph, 2875.  
 Hildesheim Cathedral, 2897.  
 Hispano-Arabic poetry, 2806.  
*Historia Regum Britanniae*, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2882, 2790, 2887.  
 Historical triads, 2843.  
 Horn, magic, 2857.  
 Hughes, Thomas, 2896.  
*Huon de Bordeaux*, 2924.  
 Iconography, 2871, 2923, 2685.  
 Iolo MSS., 2887.  
 Irish, 2492, 2890; Irish fabulous history, 2844.  
 Isles of the Blest, 2863.  
 Iseult, Isolt, 2547, 2848, 2849, 2873, 2874, 2879, 2886, 2811b, 2921.  
 Italian literature, 2837a, 2909, 2925a; see also individual authors and works.  
*Iwein*, 2840b, 2639, 2899c.  
*Jaufre*, 2913.  
*Joseph*, 2833, 2834.  
*Knight of the Cart*, see Chrétien de Troyes.  
*Knight of the Lion (Yvain)*, 2847.  
*Knights of the Round Table*, 2888.  
*Lancelot*, 2760, 2902; see also Chrétien de Troyes.  
 Latin chronicles, 2790.  
 Layamon, 2545.  
 Lays, 2868, 2918.  
 Leeds, 2876.  
 Leprosy, 2913.  
*Lestoire de Merlin*, 2928a.  
 Llwyfenydd, 2870.  
 Love in medieval romances, 2862; love debate, 2840a.  
 Lucan, 2896.  
 Lyric, Provençal, 2856, 2878.  
*Mabinogion*, 2864, 2881, 2887.  
 Magic horn, 2857.  
 Malory, Sir Thomas, 2835, 2848d, 2883, 2925.  
 Manuscripts, see Berlin, Chetham, Exeter, Iolo, Heralds' College, Peniarth, Winchester; of Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia*, 2867.  
 Marie de France, 2899b, 2918.  
 Mark, King, 2880a.  
 "Matthew of Westminster," 2871.  
 Meisterlied, 2857.  
*Meraugis de Portlesgues*, 2830.  
 Merlin, 2537, 2582, 2760, 2880a, 2928a.  
 Mezura, 2927.  
*Mimesis*, 2754.  
 Minnesong, 2899a.  
*Misfortunes of Arthur*, 2896.  
 Morolt of Ireland, 2888.  
*Morte Darthur* (Malory), 2835, 2883, 2925.  
 Myrddin, 2858.  
 Oriental sources, 2834.  
 Orlando Furioso, 2839a, 2859a, 2909, 2911, 2915.  
 Ovid, 2850.  
 Owen, 2880a.  
 Oxford *Folie Tristan*, 2823a, 2879.  
 Palmerin romances, 2906.  
*Parsival*, see Wolfram von Eschenbach.  
 Peniarth MS. 16, 2843.  
 Perceval, see Chrétien de Troyes; *Didot "Perceval"*, 2419.  
 Petrarch, 2839, 2845.  
 Politics, 2892.  
 Portuguese, 2856, 2655, 2003, 2915.  
*Privilegium Fori*, 2833.  
 Provençal lyric, 2855, 2878, 2812.  
*Queste del Graal*, 2837b, 2913.  
 Robert de Boron, 2833, 2834.  
 Robinson, E. A., 2851.  
 Rohal, 2874.  
*Roland Furiosus*, 2911.  
 Roman Britain, 2836.  
 Runkelstein frescoes, 2923.

- Saint Graal*, 2760.  
 Segontium, 2889.  
 Seventeenth century, 2775.  
 Sinadon, 2889.  
*Sir Percyvelle*, 2890.  
 Sovereignty, 2831.  
 Stewart, John, 2911.  
 Swedish literature, 2839b.  
*Syre Gawene and the Carle of Care-  
 lyle*, 2829.  
 Taliesin, 2870, 2887.  
 Tempier, Bishop Stephen, 2854.  
 Thomas of Britain, 2913, 2919, 2823a.  
 Trevisa, John de, 2875.  
 Triads, 2843, 2887.  
*Trionfi*, 2839, 2845.  
 Tristan, 1778, 2547, 2752, 2848, 2848a,  
 2849, 2873, 2874, 2639, 2879, 2884a,  
 2886, 2901, 2915, 2811b, 2916, 2921,  
 2926.  
*Troilus*, 2895.  
 Troubadours, 2762, 2894, 2927.  
 Troy, 2848b.  
 Unknown, Handsome, 2830.  
 Urien Rheged, 2870.  
 Vinaver, Eugène, 2835, 2883.  
*Vita Merlini*, 2537.  
 Vulgate romances, 2834, 2837b, 2760,  
 2913, 2928a.  
 War in medieval romances, 2862.  
 Welsh literature, 2843, 2858, 2864,  
 2868, 2870, 2880a, 2881, 2930.  
 Winchester MS., 2835, 2883, 2925.  
 Wolfram von Eschenbach, 2834, 2840b,  
 2841, 2844b, 1895, 2869, 2639, 2897,  
 2917a, 2930a.  
 Yder, 2922.  
 Ysolt, see Iseult.  
 Yvain, 2831, 2839b, 2840b, 2847, 2823a.



## REVIEWS

"Altdeutsche Übungstexte." Herausgegeben von der Akademischen Gesellschaft Schweizerischer Germanisten. Bern: A. Francke Verlag.

Band 1: *Gotische Texte*. Herausgegeben von M. SZADROWSKY, 1946. Pp. 63. s.fr. 3.50. Band 2: *Kleines Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*. Bearbeitet von WERNER BURKHARD, 1946. Pp. 80. s.fr. 3.50. Band 3: GOTTFRIED VON STRASZBURG, *Tristan und Isold*. In Auswahl herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH RANKE, 1946. Pp. 66. s.fr. 3.50. Band 4: *Minnesang vom Kürenberger bis Wolfram*. Ausgewählt und herausgegeben von MAX WEHRLI, 1946. Pp. 99. s.fr. 4. Band 5: *Walther von der Vogelweide*. Ausgewählt und herausgegeben von MAX WEHRLI, 1946. Pp. 88. s.fr. 3.50. Band 6: *Texte zur Geschichte des deutschen Tageliedes*. Ausgewählt von ERNST SCHEUNEMANN, ergänzt und herausgegeben von FRIEDRICH RANKE, 1947. Pp. 63. s.fr. 3.50.

The timely appearance of this series of small *Übungstexte* should receive a friendly welcome in the field of Germanics, where the shortage of textbooks is especially acute at the present time. Few of the books in this series actually present anything new. They are, in general, reading selections based on previous editions and anthologies of well-known scholars.

The Gothic texts of the first volume include selections from Wilhelm Braune's *Gotische Grammatik*, to which additions have been made from Wilhelm Streitberg's edition of the Gothic Bible. Several sections of the *Skeireins* have also been added. The Greek text is given with the Gothic, and an adequate glossary follows, in which diacritics are printed (contrary to the procedure in the actual text). A few sources and references to standard texts are cited, but most of Braune's notes are omitted.

The Old High German texts in the second volume are selections from Steinmeyer's *Die kleineren althochdeutschen Sprachdenkmäler* and Braune's *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*, with their editorial comments and diacritics. The order is much the same as that encountered in Braune, except that no Old Low German specimens are appended. Brief notes on each selection are given, as well as sufficient vocabulary.

The third volume of texts, taken from Gottfried von Straßburg's *Tristan und Isold*, includes selections from a 1930 edition by the same editor. The text is normalized, and copious notes are given whenever there are variant readings in the older manuscripts. The lines printed here are as follows: 1-244, 4555-5068, 10803-12568, 14583-15046, 16403-17274, 18115-18600. Three appendices include: (1) lines 2349-2508 of the Innsbruck Fragment, printed here as nearly as possible like the original; (2) a brief part of *Le Roman de Tristan par Thomas* (ed. Bédier, 1902); and (3) the two *Sprüche* attributed to Gottfried.

The fourth volume is a very readable anthology of the *Minnesang*, based largely on the last edition of *Des Minnesangs Frühling* by Karl

Lachmann, Moriz Haupt, and Friedrich Vogt, revised by Carl von Kraus (Leipzig, 1940). A few minor poets are omitted, and some of Wolfram's lyrics are added. Text variations are cited in the footnotes. An appendix includes cross-references to corresponding selections in *Des Minnesangs Frühling*.

The fifth volume contains the more popular poems of Walther von der Vogelweide, taken from the tenth edition of Lachmann's anthology, as edited by Carl von Kraus. The arrangement is as follows: (1) aphorisms; (2) *Minnesang*; and (3) religious poetry. Footnotes are supplied to indicate deviations in the various manuscripts. Cross-references to the corresponding selections in Lachmann are appended.

In the sixth volume, a familiar phase of chivalric literature, the *Tagelied*, is presented in the order of its historical development. Selections by Ernst Scheunemann have been augmented by those of Friedrich Ranke. The objective here is literary content, with emphasis on style and motif, rather than on textual criticism. Two poems of the Provence are followed by selections from the *Minnesinger* and a number of anonymous works. The *Tagelied*, heralding the break of day and the parting of lovers after their nocturnal bliss, is found here in all its forms—from vague ethereal beauty to mundane reality, from the court to the street. It is filled with literary stereotypes, such as the "pale white arms" of the fair lady, the sun that appears *von Orient her*, while the ever-present nightwatchman plays his more or less active role. And a familiar lyrical note rings out in the following lines from a folk-poem collected by Goethe:

Steh auf es mein Schätzel nur balde  
Die Vögel die singen im Walde (p. 60).

Here is a rich fund of reference material which will be of particular interest to students of comparative literature.

The seventh volume is announced as containing selections from the *Heliand*, and still other volumes are promised.

As implied in the foreword to the first volume, these texts can only be regarded as substitutes for the regular editions from which they are adapted, during the time when the latter are unavailable. Students should be made aware of the problems involved in achieving normalized texts, and collateral work in facsimile manuscripts should be encouraged. It must be noted, however, that the use of such reading texts involves the difficulty of obtaining concise historical grammars, such as those of Braune. It is desirable, therefore, that these, too, should be made available in a similar series.

CARROLL E. REED

University of Washington

*An Evaluation of the Earliest German Translation of "Don Quixote": "Junker Harnisch aus Fleckenland."* By CHRISTIAN F. MELZ. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Publications in Modern Philology, Volume 27, No. 5, 1945. Pp. 301-42. \$0.50.

The merits of this monograph are twofold: it gives a convenient summary of the present state of research on the question of the author-

ship of the first *Quixote* translation into German, and it analyzes in greater detail than had been done previously the language and style of the German version by comparing it with the original. The question of the place of the book in the literature of the time and of the reception of *Don Quixote* in Germany is touched upon only incidentally. The author fully accepts the theory of Tiemann concerning the identity of the translator, and tries to develop it further. In this attempt, however, he is not always successful, and is inclined to become involved in cavilings and contradictions. Thus he assumes with Tiemann that the translation was completed at a considerably earlier date than that of its publication; this delay of more than twenty years he attributes partly to the translator's extreme conscientiousness in revising his text. On the other hand, Dr. Melz himself quotes in a different context a passage from the translator's preface in which the latter declares that he did not wish to spend too much time in search of fitting expressions for difficult terms and phrases of the original. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful whether the author of a translation which is so truly *volkstümlich*, as Dr. Melz himself demonstrates, was given to scruples of the kind only modern fastidious literati would experience. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from the translator's rendering of "Quixote" as "Peinscheide" seem far-fetched.

Of greater value than the part dealing with its external history are Dr. Melz's investigations on the language of the translation. Here he is on sure ground, in contrast to the uncertain footing in the construction of hypotheses on an unsolvable problem, for, at least to the writer of this review, as to some contributors to the *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, Tiemann's conjectures do not seem convincing. Dr. Melz possesses the advantage of knowing Spanish well, and is therefore able to compare the translation with the original, a qualification which his predecessors in the research on the first German *Don Quixote*, with the exception of Tiemann, did not possess. Dr. Melz places his investigation in a broad framework: not only does he compare the translation with the original, but also with other translations, contemporary French and English, and subsequent German versions. In a number of well-chosen examples, he illustrates the successes and shortcomings in the work of the anonymous writer of 1648 and some of his typical procedures. He restores this book to the attention it rightfully deserves: within its limited scope it is the best German version of *Don Quixote*. He correctly assigns the style of the translation a place in the tradition of the German *Volks- und Schwankbücher*, and demonstrates in detail the delightful idiomatic raciness of the book. It is therefore so much the more surprising when Dr. Melz speaks at one point of the "baroque style" of the translation. Though it may show here and there traces of this style, the popular tenor of the book, which is still close to the literature of the sixteenth century, keeps it in general apart from the elaborate clumsiness typical of the German *Barock*. The wordiness, for which Dr. Melz is inclined to make the Baroque responsible, is explained by the translator himself who, in his preface, defends the necessity of paraphrasing one Spanish term with several words in German, and by his practice of incorporating notes on foreign customs and titles in the text.

While the analysis of the language of the translation is in general apt and comprehensive, it is too short in its treatment of syntax. The one example cited by Dr. Melz of the sentence structure of the translation is insufficient to illustrate the often masterly fashion in which the anonymous author of 1648 handles the complicated, well-balanced, syntactical edifices of Cervantes' Renaissance prose. In this, as in every other respect, the translator follows the principles which he himself establishes in his preface: to make the translation read as if the book were originally written in the language of the translation. Dr. Melz might have laid greater stress on this remarkable preface, for it is of unusual common sense and originality, astonishingly free from the pedantry of the time in its exposition of what makes a good translation; he might also have mentioned the difficulties encountered in translating from Spanish into German as compared with translating into the other Western European languages.

In general Dr. Melz's monograph is written with the attention to details and the enthusiasm which its subject deserves.

LIENHARD BERGEL

Queens College

*Voltaire, Dryden and Heroic Tragedy.* By TRUSTEN WHEELER RUSSELL. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. Pp. viii + 178. \$2.50.

The belief that Voltaire's dramas were influenced chiefly by Shakespeare is denied by this book, which attempts to prove that the connections between Voltaire and Dryden were much closer than is generally believed. Mr. Russell shows that the English literature with which Voltaire had closest contact was that of the Restoration, and as the best-known dramatist of the period, Dryden inevitably became Voltaire's model. Voltaire was excited by the freedom of political discussion in English drama; he admired Dryden's ability to ratiocinate in heroic verse; in the *Henriade* he parallels Dryden's *The Duke of Guise* in attacking religious bigotry; he borrowed lines from *The Medal for Zaire*; he based on *The Indian Emperour* not only his *Alzire*, but also an argument to be found in the *Dictionnaire philosophique* and a passage in the *Essai sur les mœurs*. By 1750 his critical attitudes had advanced little beyond those Dryden had held in 1680. The thesis that Voltaire as a playwright was considerably influenced by the heroic dramas of Dryden is thus made plausible enough. The book does not, however, present enough evidence for the reader to determine how much the recognition of Dryden's influence on Voltaire alters previously held conceptions of the influence of Shakespeare, of French heroic drama, and in particular of Corneille, on Voltaire. The tendency to relate all heroic elements in Voltaire to Dryden is questionable in view of the former's steady concern with Corneille. In addition, the aspect of Voltaire's work that shows pronounced interest in the sentimentalism of the eighteenth century is given scanty treatment.

But these comments mean only that the method of the book is less definitive than it is indicative.

The chapters devoted to study of Voltaire alone—to his conception of tragedy, to his subject matter, and to his efforts to raise dramatic style—are well done and should make the book a valuable addition to eighteenth-century scholarship; but the larger framework, in which Voltaire's critical theories are related to the main body of Neo-Classical criticism, shows so much oversimplification and such a curious shifting of definitions that it is likely to be misleading.

BAXTER HATHAWAY

Cornell University

*Camille Jullian: Un demi-siècle de science historique et de progrès français, 1880-1930.* Par ALBERT GRENIER de l'Institut, Professeur d'Antiquités Nationales au Collège de France. Paris: Albin Michel, 1944. Pp. 316. 78 francs.

Cette biographie retrace d'une manière attachante la vie du distingué historien français Camille Jullian, connu comme "l'historien des Gaules." Jullian, au début de sa carrière, avait reçu de l'Institut une bourse d'études pour l'Allemagne avec la mission officielle d'étudier le système du haut enseignement de ce pays. Ce voyage qui se place en 1882 lui servit aussi à travailler à sa thèse: "Histoire de l'administration de l'Italie d'Auguste à Dioclétien," sous la direction de Mommsen. Jullian, nommé professeur à Bordeaux, écrivit l'histoire de cette ville pour répondre à la requête de son conseil municipal. Ce travail lui permit de remonter au Bordeaux gallo-romain et peu à peu de prêter attention au plus lointain passé celtique de sa patrie. C'est beaucoup pour ce dernier aspect, c'est-à-dire en sa qualité d'historien du lointain passé français, que Jullian reçut la chaire d'Antiquités Nationales au Collège de France. Le Collège de France lui attribua cette chaire en la substituant, départ important pour cette institution, à celle de philosophie ancienne gréco-romaine (pp. 190-91).

Camille Jullian fut un épigraphiste remarquable; toutefois, dit l'auteur, il reste surtout le maître de la recherche archéologique en France. Il est probable que nous avons là la raison pour laquelle l'étude présente satisferait peu le lecteur qui voudrait par elle apercevoir quelque chose des inscriptions celtiques: on n'y trouve guère que deux pages (181-82) concernant deux tablettes de plomb contenant des textes magiques; textes dont Jullian a déchiffré quelque chose sans que le professeur Grenier nous dise quoi.

Un index eût été un complément heureux à une table des matières qui est brève. Mais on peut regretter surtout que l'auteur s'en soit tenu dans son exposition à l'ordre chronologique sans consacrer de place à une vue d'ensemble. En effet il nous dit que l'empire romain, au moins pour l'Italie (p. 27), a favorisé les libertés locales, thèse qu'a défendue Jullian contre celle de Mommsen. De plus le contexte (pp. 140 et 240 notamment) montre que l'Italie seule fut favorisée de ce libéralisme et nous voyons un exemple de l'intolérance romaine dans le cas de la

Gaule où : "Après avoir frappé la Gaule dans son existence nationale," l'Empire "a aboli jusqu'aux œuvres et au souvenir de son histoire, notamment en laissant périr dans l'oubli la poésie druidique." Et cette vue aura conduit Jullian, tard au cours de sa carrière, à regretter la victoire de César sur Vercingétorix. On voudrait savoir si Jullian a essayé d'expliquer cette disparité entre la politique extérieure et la politique intérieure de Rome. Il semble qu'un livre écrit en 1944 devrait tenir compte des objections de Valéry et de Péguy (*Clio*) contre l'histoire en montrant au plus juste ce que celle-ci peut nous faire comprendre. Par contre la promesse du sous-titre est très bien tenue et le professeur Grenier montre avec bonheur les progrès en France de l'histoire et de ses disciplines auxiliaires comme l'archéologie et l'épigraphie.

JEAN DAVID

University of Washington

*The Cycles of the Kings.* By MYLES DILLON. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1946. Pp. viii + 124. \$3.25.

The author's claims for this little volume of analysis are as valid as they are modest. For the larger public, rather than for the Irish scholar, he has selected his stories from the so-called "Historical Cycle," without attempting to do for that Cycle "what Thurneysen did for the Ulster Cycle," though he has been guided by Thurneysen's method in documentation and in summary. Documentation, a desideratum that is woefully inadequate in a collection like Cross and Slover's *Ancient Irish Tales* (which offers in full three of Dillon's narratives), is provided in admirable moderation and should prove extremely helpful; to the summaries, the general reader will in many instances prefer the fuller translations found in the *Tales*. In their fullness, however, Dillon's stories about Rónán, Becfolá, and Gulide's daughter leave little to be desired; but some of the longer tales, such as the two "Frenzies" and the *Tromdám Guaire*, suffer, on the whole, from too great compression. It is true, as Dillon observes, that the time is not ripe for an exhaustive study, yet one misses here the stories of the deaths of Fergus Mac Léte (already analyzed—in German—by Thurneysen) and Muirchertach Mac Erca, the adventures of Condlá Chaem and Art Mac Cuinn, and others, even though good technical reasons may be advanced for excluding some of them.

Twenty of the twenty-two tales selected by Dillon fall fairly readily into ten "cycles," beginning with the cycle of Labraid Loingsech assigned to the third century B.C., and ending with that of the early eighth-century king Fergal. Except for the first and latest, then, all of these tales belong—traditionally—to that dawn, always tantalizing to the historian, between the second and seventh centuries. But, of course, the time to which the events of a narrative are assigned is no safe guide to the date of composition. The tale of Conall Corc, which according to Dillon was written in the "eighth or ninth century," is placed under the fourth-century cycle of Crimthann Mac Fidaig



(whose very historicity, like *Dá Thí's* [Dillon, p. 40] is questioned by O'Rahilly, *Early Irish History and Mythology* [Dublin, 1946], pp. 209-11); but the story of the birth of the great "third-century" king Cormac Mac Airt is of much later composition. Dillon believes most of these tales were written in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries. Their geographical distribution is also significant. They are for the most part distinctly Northern, more than half of them, indeed, being in some way connected with Scotland. Of seven of them the scene is laid in Connaught, three in Ulster, and five in Meath; farther south, three belong to Leinster, and only one to Munster. As literature, too, the tales exhibit a marked range, from the stories of Suibhne and Buchet and Cano to those of Crimthann Mac Fidaig and Gulide's daughter, which Dillon frankly labels "of no literary merit."

It is in their relation to other literatures that the "larger public" will find the chief fascination of these tales. Dillon notes the similarity of the *Aided Maele Fothartaig* to the classical story of Phaedra and Hippolytus, though not the twofold resemblance of Labraid to the son of Croesus (Herodotus, I, 85) and to Midas, or the parallelism between Fithir and Dáirine (p. 104) and the classical Procne and Philomela. A connection with Arthurian romance will be seen more frequently than Dillon has indicated. Analogues for the most famous of Celtic love stories, that of Tristan and Isolt, appear not only in the *Scéla Cano*, recognized by Thurneysen in 1923 as one of the earliest parallels, but in the motif of the tree growing out of the lovers' graves in the Baile story (p. 28) retold by Yeats, in the penalty for adultery in the story of Conall Corc (p. 36), in the motifs of Mongan's conception (p. 50) and the love-charm (p. 54), which recurs in the Cano story (p. 81), and the motif of the prodigious leaps of Domnall (p. 58) to be found elsewhere in Irish legend. The conflict between love and duty, similar to that of the Cano and Tristan themes, appears also in the highly poetic story of Liadain and Curithir (ignored by Dillon) which belongs to the seventh-century Guaire cycle (Dillon, p. 75). Chaucer's Arthurian tale of the Loathly Lady finds a close parallel, if not an ultimate source, in the Irish tale summarized by Dillon on pages 38-41, and Chaucer's Sir Thopas seems effeminate enough when we find him, like Cano's Créd (p. 81), suffering from *grád écmaise* (cf. Robinson's *Chaucer*, p. 844). Suibhne Geilt may be seen behind the madness of Shakespeare's King Lear, as I have already suggested in this journal (*MLQ*, VII [1946], 153-74), and the keepsake which Cano receives from his mother and gives to Créd (p. 82) has its counterpart in the handkerchief given, also with tragic consequences, by Othello to Desdemona. This motif was revived by Eugene O'Neill in (the thoroughly Irish) Matt Burke's "cross given me by my mother [which has] great power in it," and contributes to Anna Christie's tragedy (Act IV). Moreover, Shakespeare's great contemporary, Spenser, it will be recalled, lived for two years at New Abbey in Ireland, under the shadow of the Hill of Allen (the scene of the *Cath Almaine*, p. 99), where he drew upon the folklore of the region for his *Faerie Queene*. The appearance of such books as *The Cycles of the Kings* and Dillon's more recent but more comprehensive *Early Irish Literature* (University of Chicago Press, 1948) should



open up for students of English literature more veins of Irish gold than are now dreamed of in their cosmologies.

It would be gratuitous to list omissions in a volume so admirably condensed as this one. But a few bibliographical additions may perhaps be briefly noted. On page 27, add the version printed in *Hibernica Minora*, pages 84-85; on page 41, Gabrán, see further Meyer, *Otia Merseiana* V, 2; on page 48, see the story of Créd, daughter of Rónán, king of Leinster, *Revue Celtique*, II, 199-200; on page 55 Dillon makes no mention of the "primitive folktale" with a historic setting published from YBL and D.4.2 in *Eriu* V, 113-19, a tale which would make Cathal Mac Findguine (d. 737) contemporary with Fiachna Mac Baetáin, Brandub, and Guaire; on page 99, see also the prophecy of Fergal and the love of Fergal for Congal's daughter (O'Donovan's *Three Fragments*, under A. D. 720, pp. 22-29). Footnote 3, page 79, should read "Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1924, 122-33." To the Index (p. 122, in connection with p. 41) add *Aided Néill*, *Archiv für Celt. Lexicogr.*, III, 323-24.

ROLAND M. SMITH

University of Illinois

*Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man.* By SIR THOMAS ELYOT. Edited by EDWIN JOHNSTON HOWARD. Oxford, Ohio: The Anchor Press, 1946. Pp. xxxii + 260. \$5.00.

This is another in Professor Howard's series of reprints of the works of Sir Thomas Elyot, laudably designed to make more readily accessible the lesser works of that important English humanist. Like the same editor's reprint of *The Defence of Good Women* (1940), the present volume is a page-for-page and line-for-line reproduction in modern type, the text reproduced being that of the first edition (Berthelet, 1533). The text is accompanied by an Introduction (pp. vii-xxxii), Textual Notes, collating readings of the first and second (1534) editions (pp. 233-239), and an Index.

While an edition of Elyot's works, exclusive of *The Governour* and the *Dictionary*, might have been prepared less expensively in a one- or two-volume set, most readers will feel some satisfaction in having separate volumes that approximate the form of their originals. The form of the reproduction is more attractive than facsimile; and the transcription, in the sixteen pages checked by this reviewer ("The prohemie," pp. 3-13; Dialogue II, pp. 68-72) is scrupulously exact, the only slip consisting of one long *s* reproduced (p. 5: *Englyshe*) as an *f*. It is a pity that the limitation of the edition to two hundred copies should partially defeat the editor's expressed purpose of rendering Elyot accessible.

JOHN LEON LIEVSAY

University of Tennessee

*Fletcher, Beaumont & Company.* By LAWRENCE B. WALLIS. New York: King's Crown Press, 1947. Pp. xii + 315. \$3.75.

Professor Wallis contends in his interesting volume that "Fletcher, Beaumont and Company can be most wisely understood, and appreciated, if regarded above all as entertainers to the gentry of their day." In support of this contention, he presents, in Part One, a survey of Beaumont and Fletcher criticism, and, in Part Two, a reappraisal of these playwrights. Part One reveals the high esteem accorded Beaumont and Fletcher up to the Restoration, their waning popularity during the last part of the seventeenth century, their obscurity during the eighteenth century, their reemergence as "panders" in the Romantic period, their historical treatment in the nineteenth century, and their present disputed position among critics, some of whom deem them decadent. Part Two places them in their social, educational, and theatrical milieux, and shows how their artful appeal to gentry tastes made them, in contemporary eyes, the Castor and Pollux of the Stuart dramatic galaxy, outshining even Shakespeare and Jonson.

Professor Wallis raises Fletcher above Beaumont in his appraisal, an elevation which reverses much accepted opinion. Fletcher, he claims, possessed greater powers of wit and invention; Beaumont displayed more discrimination and judgment. But both playwrights emerge from his study as consummate technicians. Indeed, it was their very ability to "grip, move, startle, surprise, and amuse the audience for whom they wrote" that insured their success. They had grown up and matured in an atmosphere saturated with Sidney's *Arcadia* and D'Urfé's *L'Astrée*, and had fallen heir to a romantic theatrical tradition. Such a milieu not only allowed them to present in their plays spectacular turns and reversals, but also prepared their audiences to understand and applaud them. It is thus not surprising that *Philaster*, which traced "emotional patterns" familiar yet pleasingly new, brought Beaumont and Fletcher immediate fame. But they not only skillfully played on gentry emotions; they touched upon topics of special interest to men of their time. Their dramatic characters, for example, spoke of tyrants and kingship, topics which James I had made particularly relevant. It is to be regretted that Professor Wallis did not at this point examine contemporary sermons, pamphlets, and broadsides, for such sources would have disclosed conflicting political views, a knowledge of which would illuminate many allusions. Further evidence, however, would only support the conclusion that Beaumont and Fletcher were conscious technicians who, more skillfully than their contemporaries, shaped familiar materials into pleasing and novel forms.

Such an appraisal should modify the critical dogma that their plays, particularly those of Fletcher, contributed notably to the decay of the drama. This dogma, which has often placed their turn of phrase and twist of plot in an unfavorable light, has done much to obscure real excellencies of form and technique which reside in their works. But the new appreciation for which Professor Wallis contends should not, as he himself states, raise Beaumont and Fletcher to the rank

of great dramatists. "They had," as he says, "no serious philosophy of life to offer; no profound interpretation of human nature to give; no deep political, social or poetic insight to reveal." Perhaps such fundamental deficiencies were also apparent to Milton, who, when describing the pleasures of the stage, in *L'Allegro*, differed from the opinion of his contemporaries by mentioning, not Beaumont and Fletcher, but Shakespeare and Jonson. The perspective of three hundred years reveals the acumen of Milton's critical insight.

G. F. SENSABAUGH

Stanford University

*Johnsonian Gleanings.* By ALEYN LYELL READE. Part X: *Johnson's Early Life: The Final Narrative.* London: Privately printed for the author by Percy Lund Humphries & Co., 1946. Pp. xii + 224.

Wherever Johnsonian studies are seriously undertaken, Aleyn Lyell Reade will be remembered with honor among the half-dozen disciples who have done most to increase the stock of factual information about their master. For nearly half a century he has applied himself to this pursuit with an energy and a devotion before which the only becoming attitude is that of humble awe. His ten preceding volumes, of which the present is a succinct summary, are the sober evidence of a life filled with excitements and ardors, of hope, disappointment, surprise, and rejoicing, of which the world can know nothing, and of which less devoted scholars may have but an inkling. Such work as Mr. Reade's exacts for its successful accomplishment a tribute of intelligent effort and faithful endurance, of mind and moral fibre, easily comparable to that required by much more publicized forms of high adventure.

"The art of biography," wrote Mr. Reade in 1922, "is the gift of the few, but the science of biography can be advanced by anyone schooled to the pursuit of truth." The science, in brief, is to follow backward, outward, and forward, every family name that cuts across the orbit of the main subject, for what may be disclosed of fresh light of any kind. The rigorous application of his method of genealogical enquiry has yielded rich rewards in the provinces where he has labored, where the community life was relatively static for generations. He has revealed how richly interpenetrated and cross-fertilized and interlocked Johnson's own being was with that of the region which produced him; and it is truly surprising to realize this debt of the famous Londoner to his country origins. Moreover, such matted roots as Mr. Reade has painstakingly laid bare do much to explain that English toughness and fidelity for which in the last decade we have had such profound reason to be grateful.

The solid foundations on which Mr. Reade has established Johnson's pre-London life are in no danger of serious disturbance. It is perhaps inevitable that this tenth volume of the *Johnsonian Gleanings* should leave us with a faint sense of disappointment. For the pioneering excitement, the thrill of discovery, lies in the earlier vol-

umes. The probing, the minute detail, the footnotes, the debate and doubt, are the life-blood of this enterprise. A summary of the findings, detached, even expert, but stripped of the evidence of struggle, does not communicate that living experience; and Mr. Reade has modestly disclaimed the possession of talents which might compensate, and has steadfastly resisted all impulses to import a specious dramatic effect.

We may nevertheless be very grateful for this sifting and judicious *précis*, which probably no other hand could have accomplished with such steadiness and assurance. The job needed to be done, and the indices which are to follow will be invaluable. But for our excitement we shall return to the earlier, richer record; and for *his* excitement, as well as ours, we wish Mr. Reade years of further exploration and discovery in the relatively unknown, first epoch of Johnson's London life, to which he is now free to devote his extraordinary gifts.

BERTRAND H. BRONSON

Berkeley, California

*Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake.* By NORTHROP FRYE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. Pp. 462. \$5.00.

Recent critical interest in Blake has centered on his mythopoetic quality with the accompanying emphasis on the irrationality of a society in which the artist alone plays a fecund role. Such a reading of Blake generally slights the historical context of the poetry and the traditional aspect of his thought. It further neglects the fundamental ethical impulse which so often can differentiate great from good poetry. Professor Frye's new study of Blake does much to rectify both these sins of omission and denigration.

Professor Frye has faced up squarely to the problem of the material of Blake's vision and his goal in patterning that material. The terminological influence of the Ossian poems, the methodological influence of Berkeley, and the symbolic influence of Swedenborg and Boehme are carefully delineated to reveal the essentially rational pattern of Blake's speculation. Creative imagination with all its importance as an organic and fluid concept in which the intuitive and subconscious qualities of human intelligence predominate still requires a systematic analysis in order that the critic may reveal its place in the make-up of the artist.

Blake's poetry is nothing more nor less than a shell fashioned and discarded in the supreme effort not just to account for the genesis of fallen man and postulate conditions for his ascension to an unfallen state as in Milton, but to visualize in the visionary implication of that word the process of the fallen cosmos becoming unfallen. During the course of unfolding that largest of all possible visions Blake levels his guns at all possible deterrents to that state of becoming, whether Locke's emphasis on the sensational aspects of human experience, or Newton's emphasis on causality, or Bacon's method of natural inferences, with an irony and an invective often equal to the best in Neo-Classical satire.

The individual quality of Blake's poetry cannot come clear unless the visionary intent is comprehended. The contextual analysis in terms of image, music, fusion of language and subject into symbol aid in understanding Blake's mode of expression and his skill as a poet. But he can no more be evaluated except in relation to the dynamics and goal of his vision than Milton can in respect to the revolutionary ethical impulses of his poetry. Professor Frye has realized this fully. For him the "politics of vision" have given way to the ends and qualities of vision, and a basic standard of aesthetic judgment has been re-affirmed.

We must not, however, allow the larger values of Professor Frye's book to obscure his minor triumphs and failures. The chapter headings, such as "Comus Agonistes," in which the influence of the Milton of those two works is perceptively discussed, are full of relevant implications. The matter of Blake's thought at times is given a finish which adds depth to our comprehension, and yet on other occasions there is provided a complex explication where Blake's own statement is much the clearer. Professor Frye's commentary on the longer poems infrequently descends to mere summary, and fails to annotate the symbolism completely. But these deficiencies do not seriously detract from the importance of the study. Professor Frye has written in a highly intelligent fashion, and has opened up yet another room in the ever-imposing edifice of William Blake.

HENRY WASSER

*City College of New York*

*The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray.*

Collected and edited by GORDON N. RAY. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1946. Set of four volumes boxed, \$25.00.

Few scholarly works in recent years have given the professional student of literature so much pleasure, or provided him with such rich material for study, as *The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace Thackeray*. Every reviewer has testified to this fact in glowing terms of praise for Professor Gordon Ray's work.

There is another aspect of these four volumes that should not be neglected in a review. The scholars may claim them for their own, but the average reader, whose education has included the reading of *Vanity Fair*, will find in the *Letters* endless delight. He will find an array of unique personalities revealed with a frank insight that is always both charming and exciting. He will be involved in petty and great disputes, and follow them with the interest with which he might pursue the plot of a detective story. At times he will be so impatient to follow clues that he will learn painlessly the aids provided by fine scholarship as it is revealed in footnotes and cross-references. He may begin on page 1, Volume I, but before an hour has passed he may be reading page 370 in Volume IV. When he accidentally discovers the forty-three double column pages of the Index, nothing less than a table

where four volumes can be spread out for easy reference will satisfy him. The story pleasure to be derived from these volumes is endless.

For the reader with a casual interest in historical personalities and issues, there is a great wealth of firsthand information. The letters give the reader a feeling that he is on the inside track, reading that which was once forbidden. Disraeli will vie with Dickens for an evening's reading, but of course the Dickens scandal will ultimately surpass the virtues of the great prime minister.

It would be a strange reader, however, who did not spend his first evening with these delightful books not reading at all, but just turning the pages to look at Thackeray's drawings. There must be nearly one thousand portraits, sketches, and facsimile reproductions that are fascinating in themselves. Thackeray's satirical sketches are a major part of his contribution. They are beautifully reproduced in these volumes, for which both editor and publisher deserve unqualified praise.

Here is enough for every reader, and it is important that every reader should occasionally share in the work of the scholar. In these days when the scholar's responsibility to the intelligent public is of primary importance, it is good to have such a work to offer all citizens who can read. The only sad thing is that it costs too much. It deserves an endowment that would make it available to the public at half the price.

SOPHUS K. WINTHER

*University of Washington*

*Preaching in the First Half of New England Church History.* By BABETTE MAY LEVY. Hartford, Connecticut: American Society of Church History, Studies in Church History, Volume VI, 1945. Pp. 213. \$3.00.

Miss Levy's study of the sermons of the early Puritan preachers is very important for the light it sheds on Puritan faith and life during those first years in New England which were so important for the shaping of patterns of life not only for that region, but for the country as a whole. The very earliest of these preachers came of course from England, where not a few of them had given up positions of considerable distinction for the sake of conviction. They, like all of their religious point of view, put a good deal of stress on conversion, but they were, on the whole, men who had enjoyed a good education and who valued education. Miss Levy points out that they had been trained in scholastic dialectic as modified by Ramus with his emphasis on dichotomies, his analytical methods, and his utilitarian criteria. And though much of their reasoning may strike the non-Puritan as circular, they laid great stress on logic as the tool with which to wrest truth from Scripture.

Taken as a group, they seem less pre-occupied with hell-fire than is generally assumed, but they were much more insistent on religious orthodoxy as the foundation of all order in Church and State than is



always realized at present. In their resistance to toleration in New England, they were by no means unaware of the fact that they were denying to others what they had claimed for themselves; but they were convinced that truth had been established in America, and that those who differed from them were guilty of not acknowledging the truth when they saw it. All these early preachers believed that the welfare of the people rested upon the strength of the Church, since to be a free man in the community a man had to be a Church member.

Under such circumstances Church attendance obviously flourished, but it had its penalty, as the preachers were quite aware. They worried without cease over the spiritual degeneration of their times, and they fought toleration on the ground that it would further the religious corruption of New England. Miss Levy defines this position with a good deal of fairness and balance.

And she makes a very good literary analysis of the style of their preaching. Like Puritan preaching of the time in England, it was controlled by the ideals of plainness and simplicity. It was designed to be understood by the simplest in the congregation. It rigorously eschewed "humane testimonies," but preachers often drew upon history and historical writers, and even, on occasion, on the classical writers whom they had all studied in university days. Three of these preachers—Hooker, perhaps the most original, Cotton the most revered, and Shepard the mystic and the best loved—produced works of real distinction.

Miss Levy has written a very substantial and judicious study, of value not only to the student of American civilization, but to anyone who is interested in the not always too well understood interrelations of religious ideals and contemporary circumstance.

HELEN C. WHITE

*University of Wisconsin*

*Edward Eggleston. Author of the Hoosier School-Master.* By WILLIAM PEIRCE RANDEL. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. Pp. xi + 313. \$3.50.

Edward Eggleston has deserved a sound biographical and critical study, and now in William Peirce Randel's *Edward Eggleston* at last he has it. Further monographs there may well be on Eggleston's intellectual and religious background, on his literary associations and influences, or on his editorial and clerical career; but such investigations are not likely to alter the outlines and conclusions of Mr. Randel's substantially documented and judiciously proportioned treatment. Indeed, this "American biography," as it is subtitled, is likely to remain the standard life of the Hoosier novelist. Mr. Randel has had access to and has made comprehensive use of the large collections of manuscript material, especially of the Eggleston Papers, deposited at Cornell University, consisting of the originals of most of the Eggleston novels and many of the stories, articles, and sermons, of historical notes, journals, scrapbooks, and thousands of the letters. In addition,



numerous letters and miscellaneous papers scattered throughout a score of libraries across the country have been skillfully woven into the substance of the biography. Nearly a third of the volume is given over to notes and bibliography, which includes a listing of not only the locations of Eggleston's manuscripts, but also all books, pamphlets, and periodical contributions by Eggleston between 1859 and 1904.

Mr. Randel's study is of value to anyone who seeks to understand the literary scene in America in the latter half of the nineteenth century. When Hamlin Garland, in speaking to certain Midwestern writers in 1908, remarked that Eggleston was the "father of us all," he suggested that a biography of Eggleston might illuminate the temper and career of an entire group. If Mr. Randel had chosen to accept the thesis of Mr. Van Wyck Brooks, he might have described the Hoosier's back-trailing from the middle border as the ordeal of Edward Eggleston. Instead, he has chosen to interpret Eggleston's career as an "intellectual Odyssey" (p. x). Yet one frequently must think of Garland or of Twain as he reads of Eggleston's escape from the West, of his liberation into a culture in which he often moved with awkward discontent, of his struggle with a narrow moralism impressed upon him by his early reading, by his circuit-riding, or by his association with religious journals. In showing how completely and often how literally Eggleston's experiences on the frontier were transferred to his stories, Mr. Randel provides additional data on the development of realistic fiction in America. In recounting Eggleston's continuous disapproval of Whitman and the critical reception of Eggleston's various books, he adds interesting material on the history of American taste. In showing Eggleston at the Authors Club in the 1880's and 1890's, he affords a sad reminder of the ebb of American letters in those days.

*Edward Eggleston* is biographical rather than critical in emphasis; its author therefore prefers to allow the exhibited record of Eggleston's career to establish the place of the Hoosier novelist in American literature. From time to time, however, Mr. Randel ventures an appraisal of Eggleston's literary stature—an appraisal which is as happily free from condescension as it is from puffing. Nor does he hesitate, on the basis of passages in the manuscripts, to offer cautious assumptions regarding Eggleston's motives and moods and attitudes. Mr. Randel's real contribution, however, lies in his filling in with rich detail, from an abundance of fresh sources, the already well-known outlines of Eggleston's typically American career—from circuit-rider to president of the American Historical Association.

BENJAMIN T. SPENCER

*Ohio Wesleyan University*

*The Centennial Edition of the Works of Sidney Lanier.* General editor, CHARLES R. ANDERSON. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1945. 10 volumes. \$30.00.

As a memorial to Sidney Lanier this centenary edition is an example of what needs doing for many other American men of letters. It includes almost all the material necessary for any conceivable study of Lanier. The text is authoritative; all the variants are given; the publication of Lanier's outlines, notes, and correspondence provides the foreground material, while the several introductions and the bibliography suggest the background. Of course some of the material is trivial, but no editor can presume to know where the potentially useful ends and the absolutely insignificant begins. It is always possible that some ingenious scholar will find meaning in some random notation about the making of small beer.

That the first-rate work of Lanier consists of a few poems is amply demonstrated by his complete works, but the rest of his writings have value in the light of that fact. Moreover, they reveal much about the life of Lanier and more about literary and other cultural conditions in the ante-bellum South. Above all, this complete publication of all the Lanier material proves that Lanier's so-called thinness is a product of his circumstances. Lanier had a good range of interests and absorbed eagerly all the intellectual provender accessible to him, but only a small fraction of his time and energy was free to be focused on poetic creation. Even his sentimentalism is not personal weakness as much as it is a mannerism of his time and place. This edition shows that when Lanier had a fair chance he could distinguish between flashy but thin writers and those of substance.

Lanier made a mistake in devoting so much of his most careful thought to a study of the relationship of music to verse. Important as the problem is, it was not the main issue for Lanier. His major problem was to enrich his intellectual resources, for in that lay the difference between his potential as a major poet or a minor one. What began so promisingly in his awakening to Emerson and Whitman was not allowed to mature. Therein lies the tragedy of Lanier.

E. HAROLD EBY

*University of Washington*

## BOOKS RECEIVED

### AMERICAN

- Gibson, William M. and George Arms. *A Bibliography of William Dean Howells*. New York: New York Public Library, 1948. Pp. 182.
- Gloster, Hugh M. *Negro Voices in American Fiction*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948. Pp. xiv + 295. \$3.50.
- James, Henry. *The Portrait of a Lady*. With an Introduction by Graham Greene. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, The World's Classics 509, 1947. Pp. xxix + 645. \$2.45.
- Resnick, Nathan. *Walt Whitman and the Authorship of The Good Gray Poet*. Brooklyn, New York: Long Island University Press, 1948. Pp. 38. \$1.75.

### ENGLISH

- Baker, Carlos. *Shelley's Major Poetry: The Fabric of a Vision*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 307. \$5.00.
- Bradner, Leicester. *Edmund Spenser and the Faerie Queene*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. xi + 190. \$2.75.
- Brown, E. K. *Matthew Arnold: A Study in Conflict*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. xiii + 224. \$3.00.
- Clapp, Sarah Lewis Carol (editor). *Jacob Tonson in Ten Letters by and about Him*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1948. Pp. 32.
- Damon, S. Foster. *William Blake: His Philosophy and Symbols*. New York: Peter Smith, 1947. Pp. xiv + 487. \$12.50.
- De Selincourt, E. and Helen Darbishire (editors). *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1947. Pp. xvi + 490. \$7.50.
- Lacey, Norman. *Wordsworth's View of Nature and Its Ethical Consequences*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 128. \$2.00. Agents for U.S.A., Canada, and India: Macmillan.
- Lee, Donald Woodward. *Functional Change in Early English*. A dissertation. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1948. Pp. ix + 128. \$2.50.
- Meredith, George. *The Egoist: A Comedy in Narrative*. With an Introduction by Lord Dunsany. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, The World's Classics 508, 1947. Pp. xiii + 547. \$2.45.
- Nagel, Lorine White (translator). *Five Essays Written in French by Emily Jane Brontë*. With an Introduction and Notes by Fannie E. Ratchford. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1948. Pp. 19.
- Pratt, Willis W. *Byron at Southwell: The Making of a Poet*. With New Poems and Letters from the Rare Books Collections of The University of Texas. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1948. Pp. xi + 145. \$3.50.

- Rickert, Edith (compiler). *Chaucer's World*. Edited by Clair C. Olson and Martin M. Crow. Illustrations by Margaret Rickert. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. Pp. xxi + 456. \$6.75.
- Schmitz, Robert Morell. Hugh Blair. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. Pp. xii + 162. \$2.75.
- Spoerri, James Fuller (compiler). *Catalog of a Collection of The Works of James Joyce, Exhibited at The Newberry Library, March 1 to March 26, 1948*. Chicago, February, 1948. Pp. 143. For private distribution.
- Taylor, Archer. *The Literary Riddle before 1600*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1948. Pp. 131. \$2.75.
- Trollope, Anthony. *The Last Chronicle of Barset*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, *The World's Classics* 398, 1946. Two volumes in one. Pp. 460, 452. \$2.45.
- Warren, Austin. *Rage for Order: Essays in Criticism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 165. \$3.00.

## FRENCH

- Peyre, Henri. *Les Générations Littéraires*. Paris: Boivin et C<sup>o</sup>, Editions Contemporaines, 1948. Pp. 266.

## GERMAN

- Boesch, Bruno (editor). *Aus Frühmittelhochdeutscher Dichtung: Ein Lesebuch. Altdeutsche Übungstexte, herausgegeben von der akademischen Gesellschaft schweizerischer Germanisten. Band 8*. Bern: A. Francke, 1948. Pp. 71. s.fr. 3.50.
- DeVries, Louis (editor). *A Contemporary German Science Reader*. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948. Pp. xi + 258. \$3.50.
- Flandreau, Audrey. *Ricarda Huch's Weltanschauung as Expressed in Her Philosophical Works and in Her Novels. A dissertation*. Chicago, Illinois, 1948. Pp. 212.
- Friedrich, Werner P., with the collaboration of Philip A. Shelley and Oskar Seidlin. *An Outline-History of German Literature*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1948. Pp. vi + 326. \$1.50.
- Gugler, Ilse. *Das Problem der fragmentarischen Dichtung in der englischen Romantik*. Bern: A. Francke, *Schweizer Anglistische Arbeiten*, 1944. Band 15. Pp. 89. s.fr. 6.—.
- Hablützel, Margrit Elisabeth. *Die Bildwelt Thomas Deloneys: Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis von Zeitgeist und Gattungsgeschichte der englischen Renaissance*. Bern: A. Francke, *Schweizer Anglistische Arbeiten*, 1946. Band 16. Pp. 119. s.fr. 8.—.
- Kafka, Franz. *Gesammelte Schriften. Herausgegeben von Max Brod*. New York: Schocken Books, 1946. Band 1: *Erzählungen und Kleine Prosa*. Pp. 287. Band 2: *Amerika. Roman*. Pp. 315. Band 3: *Der Prozess. Roman*. Pp. 287. Band 4: *Das Schloss. Roman*. Pp. 429. Band 5: *Beschreibung eines Kampfes*. Pp. 336. \$3.00 each volume.
- Pfeffer, J. Alan. *The Proverb in Goethe*. New York: King's Crown Press, *Columbia University Germanic Studies No. 18*, 1948. Pp. 200. \$3.50.

- Ranke, Friedrich (editor). *Das Nibelungenlied. Altdeutsche Übungstexte*, herausgegeben von der akademischen Gesellschaft schweizerischer Germanisten. Band 9. Bern: A. Francke, 1948. Pp. 80. s.fr. 3.50.
- Rilke, Rainer Maria. *Fifty Selected Poems with English Translations* by C. F. MacIntyre. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947. Pp. ix + 151. \$3.50.
- Rilke, Rainer Maria. *The Life of the Virgin Mary. Translated with an Introduction and Notes* by C. F. MacIntyre. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947. Pp. x + 55. \$2.50.
- Schirmer, Walter F. *Der Einfluß der deutschen Literatur auf die englische im 19. Jahrhundert*. Halle-Saale: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1947. Pp. ix + 165. 7.— Rm.
- Werfel, Franz. *Der Abituriententag*. Edited with Introduction, Notes, and Vocabulary by Gustave O. Arlt. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948. Pp. vi + 249. \$2.50.

## ITALIAN

- Shewring, Walter. *Italian Prose Usage: A Supplement to Italian Grammars*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1948. Pp. vi + 90. \$1.50. Agents for U.S.A., Canada, and India: Macmillan.

## SPANISH

- Morley, S. Griswold (translator). *The Interludes of Cervantes*. Translated from the Spanish with a Preface and Notes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. x + 223. \$3.00.

## SPANISH-AMERICAN\*

- Wilcock, J. R. *Persecución de las Musas Menores*. Buenos Aires: La Imprenta López, 1945. Pp. 79.

## GENERAL

- Diringer, David. *The Alphabet: A Key to the History of Mankind*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. 607. \$12.00.
- Hardie, D. W. F. *A Handbook of Modern Breton (Armorican)*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 241. 10/6.
- Jelinek, James J. *Experience through Literature*. New York: Exposition Press, 1948. Pp. 40. \$2.00.
- Newmark, Maxim (editor). *Twentieth Century Modern Language Teaching: Sources and Readings*. With an Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. Pp. xxii + 723. \$7.50.
- Ortega y Gasset, José. *The Dehumanization of Art and Notes on the Novel*. Translated by Helene Weyl. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. 103. \$2.00.

\* Books received which treat nonliterary aspects of Spanish America will be found listed, and in many cases reviewed, in the *Revista Iberoamericana*.







ANNOUNCING

## COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

*A New Journal, to be published by the University of Oregon,  
at Eugene, Oregon—with the Coöperation of the Comparative  
Literature Section of the Modern Language Association*

---

Based on the premise that literature, like any other art, recognizes no limitations of language, nationality, or race, but is the heritage of all peoples, COMPARATIVE LITERATURE proposes to offer a forum for those scholars and critics who are engaged in the study of literature from an international point of view. It is planned to make this journal a literary periodical which will be primarily concerned with the analysis and evaluation of literature and the methods of literary study called forth by the consideration of periods, genres, authors, and problems, whether of ancient, medieval, or modern times. Thus it is hoped that the critical and creative scholarship of America will be directed toward the investigation of aesthetic and philosophical values of literature as a living institution. While preferring English as the medium of expression, the new journal will also welcome articles written in German and the Romance languages.

### EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor: Chandler B. Beall (Oregon)

Associate Editor: Werner R. Friederich (North Carolina)

Austin Warren (Iowa)

René Wellek (Yale)

Victor Lange (Cornell)

Harry Levin (Harvard)

Helmut Hatzfeld (Catholic University)

---

Manuscripts and editorial communications may be addressed to: COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

The journal will appear quarterly, beginning early in 1949. The subscription rate will be \$3.50 per year. Correspondence concerning subscriptions or exchanges should be addressed to: University of Oregon Publications, Eugene, Oregon.

## Why Should You Read SOUTHWEST REVIEW?

Perhaps here is the answer quoted from the Sunday book page of the *Dallas News*:

"Anyone who wishes to understand the currents of thought that are affecting the life of the Southwest, and the many interests of this young and exuberant region, could scarcely do better than to give the *Southwest Review* a careful and thorough reading. In the babel of tongues rising from a Southwest confused by the very luxuriance of its new growth, the *Review* is a clear and challenging voice."

Today SOUTHWEST REVIEW has more paid subscribers than ever before. Try it yourself — for a year at \$2.00 — for three years at \$5.00.

*Mail Your Order to:*

### SOUTHWEST REVIEW

Southern Methodist University

Dallas 5, Texas

To the Readers of the *Modern Language Quarterly*  
who appreciate good literature

## Prairie Schooner

*Literary Quarterly of the University of Nebraska Press*

offers interesting fare. Our magazine, kept on a constantly high literary level and edited with an eye to readers' entertainment, has made friends and won loyal supporters all over the United States. Why not complement your pleasure in reading the *Modern Language Quarterly* by subscribing to the

### PRAIRIE SCHOONER

\$1.50 a Year

45c a Copy

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS

Administration Building 209

Lincoln 8, Nebraska

